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Abstract 
 
Using the theoretical approach of discursive psychology, this thesis examines the 
interactive uses of mental state talk, in particular the term ‘want’, in everyday 
family interaction. In mainstream cognitive psychology mental state terms are 
examined as words which signify internal referents. How individuals come to 
competently participate in social interaction is formulated as a problem of how 
individual, isolated minds come to understand the contents of other minds. This 
thesis challenges these individualistic notions and examines notions of ‘wanting’ 
as interactionally managed participants’ concerns.  
 
The data are taken from two sources; a set of video recordings taken from a 
series of ‘fly-on-the-wall’ documentary programmes which each focus on a 
particular family and videotapes of mealtimes recorded by three families. 
Recordings were initially transcribed verbatim and sections related to the 
emerging themes within the thesis were subsequently transcribed using the 
Jefferson notation system. These transcripts were then analysed, alongside 
repeated viewings of the video recordings. The thesis considers a range of 
analytic themes, which are interlinked via one of the primary research questions, 
which has been to examine how, and to what end, speakers routinely deploy 
notions of ‘wanting’ in everyday talk-in-interaction. A major theme has been to 
highlight inherent problems with work in social cognition which uses experimental 
tasks to examine children’s Theory of Mind and understanding of ‘desires’. I 
argue that the assumptions of this work are a gross simplification of the meaning 
‘wanting’ for both children and adults. A further theme has been to examine the 
sequential organisation of directives and requests in both adults’ and children’s 
talk. Finally, I examine speakers’ practices for rejecting a proposal regarding their 
actions and for denying a formulation of their motivations by a co-interactant.  
 
The conclusions of the thesis show that expressions of wanting are practical 
expressions which work within a flow of interactional and deontic considerations 
and that making claims regarding one’s own or others’ wants is entirely a social 
matter. I argue that rather than being examined for what they may reveal about 
‘the mind’, mental state terms may be fruitfully examined as interactional matters.  
 
Key words: ‘discursive psychology’ ‘conversation analysis’ ‘family’ ‘interaction’ 
‘requests’ ‘mental states’ ‘accounts’ 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis is an examination of the interactive uses of the mental state term 
‘want’ in everyday family interaction. It is not my intention to examine the family 
per se. Neither am I interested in language as a system of words and 
meanings. I have approached the thesis first and foremost as a discursive 
psychologist. My concern is with how basic social psychological matters are 
played out as individuals co-ordinate their activities during the course of 
everyday interaction (see Potter, 2010a). I consider talk as part of social 
practices and examine the practical uses of the term ‘want’ as an intelligible 
practice of accountability (Edwards & Potter, 2005). My argument is that rather 
than simply expressing a private, internal experience of desire, any 
conversational deployment of the notion of ‘wanting’ is a means of performing 
some kind of action within a conversational sequence. Hence, one cannot 
separate what it means to ‘want’ something from discourse and talk-in-
interaction.  
 
Conversation analysis (henceforth CA) is a broadly non-cognitivist approach to 
discourse while discursive psychology (henceforth DP) is a theoretical 
approach towards psychology which represents a major alternative to scientific 
epistemology. As such, the thesis has major implications for work in 
contemporary cognitive psychology, in particular Theory of Mind. However one 
characteristic of conversation analytic research is the concept of ‘unmotivated 
looking’. Rather than approaching analysis with an agenda, such as to develop 
a ‘critical discursive psychology of desire’ I found in the data that which was of 
interest. By drawing on conversation analytic work which has examined the 
structural organisation of talk-in-interaction and general themes highlighted by 
previous discursive psychological work, I set out to examine the practical uses 
of the term ‘want’. My interest in Theory of Mind emerged part way through the 
 2 
project as the analysis evolved. I found in my materials that notions of wanting 
are interactionally managed participants’ concerns. As a theory which is 
concerned with children’s uses of mental state terms as a window into the 
developing mind, it seemed fitting to explore the implications of my analysis for 
Theory of Mind.  
 
I use two sources of data; television documentary data and videotapes made 
during mealtimes by three families. The analysis draws heavily on conversation 
analytic techniques and is based on the analysis of detailed transcripts of the 
data. The focus of the thesis is how, in which environments, and to what end, 
speakers routinely deploy notions of ‘wanting’ in everyday talk-in-interaction.  
 
This chapter will introduce the research topic by briefly outlining work in Theory 
of Mind as I discuss key themes and aims of the thesis. This chapter will 
provide only a brief overview and introduction as I discuss cognitive 
psychological work on emotions and mental states in detail in chapter 2. The 
chapter concludes with an overview of the thesis and the chapters to follow.  
 
Aims of the research  
 
How individuals come to competently participate in social interaction is of 
perennial interest in psychology. This is reflected in the large body of work in 
developmental psychology which documents the processes by which children 
come to understand others. The development of children’s interactional 
competencies is typically studied under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which is 
concerned with how individual, isolated minds come to understand the contents 
of other minds (an ability which is commonly referred to as ‘mind reading’). As 
Baker, Saxe and Tenenbaum note; “human social interaction depends on our 
ability to understand and predict other people’s actions in terms of the 
psychological states that produce behaviour: chiefly, beliefs and desires” 
(2009, p. 329). It is only within the last decade that language based research, 
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for example work in contemporary CA, has begun to show that the phenomena 
which the theory claims to explain is in fact acquired through language. Thus 
far this body of work has primarily focussed on showing that particular 
individuals, such as young children and those with diagnoses of autism and 
schizophrenia, demonstrate abilities that the Theory of Mind model predicts 
that they should not. While this work is important, it has thus far engaged with 
Theory of Mind on its own terms. As an oppositional body of work, the 
objectives and rationale of this research have largely been determined and 
defined by the main assumptions and theories of Theory of Mind. One of the 
aims of the thesis is to extend this body of work and to show that what it means 
to ‘want’ something is part and parcel of interaction. This brings us to a second 
aspect of research interest, which is to extend work in DP. I examine how 
notions of ‘wanting’ are deployed in the service of performing specific social 
actions in specific sequential environments; how these notions are used, where 
they are deployed, and to what end. This is of relevance to discursive 
psychologists, academic psychology and ordinary individuals alike as 
formulating one’s own or others’ ‘wants’ is a common activity in conversation. 
The thesis offers a technical, empirically grounded account of these practices.  
 
Another interest is to extend work in CA which has examined the structural 
organisation of talk-in-interaction, in particular the body of work which has 
examined the sequential design of requests and directives (Craven & Potter, 
2010; Curl & Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lee, 2011; Lindström, 2005) and 
the structural organisation of accounts (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Ford, 2002, 
Robinson & Bolden, 2010) as I examine the practices of formulating ‘wants’ in 
the service of performing these particular conversational activities.  
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Overview of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
This chapter places the thesis in context and surveys the literature on several 
topics. The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin by introducing two areas 
of cognitive research which are pertinent to the analysis, which are Theory of 
Mind and mainstream cognitive approaches to emotion. I then introduce social 
constructionist, discursive and conversation analytic approaches to cognition 
and emotion. In part two I discuss work in CA which has examined the 
structural organisation of talk. This work is important as it informs the analysis 
in each of the empirical chapters. Finally, in part three I outline the theoretical 
approach of DP. I discuss key influences, which are ethnomethodology, CA 
and the sociology of scientific knowledge, and outline their relevance to the 
thesis.  
 
Chapter 3: Method  
 
Having introduced the theoretical approach of DP in chapter 2, this chapter is a 
brief look at method which discusses the methodological procedures and 
practicalities of the thesis. The chapter is divided into two sections; part 1 
begins by introducing the dataset. In part 2 I outline the practical steps involved 
in collecting, transcribing and analysing the materials.  
 
Chapter 4: Want as an interactional resource 
 
Chapter 4 is the first analytic chapter. I begin at a basic level and explicate 
what is meant by examining formulations of wants as an interactional resource. 
The chapter begins by introducing experimental tasks which are used in the 
Theory of Mind framework to examine children’s understandings of desires, 
and discusses the assumptions embodied in this work. As the analysis begins I 
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highlight some inherent problems and issues with this work as I consider how 
notions of ‘wanting’ are deployed and oriented to in everyday talk. Specifically, 
I show how these experimental tests are based on an assumption that 
individuals ordinarily act in ways which are consistent with the fulfilment of their 
‘wants’. I show how ‘wants’ are routinely invoked and deployed in the service of 
interactions involving obligations and constraints. My argument then, is that the 
assumptions embedded in tasks are a departure from, and gross simplification 
of, the meaning of ‘wanting’ for both children and adults. The chapter then 
moves on to begin examine the kinds of conversational activities in which 
notions of ‘wanting’ are routinely deployed.  
 
Chapter 5: Children’s wants  
 
In the second analytic chapter I build on the analysis in chapter 4 and will 
examine in further detail the specific sequential environments in which young 
children build requests using ‘I want’. Rather than understanding children’s 
uses of the word ‘want’ as simply an expression of a desire, a window into the 
developing mind, I show how young children select ‘I want’ to build requests in 
particular environments where the notion of ‘wanting’ is deployed to manage 
particular considerations.  
 
Chapter 6: Directing and requesting  
 
This chapter extends the analysis in chapter 5 by examining adult speakers’ 
uses of ‘want’ and ‘need’ to build directives and requests. Similarly to the 
analysis of children’s requests, here we will see that adult speakers use ‘I want’ 
to deliver directives and ‘I need’ to build requests in specific, recurrent 
environments to manage a range of contingencies and considerations. Rather 
than using ‘I want’ to communicate an internal experience of desire or using ‘I 
need’ to request a particular class of items (those which are necessary for 
some function) we see that notions of wanting and needing are resources 
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which have practical uses in their normative sequential environments. 
‘Wanting’ and ‘needing’ then, become discursive matters which are constructed 
and deployed in interaction.  
 
Chapter 7: “I’m not X, I just want Y” 
 
The focus here is on speakers’ uses of a two-part structure ‘I don’t want/I’m not 
X, I just want Y’ which adult speakers use to reject a formulation of their 
motivations or a proposal regarding their future actions in the first turn 
construction unit (TCU), and subsequently formulate an alternative sense of 
agency in the second TCU. The important point here is that speakers may 
construct an intention or motivation in interaction to attend to considerations 
which are alive in the current interactional sequence.  
 
Chapter 8: Discussion  
 
This chapter is the concluding discussion. Here I discuss key themes and 
arguments of each chapter as I summarise my findings and discuss the 
contribution of the thesis to developmental psychology, sociology, interaction 
analysis and systems family therapy. 
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2 
 
Literature review 
 
We take it for granted that the problem of other minds does not reflect 
something timeless and transcultural about the human condition, but is 
instead a problem which makes sense in specific historical conditions 
and in its current form is partly of psychologists’ own doing. In 
psychology, it does not usually arise as a formally stated philosophical 
problem but is instead inscribed in theories, methods of investigation 
and in the language of psychology itself—in this respect it is a 
historical problem and should be treated as such. (Leudar & Costall, 
2004, p. 603).  
 
This introductory quote from Leudar and Costall raises important issues 
concerning whether mental states and emotion are individual, posing the 
problem of how we come to understand ‘other minds’, or whether, as will be 
argued throughout the thesis, these are displayed in everyday talk-in-
interaction with understandings of others acquired in language. This chapter is 
organised into three main parts and will discuss the literature on several topics. 
The first of these, section 1.1, is an examination of the literature on Theory of 
Mind which is a dominant framework in the field of social cognition for 
explaining interpersonal interaction. Following this, in section 1.2, I briefly 
introduce mainstream approaches to emotion. I then discuss social 
constructionist, discursive and conversation analytic approaches to cognition 
and emotion in section 1.3. In part 2 I discuss the literature on several topics in 
order to locate each of the empirical chapters to follow. I begin in section 2.1 by 
discussing work in the new sociology of childhood, in particular work within CA 
which examines children’s talk-in-interaction. I then introduce sociolinguistic 
work on request formats and from this work I discuss conversation analytic 
work which has examined the sequential design of requests and directives. 
The chapter then moves on, in section 2.4, to discuss ‘intentions’ in 
psychological research and from this examines motivations and accounts for 
conduct in philosophy, sociology and discursive studies. In section 3 I discuss 
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DP in further detail as I outline the theoretical influences of ethnomethodology, 
CA and the sociology of scientific knowledge. In section 3.5 I discuss the 
approach of epistemological constructionism adopted within the thesis. Finally, 
in section 3.6, I review work that may be described as anti-cognitivist and 
which has developed a sustained critique of research on Theory of Mind.  
 
Part 1: Mind and emotion 
 
1.1 Theory of Mind in contemporary cognitive psychology  
 
The development of children’s understanding has been a topic of perennial 
interest in developmental psychology. For over three decades, Theory of Mind, 
defined as a basic human competence to impute mental states to others, to 
recognise that others may have desires, beliefs and intentions that differ from 
one’s own and to use knowledge of others’ mental states to explain and predict 
their behaviour, has been one of the fastest growing areas in psychology, 
generating thousands of research articles. The central premise of the theory is 
that to engage in everyday life one must understand that actions and behaviour 
are motivated by internal thoughts and feelings and be able to appreciate what 
these thoughts and feelings are. Individuals must be able to predict and explain 
the actions of others with reference to their mental states such as desires, 
beliefs and intentions. This is often referred to as the ability to ‘read minds’ (see 
Baron-Cohen, 1995) and is proposed to be necessary for normal social 
functioning.  
 
The term ‘Theory of Mind’ was coined by Premack in his work on in 
intentionality in chimpanzees as he investigated chimpanzees’ ability to infer 
intentions and mental states such as the knowledge and beliefs of someone 
struggling to solve a problem (Premack, 1976; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In 
1986 the movement began to gain momentum as two seminal conferences 
took place; the International Conference on Developing Theories of Mind at the 
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University of Toronto, and the Workshop on Children’s Early Concept of Mind 
at the University of Oxford. The work presented at these two conferences was 
subsequently published in Developing Theories of Mind (Astington, Harris & 
Olson 1988), which marked the official launch of the movement. The phrase 
‘Theory of Mind’ reflects the theoretical position that children construct theories 
or explanatory systems of others’ behaviour using processes which are similar 
to scientific theory formation. Premack and Woodruff argue that “a system of 
inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are 
not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about 
the behaviour of others” (1978, p. 515).  
 
Research in the area expanded as scholars in developmental psychology 
introduced the false belief test, which is designed to assess whether individuals 
understand that others may have beliefs about the world which are false. One 
of the most important milestones in Theory of Mind development is the ability to 
attribute false belief to others. This is widely believed to reflect an 
understanding of the subjective and representational nature of mental states; 
one recognises that others may have thoughts, feelings and beliefs which are 
different from one’s own and that others can have beliefs about the world which 
are false. As such, the false belief test is commonly viewed as the litmus test of 
Theory of Mind.  
 
Although infants’ understandings of mental states and the acquisition of a 
Theory of Mind continues to be vigorously researched the nature of ‘Theory of 
Mind’ remains contested and unclear (Wellman, 2010). At present there is 
vigorous debate concerning the processes by which individuals develop the 
ability to understand others’ mental states. There is consensus that this is an 
innate ability in humans, however the age at which this develops and whether 
this is best characterised as a developing theory or a cognitive module (Scholl 
& Leslie, 1999) is a topic of intense discussion.  
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According to modular theories “humans have specialized, inherited ‘hardware’ 
for dealing with the complex social world” (Baron-Cohen, 2006, p. 867) and 
Theory of Mind is accounted for by a neuro-cognitive module, or a ‘Theory of 
Mind mechanism’ (Leslie, 1987, 1992) which ‘comes online’ in late infancy as 
children appear to rapidly develop understandings of other persons (Scholl & 
Leslie, 1999). This module “allows the brain to attend to invisible mental states” 
(Leslie, 1992, p. 20) and according to this theory understanding of all mental 
attitudes, desires, emotions and beliefs, should ‘come online’ together (for an 
alternative view, see Scholl & Leslie, 1999). It is notable that the metaphor of 
‘coming online’ assumes the existence of an innate Theory of Mind module 
which is simply waiting to be activated. Clearly then, the ability to partake in 
social interaction is placed firmly within the biology of the individual.  
 
A competing view is the ‘Theory-Theory’, according to which children form a 
theory based on their own experience. Changes in children’s understanding, 
which are thought of as theory changes, occur as children modify their theories 
in light of evidence which is incompatible with their current framework of 
understanding (Gopnik, 2003; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). A key theory change 
is the shift from understanding people in terms of a simple desire psychology 
(Wellman & Woolley, 1989) to understanding them in terms of their thoughts 
and beliefs. As Wellman (2010) notes, the resolution of the issue of how infants 
acquire understandings of others, specifically whether this develops in stages 
or ‘comes online’ at a particular time, has been a central issue in the field as 
this would clarify some of the theoretical debate.  
 
In a seminal article Wellman and Woolley (1989) suggested that before the age 
of four, children typically operate with a ‘simple desire psychology’ as they 
understand others in terms of their desires before developing an understanding 
of belief. It is proposed that when operating with a fully developed Theory of 
Mind we explain others’ behaviour by utilising a belief-desire framework. That 
is, we understand that others act as they desire something and believe that 
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they can satisfy this desire. “Desires motivate behaviours but beliefs frame 
them” (Wellman & Woolley, 1989, p. 246). Wellman and Woolley describe the 
‘simple desire psychology’ with which young children operate as “one resting 
essentially on a conception of internal states directed toward obtainment of 
objects in the world- and in this way quite different from a belief-desire 
psychology which rests centrally if not wholly on a conception of internal 
cognitive states representing truths about the world” (p. 250).  
 
In the empirical literature there are two main types of methods used to 
investigate children’s understandings of mental states. A large body of 
research has utilised tests of false belief understanding, such as the classic 
false belief task. Second, researchers have adopted observational methods in 
order to examine the role of social interaction in children’s developing 
understandings. I now consider each of these in turn.   
 
1.2 The false belief test  
 
One of the most important milestones in Theory of Mind development is the 
ability to attribute false belief, which is believed to reflect an understanding that 
others can have thoughts and beliefs about the world which are wrong and 
which differ from one’s own. As Hutto (2009) notes, the false belief test 
provides psychologists with a portable experimental paradigm which can be 
applied on various different populations with subtle variations and as such “it 
provides a wealth of data that is generally accepted in the psychological 
community as providing a robust indication of the presence (or otherwise) of a 
cognitive competency” (Hutto, 2009, p. 204). Theory of Mind is often equated 
with false belief understanding as the false belief task quickly became the 
litmus test for attributing Theory of Mind (Hughes, Leece & Wilson, 2007) and 
is now a classic method in the study of development.  
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The original test was developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983) and was 
modified by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) to be simple enough to 
administer to children with autism. It involves a child being able to distinguish a 
puppet’s false belief from their own true belief. A typical finding is that children 
under the age of four years are much less likely to make this distinction and 
attribute a false belief to the puppet, and this has prompted scholars to deduce 
that an important developmental shift, the shift to a representational Theory of 
Mind, occurs at about four years of age (e.g. Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Gopnik, 
1993; Williams & Happe, 2010). Task failure is interpreted as a deficit in the 
ability to reason about the beliefs and mental lives of others– the child lacks a 
Theory of Mind, while task success evidences the ability to reason about the 
behavioural consequences of holding a false belief. During the typical task the 
child is given information which the puppet (or other story character/person) 
does not have access to. The child is then asked a series of questions about 
what the puppet will do or say, which are designed to elicit an understanding of 
the puppet’s beliefs. During the questioning phase differences in children’s 
responses are interpreted by experimenters in terms of whether they ‘have’ a 
representational Theory of Mind or not. A Theory of Mind deficit is implicated in 
explanations of symptoms typically seen in autism and schizophrenia. 
Consequently the false belief test has become a major tool for research in 
clinical settings (e.g. Couture, et al., 2010; Herold et al., 2009).  
 
As noted above, whether children under the age of four understand others in 
terms of a simple desire psychology is a long standing debate which has 
generated intense research interest. Consequently researchers have 
developed a battery of tests which are methodologically comparable to the 
false belief task that assess children’s understandings of intentions, emotions, 
knowledge and other states (Wellman & Liu, 2004). A typical ‘desire 
psychology’ task is designed to assess whether children can use knowledge of 
others’ desires to predict their behaviour (e.g. Cassidy et al., 2005a). In the 
typical laboratory set-up participants are presented with vignettes in which they 
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are either explicitly told the desires of a character, or where they are required 
to infer the character’s desires based on their experiences detailed in the story. 
Typically a discrepancy between the desires of the participant and the desires 
of the character is created. Children are then asked to predict the character’s 
actions and emotional reactions to a particular situation. Consider a typical 
vignette;  
 
Let’s look at these four things to do (eat candy, take nap, clean room, 
brush your hair). Show me the one that you like to do best, the one that 
you REALLY, REALLY like to do (Child chooses eat candy). Now point 
to the one that you hate to do, the one that you don’t like to do (Child 
chooses clean room). OK. So you REALLY like this one (eat candy) 
and you REALLY don’t like this one (clean room). Now I am going to 
read you a story and ask you some questions. This is Brendan. There 
are lots of things to do at Brendan’s house. Brendan loves to clean his 
room. Brendan loves to sing the clean-up song and he loves to put 
everything where it belongs. Brendan hates eating candy. Brandon 
thinks that candy is too sweet and he does not like to get his hand 
sticky. Brendan’s mom asks Brendan what he would like to do today.  
 
Test Question: Will Brendan choose to clean his room or eat candy?  
 
Participant Preference Question: Which thing do you like to do best? 
Which thing do you really hate to do the most?’ (Cassidy et al., 2005a, 
p. 453) 
 
In this paradigm a ‘correct’ answer is that Brendan will choose to clean his 
room. An ‘incorrect’ answer, that Brendan will choose to eat candy, is 
understood to reflect an inability to appreciate that others can have desires 
which differ from one’s own. That is, that the child answers egocentrically and 
predicts that Brendan will act in accordance with the participants’, rather than 
his own desires.  
 
Although the false belief task is understood as the litmus test for Theory of 
Mind its efficacy and appropriateness have been questioned, with some critics 
maintaining that the test should be abandoned altogether (Bloom & German, 
2000). It has been argued that tests are inherently difficult and hence require 
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“abilities other than Theory of Mind” (Bloom & German, 2000, p. B25).  To 
solve the task using the vignette above the child must be able to follow 
Brendan’s actions, remember that Brendan likes to clean his room and does 
not like to eat candy and appreciate the meaning of the test question. The 
typical set-up has also been criticised as it makes assumptions about how 
children operate. Terwogt and Rieff (2003) argue that when adults fail to make 
a ‘correct’ prediction this is assumed to be because the adult must have 
reasonably questioned the validity of the desire statement, as “nobody doubts 
adults’ theory of mind abilities” (p. 71). However they argue that “even young 
children might have reasons for accepting or questioning the desire statement” 
(p. 71). They note that both adults and young children may use generalised 
beliefs about desirability as a basis for their predictions. That is, a child may 
question that Brendan truly desires to clean his room, rather than eat candy. 
Incorrect answers then, may not reflect an inability to appreciate the subjective 
nature of desires. Clément, Bernard and Kauffman (2011) show that young 
children who fail the typical false belief task are able to infer rules from social 
situations and to use this information to predict protagonists’ behaviour. They 
argue that deontic reasoning, which is less cognitively demanding than 
‘mentalising’ may sufficiently explain children’s predictions of others’ behaviour.   
 
It has also been noted that there is variation in the specific age at which 
individuals are able to succeed at tasks (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). For 
example Hughes et al. (2005) found marked individual differences in Theory of 
Mind performance in pairs of twins at age 5. Consequently, while early 
research focused on milestones in children’s developing Theory of Mind, 
throughout the 2000s there was increasing interest in individual differences in 
task performance (Ensor & Hughes, 2008) and the social factors which may 
contribute to these individual differences. Further, as early as the 1980s 
researchers documented the uses of terms which reflect internal experiences 
such as ‘tired’, ‘watch’ and ‘see’ by children as young as 28 months (Bretherton 
& Beeghly, 1982; Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). This, along with critiques of 
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the narrow definition of Theory of Mind proposed by the false belief task 
(Bloom & German, 2000) cast doubt on the efficacy of the test, prompting 
researchers to adopt observational methods to examine the role of language 
and social interaction in children’s developing social understanding.  
 
1.3 Language and Theory of Mind  
 
A number of researchers have reported correlations between aspects of 
socialisation history such as parent-child conversation (e.g. collections in a 
special issue of Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, Thompson, 2006), relationships with 
peers (Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Peterson & Siegal, 2002), and sibling status 
(Barr & Hayne, 2003; Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown & Perkins, 2005b) and false 
belief performance. Across these studies language has emerged as an 
important correlate (Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007) and it has been 
suggested that conversations about mental states, emotions and the causes of 
action influence the age at which children develop a representational Theory of 
Mind (Dunn & Brown, 1993; Ruffman et al., 2002).  
 
Milligan, Astington and Dack (2007) note that language can be operationalised 
in many different ways and across these studies “is measured from 
observations of naturalistic conversation, from standardized inventories, and 
from performance on language-ability tasks” (p. 623). Although there are 
various ways of measuring language ability, these researchers converge in 
their understanding of language as a methodological tool for the study of the 
mind (Budwig, 1999). Semantic development is thought to be a problem of 
reference as words are understood as signs which signify a referent. The 
child’s task is to establish word-referent links and to figure out which words 
map onto which referents (Montgomery, 2002). As Moissinac and Budwig note, 
“underpinning these studies is the idea that the child’s development of 
language provides the researcher a means to infer the cognitive development 
that either undergirds it or is concurrent with it” (2000, p. 1). For example, 
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according to Gopnik and Meltzoff’s (1986, 1987) cognitive specificity 
hypothesis there are close relations between particular linguistic and particular 
cognitive developments with particular words emerging in the vocabulary that 
are relevant to the acquisition of particular cognitive capabilities.  
 
As noted above, the proposition that children come to understand other 
people’s desires before they understand the concept of belief (Bartsch and 
Wellman, 1995; Wellman & Woolley, 1989) has been influential in Theory of 
Mind research. The centre-piece of this thesis is Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) 
seminal study of the conversations of children aged two to five. They propose 
that children are able to make genuine references to desire from the age of 
eighteen months and do so frequently from the age of two. In contrast they 
argue that children are not able to use terms such as ‘think’, ‘know’ and 
‘wonder’ to refer to genuine beliefs until shortly after their second birthday. This 
lag in the use of belief terms is cited as evidence that the child understands the 
concept of desire before they understand that of belief.  
 
In order to examine talk about desires Bartsch and Wellman developed a 
coding system which was designed to identify utterances with “a focus on 
desire rather than on a specific action” (p. 68). Idiomatic expressions such as 
‘wish upon a star’, those which are used “purely for social convention (“I don’t 
care” to make a polite denial)” (p. 67) and “mere repetition of someone else’s 
utterances (child repeats adult’s statement “I want one”)” (p. 67) were 
disregarded. Below are two examples of convincing references to genuine 
desires;  
 
Father: Mommy’ll read it to you 
Ross (02;10): I want you read my new books (p. 83) 
 
Adam (2;10): More milk.  
Adult: You don’t need milk.  
Adam: Why not? Want more milk in it.  
Adult: You take that in (you put the glass away) (p. 87) 
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These examples were coded by Bartsch and Wellman as ‘subject contrastive’ 
and ‘desire-outcome contrastive’ respectively and are cited as being 
particularly revealing about children’s understanding of desire states. 
Contrastive utterances, “those contrasting desire and outcomes, those 
contrasting desire with actions” (p. 77), Bartsch and Wellman argue, provide 
evidence of an understanding of the subjective nature of desires.  
 
Following the proposal of Bartsch and Wellman’s ‘simple desire psychology’ 
interest in the acquisition of desire terms began to increase (Moissinac & 
Budwig, 2000) as it is assumed that a desire-based Theory of Mind can be 
studied through the analysis of children’s uses of desire terms. In this literature 
the word ‘want’ is often treated as uniquely reflecting an private experience of 
desire (Montgomery, 2002). For example Ferres (2003) examined uses of the 
desire term ‘querer’ by speakers of Spanish and claimed that children begin by 
making references to their own, rather than others’ desires and that they do so 
from around the age of two. Their explanations of others behaviour “by means 
of this mental state” (p. 163) peaks around thirty-three months after which there 
is an apparent decrease. Ferres notes that these findings converge with those 
of Bartsch and Wellman (1995) who attribute this decline to the increase of the 
use of belief terms at this age. Moissinac and Budwig’s (2000) findings also 
converge with those of Bartsch and Wellman. They examined the terms 
‘moechte’ (would like), ‘wollen’ (want) and ‘brauchen’ (need) in German 
mother-child dyads. They found that over the course of the three months of the 
study children’s references to others’ desires increased. They interpret this as 
evidence of Shatz’s (1994) theory of children’s increasing socio-linguistic 
intelligence; “as the child participates in more linguistic interactions she 
increasingly realises that others have desires like her own and consequently 
makes more reference to them” (Moissinac & Budwig, 2000, p. 17).  
 
While researchers have recognised the role of language in the development of 
social understanding, there is much debate concerning the specific role of 
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language in predicting success at false belief tasks. For example some 
researchers, such as advocates of constructivism, argue that it is “within social 
interactions an understanding of mental states develops and is constituted” 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, p. 80, original emphasis). On the other hand, 
others suggest that the relations between false belief success and language 
measures simply reflects the fact that most false belief tasks are verbal tasks 
(Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007). For example, de Villiers argues that an 
understanding of syntax, specifically tensed complements, is a prerequisite of 
successful task performance (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; de Villiers, 2005).   
 
The research discussed in this section is concerned with how an innate ability 
to understand the minds of others, a prerequisite to successful participation in 
social interaction, develops. Language is understood as a variable which 
influences task performance (such as the approach advocated by de Villiers & 
Pyers, 2002; de Villiers, 2005)  or as a medium through which the mind 
develops and is constituted (such as the approach adopted by Carpendale, 
1997; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 2006). Language is understood as a 
methodological tool, as a window into the developing mind. These approaches 
converge in their understanding of an ability to ‘mentalise’ as essential to be 
able to manage everyday life and to interact with others. The thesis presents a 
radically different way of understanding participation in social interaction. As 
McCabe (2009) notes, theorising about putative mental states is not an 
accurate reflection of how individuals participate in social interaction, rather talk 
is designed so that communicative intentions are obvious. Rather than 
understanding ‘want’ as simple references to internal states I show that 
invocations of notions of wanting are resources in and for interaction which 
have practical uses in their normative sequential environments. This takes us 
away from the need to theorise about individual processes which allow 
individuals to read the minds of others and to consider instead what it means to 
‘want’ something as a human action in interaction.   
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For proponents of Theory of Mind, emotion understanding is achieved as 
children develop a Theory of Mind and learn to appreciate the subjective states 
of others. This view of emotions as individual entities which other people must 
learn to read and to ‘figure out’ is grounded in emotion research in cognitive 
psychology. The next section will discuss some of the principles, assumptions 
and findings of this work before moving on to discuss social constructionist and 
discursive studies of emotion and cognition.  
 
1.4 Mainstream approaches to emotion  
 
Emotion is a big topic for social scientific inquiry and popular culture alike as it 
appears to encapsulate the crux of what it means to be an individual. Goleman 
(1995, 1998, 2006) popularised the concept of ‘emotional intelligence’, which 
he defines as “the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of 
others, for motivating ourselves, for managing emotions well in ourselves and 
in our relationships” (1998, p. 317). His 1995 book was on the New York best 
seller list for a year and a half and has spawned thousands of research articles 
and popular books, with experts developing seminars and training workshops 
to help companies and individuals improve their emotional intelligence. While 
‘emotional intelligence’ is a relatively new concept which emerged in the early 
1990s  (Mayer, DiPaolo & Salovey, 1990; Mayer and Salovey, 1993; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990), the study of ‘emotions’ by philosophers and social scientists 
dates back to the time of Aristotle. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer 
a general review of psychological theories of emotion, so here I offer only a 
brief overview (for an overview of the history of emotion in psychology see 
Gergen, 2009; Stearns, 2008).  
 
Studies of emotion in the disciplines of psychology, sociology and philosophy 
can be broadly identified within two approaches; the essentialist and the social-
constructionist approaches. ‘Essentialism’ is a term that is not used by those 
who practice it, rather by those who oppose it, as references to ‘essentialism’ in 
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the literature tend to be derogatory (DeLamater & Hyde, 1998; Sayer, 1997). 
The term refers to research and theory which presupposes a biological basis 
and is exemplified by work in socio-biology, genetic research and evolutionary 
psychology. The emotions are understood as properties of persons which are 
natural and biologically determined and proponents argue that there are a set 
of universal emotions that are part of innate human physiology which are 
culturally refined (see e.g. collections in Röttger-Rössler & Jürgen, 2009). 
Similarly to studies of language in Theory of Mind, this view is grounded in a 
referential view of language which assumes that emotion words develop as 
names referring to private entities and that “emotional signals are an example 
of a communicative system that may constitute a psychological universal” 
(Sauter, Eisner, Ekman & Scott, 2010, p. 1).  
 
Ekman, who was influenced by Darwin’s work on the biology of emotions 
(1872) and Tomkins’ affect theory (1962) is a key figure in the field of emotion 
research. He carried out cross-cultural research on the Fore Tribesman of 
Papua New Guinea (1972) and noted that certain facial expressions of emotion 
appear to be universal. This observation led him to conclude that there are a 
set of separate, basic emotions that “differ in their appraisal, antecedent 
events, probable behavioral response, physiology and other characteristics” 
(Ekman, 1999, p. 45) . Each basic emotion is a ‘family’ of related states which 
share common, physiologically determined characteristics that are part of our 
evolution. The basic emotions argument was reproduced in the work of 
Lazarus (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1990), who drew on Arnold’s 
appraisal construct (1960). Within current academic psychology emotions are 
typically viewed as a highly organised system which serves important 
motivational and adaptive functions and appraisal theories developed to 
explain the elicitation of emotion, particularly individual differences in elicitation 
(Smith & Kirby, 2011). According to appraisal theories emotions are the result 
of the evaluation of a situation (appraisal) along with the cognitive reaction to 
face the situation (coping); “each emotion expresses a person’s appraisal of a 
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person-environment relationship involving a particular kind of harm or benefit” 
(Smith & Lazarus, 1991, p. 611). In this framework, “events do not have 
significance in of themselves, but only by virtue of their interpretation in the 
context of an individual’s beliefs, desires, intentions and abilities” (Gratch & 
Marsella, 2004, p. 273). According to appraisal theories then, emotions cannot 
take place without cognition or an appraisal of a situation, placing emotion 
firmly within the biology and cognition of the individual. Appraisal theories are 
now dominant in emotion research where individual experiences of emotion are 
placed prior to social factors. For example ‘culture’ is typically factored into 
analyses as an independent variable which affects the expression and 
interpretation of emotions (see e.g. collections in Röttger-Rössler & Jürgen, 
2009).  
 
During the 1970s the social constructionist movement gained momentum as 
several important developments raised problems for the ‘basic emotions’ 
approach. Social constructionist studies of emotions can be broadly grouped 
into three strands; historical, anthropological and discursive. Here I sketch out 
a brief overview of each of these, beginning with anthropological and historical 
studies which throughout the 1970s and 1980s raised questions regarding the 
universality and ahistoricality of emotions.  
 
In anthropology the work of three researchers, Michelle Rosaldo, Catherine 
Lutz and Clifford Geertz was influential in raising doubts concerning the 
existence of a universal set of basic emotions. In her fieldwork with the Ilgonot 
people in the Philippines Rosaldo (1982, 1983) observed that rather than 
thinking of language as tools to ‘express’ or to refer, the Ilognot people 
conceive of language in terms of action. Her work showed that emotions terms 
are cultural rather than universal and that emotions terms which we use to 
account for our activities “are at the same time “ideological” or “moral” notions” 
(1983, p. 135). Similarly, in her work with the Ifaluk people in the South Pacific 
Lutz challenges “the cultural assumptions found in Western thinking about the 
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emotions” (1988, p. 3) as she argues that uses of emotion terms are bound up 
with social structure and moral attributions rather than individual feelings. 
Finally, Geertz has written extensively on the construction of ‘the self’ and 
argues that;  
 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or 
less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre 
of awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organised into a 
distinctive whole and set contrastively against other wholes and 
against a natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to 
us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures. 
(1979, p. 229).  
 
For Geertz then, emotions are cultural artefacts which are bound up with the 
concept of the self in Western society. The work of these anthropologists 
documented the cultural specificity of emotion, challenging the basic emotions 
argument which theorises emotions as biologically determined, discrete states. 
It became apparent that the experience of emotion is not universal and that the 
understanding of emotions as discrete entities is particular to Western culture.  
 
A second problem for the basic emotions argument came from historical 
studies of emotion etymology which have shown that there are changes in the 
emotional repertoires of cultures throughout history. As Gergen notes; 
“Aristotle identified placability, confidence, benevolence, churlishness, 
resentment, emulation, longing, and enthusiasm as emotional states no less 
transparent than anger or joy. Yet, in their twentieth-century exegeses, neither 
Tomkins (1962) nor Izard (1977) recognizes these states as constituents of the 
emotional domain” (1996, p. 61, original emphasis). Harré (1986) notes that in 
the psychological literature of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance 
discussions of accidie, an emotion which was related to the religious sin sloth, 
were prominent. The term represented boredom and despondence with 
fulfilling one’s religious duty. While today we recognise idleness and 
procrastination, our emotions are now defined against a backdrop of the ethics 
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of a material production, rather than religious duty. In his historical analysis 
Wenzel (as cited in Edwards, 1997) shows that the decline and eventual 
extinction (Harré, 1986) of accidie is linked to social patterns and religious 
beliefs. “The essential issue is the dependence of the very existence of the 
emotional state on a moral order (duty to God fulfilled in spiritual exercises)” 
(Harré, 1986, p. 222). We can note that it is not simply the case that we 
experience the same emotions but learn to label them using different terms. 
Rather “emotions and the names we call them are intrinsically linked to social 
conditions, rights, and responsibilities, which change historically and across 
cultures” (Edwards, 1997, p. 180).  
 
Social constructionist and discursive approaches to emotion gained momentum 
throughout the 1980s in the context of cultural and historical analyses which 
challenged the basic emotions argument (see e.g. collections in Harré, 1986). 
For these researchers emotions are cultural products which acquire meaning 
within social structure and far from being discrete, innate entities, can only be 
experienced in the context of reciprocal social encounters. As Harré argues;  
 
There has been a tendency amongst both philosophers and 
psychologists to abstract an entity- call it ‘anger’, ‘love’, ‘grief’ or 
‘anxiety’- and try to study it. But what there is are angry people, 
upsetting scenes, sentimental episodes, grieving families and funerals, 
anxious parents pacing at midnight, and so on. There is a concrete 
world of contexts and activities. We reify and abstract from that 
concreteness at our peril. (1986; p. 4).  
 
One wide ranging and influential account of social constructionism is Kenneth 
Gergen and Jonathan Shotter’s relational perspective (Gergen, 1994, 2009; 
Shotter, 1993,1997). They relocate our ‘inner lives’ and emotions in the 
relational counters between people and argue that “meaning lies not within the 
private mind, but in the process of relating” (Gergen, 2009, p. 98). Emotion 
words are not to be understood as representations of private states but “as 
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actions within relationships, actions that gain their meaning through social 
collaboration” (ibid).  
 
Gergen (2009) notes that in contemporary Western society we are comfortable 
with the view of ourselves as individuals who think for ourselves, making 
conscious decisions, but that it is only for the last several hundred years that 
we in the West have had this idea. Gergen traces this notion back to Descartes 
as he proclaimed ‘“I think, therefore I am” during the 1600s; “it was only in the 
following century that people began to construct themselves as having 
‘feelings’” (2009, p. 82). Gergen argues that mental state discourses are 
performances and so that “it is useful to replace the image of ‘private feelings’ 
with public action” (p. 99) as what we describe as the mind or emotion only has 
meaning within relationships. As Shotter (1997) notes, rather than representing 
a new method or theory within contemporary psychology, their aim is to 
“change the subject” (Rorty, 1989, p. 44, as cited in Shotter, 1997). Shotter and 
Gergen are both strongly influenced by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as they 
argue that the mind and self are discursive formulations which emerge in the 
relational field of ‘joint action’.  
 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mind, published in 1953 as Philosophical 
Investigations, made several observations which exclude the possibility of a 
private language which develops as individuals label discrete, private, inner 
emotions. He observed that language functions according to shared norms of 
life and so it would be impossible to create a language which corresponds to 
one’s inner sensations as there would be no public criteria to determine 
whether a word had been used correctly. One of his famous thought 
experiments was the ‘beetle in a box’ which is as follows; 
 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. 
No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows 
what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.  Here it would be quite 
possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One 
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might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.  But suppose 
the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? If so it would 
not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place 
in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box 
might even be empty.- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the 
box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the 
grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and 
designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (1953, 
§293). 
 
For Wittgenstein then, words such as ‘want’, ‘think’, ‘angry’, and ‘happy’ cannot 
refer to private, discrete states as they require agreed upon, public criteria to 
determine their proper use. If mental states and emotions were private, the 
only way individuals can say they know what others mean is by examining their 
own states. This poses problems of indeterminacy, as there are indeterminate 
possibilities for what any one word may be referring to (Montgomery, 2005).  
 
1.5 Discursive studies of emotion and cognition 
 
The chapter moves on to give a brief overview of discursive and conversation 
analytic studies of emotion and cognition which are influenced by social 
constructionist thinking. The discipline of psychology has developed around the 
notion that studying what people do and how they communicate means 
studying the mental machinery by which individuals perceive, code and explain 
the world around them. The traditional research question is formulated as ‘what 
is the effect of X on Y?’. Emotions are understood as independent variables 
which influence behaviour, as reflected in the large body of literature which 
correlates emotional intelligence with success in the workplace and academic 
settings (e.g. Brackett, Rivers & Salovey, 2011; Cliffe, 2011). Discursive 
psychologists question this view, and have developed an alternative route to 
the understanding of human action that addresses ‘mind’ in a very different 
way to traditional psychological perspectives. ‘Emotions’ and ‘cognition’ are not 
approached from an analysts’ perspective, as dependent or independent 
variables used to explain human actions. Rather, the notion that mental state 
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and emotion expressions can be studied as concepts used and as matters 
oriented to in talk-in-interaction is a basic premise (Edwards, 2005).  
 
Discursive studies of ‘mind’ have examined various different aspects. Research 
has reworked a range of standard psychological topics such as memory 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Shaw & Kitzinger, 2007), 
attitudes and attributions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wiggins & Potter, 2003) 
and  ‘script’ knowledge (Edwards, 1994, 1995). A second strand of work has 
focussed on the ‘psychological thesaurus’ and how ‘psychological’ terminology 
(such as emotion and mental state terms) is described, invoked and put to use 
by people themselves in situ as part of the social actions performed in and 
through everyday talk. What psychologists have traditionally seen as personal, 
individualised notions, such as ‘emotions’ are now seen in terms of their 
location in broader social and interactional practices. For example, Locke 
(2001, 2003, 2004) examined the use of mental concepts such as ‘emotion’ in 
athletes’ accounts for sports performance. She shows how experiencing 
particular types of emotion, such as ‘nervousness’ is treated as normal and 
expectable in competitive sport. Emotion discourse can be related to notions of 
rationality or irrationality (Edwards, 1997, 1999). Locke shows that in their 
accounts, athletes were not only accountable for their emotions themselves but 
for their ability to control and cope with them. To soften this accountability, 
emotions such as ‘anxiety’ and ‘nervousness’ were constructed as ‘positive’ 
and as facilitative to performance. Rather than understanding emotions as pre-
existing, measurable variables which influence sport performance (e.g. 
Lazarus, 2000; Vast, Young & Thomas, 2010) Locke shows how emotion 
discourse “is part of a larger accounting structure” (2001, p. 87).  
 
Further work has examined the use of emotion and mental state terms in 
institutional settings such as relationship counselling (Edwards 1994, 1995) 
and legal discourse (Locke & Edwards, 2003; Edwards, 2006, 2008). Edwards 
(1994, 1995) shows how in the context of relationship counselling speakers 
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routinely construct events with regard to how routine or exceptional they are. 
For example describing someone as a ‘jealous person’ may be used to invoke 
and ascribe dispositional jealousy. In the institutional setting of relationship 
counselling one effect of this is to construct a partners’ behaviour as non-
normative, ascribing blame for marital difficulties. This may also undermine the 
jealous person’s account and protect the speaker from blame as it makes 
available the inference that “jealousy underlies not only his own unreasonable 
behaviour, but also his false accounts of her actions” (1995, p. 331,original 
emphasis). Locke and Edwards (2003) examine emotions and constructions of 
normativity in Bill Clinton’s discussions of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky 
under Grand Jury cross examination. They show how Clinton managed blame 
and accountability by depicting himself as rational and sensible in contrast to 
Lewinsky who was portrayed as irrational and emotional.  Clinton describes 
Lewinsky, for example, as getting ‘upset from time to time’. Locke and Edwards 
note that “it is implied that Lewinsky was perhaps prone to getting upset, such 
that any pursuit of the reasons for her getting upset, on any particular occasion, 
might look to reasons within her, and not only to local causes such as what (in 
this case) Clinton might have done or said to provoke her” (p. 20, original 
emphasis).  
 
A third strand of work examines how psychological themes are handled and 
managed without necessarily being overtly labelled and how descriptions of 
events and actions are organised in ways which invoke and manage 
traditionally ‘cognitive’ topics such as doubt, caring, belief and prejudice 
(Edwards, 2005; Patterson & Potter 2009; Potter & Hepburn, 2003). In this 
body of work  “psychological concepts such as prejudice, identity, memory or 
trust become something people do rather than something people have” (Willig, 
2001, p. 91). Edwards (2008) approaches intentionality as a practical feature of 
how events are reported. He examines speakers’ invocations of intentionality in 
mundane talk and the institutional setting of police interrogation. He shows 
how, in everyday talk, speakers ordinarily invoke an ‘intent’ to do something 
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(such as ‘I would like to X’) in circumstances when “the intended actions are in 
some way balked, unfulfilled, or a departure from expectation” (p. 117). In 
contrast to everyday talk, establishing the intentionality of an act (in legal terms 
mens rea) is an integral aspect of police interrogation. Edwards shows how 
officers may use resources such as beginning with generalised normative 
scenarios which retain crucial aspects of the crime in question before asking 
the suspect to consider the specific case in question. Suspects’ responses to 
questions regarding hypothesised scenarios provide the basis for officers to 
return to the specifics of what the suspect actually knew or understood at the 
time when they committed the crime. Edwards (2005) shows how, when 
making complaints, speakers manage their subjective investment in the 
compliant, their motivation for making the compliant and their disposition (or 
otherwise) to complain. For example, ‘whinging’ reflects a major indexical 
danger of complaining as this is an action that reflects the complainer 
themselves and is something which can be used to counter a complaint. 
Meanwhile, Patterson and Potter (2009) argue that ‘caring’ is a practical, 
conversationally unfolding accomplishment with a range of systematic 
elements rather than a psychological disposition held by an individual. They 
examine closing sections of telephone calls between a young adult with a 
learning disability staying in a residential placement and members of her family 
and show how speakers attend to the potentially interactionally troubling matter 
of closing the call in ways which construct a ‘caring’ stance to one another.  
 
In sum, discursive work has shown that the uses of ‘psychological’ categories, 
emotion and mental state terms “are clearly not simply a matter of referring to 
private mental states but, rather, are part of how actions and actors are made 
publicly accountable” (Locke & Edwards, 2003, p. 24). While DP’s disciplinary 
roots are within psychology and has developed as an alternative to cognitivism, 
conversation analysts have traditionally shown little concern with 
‘psychological’ topics such as the status of cognition and emotion. In recent 
years however there has been debate concerning the extent to which cognitive 
 29
concerns may enter into analysis. In the following section I provide an overview 
of work within CA which has begun to consider the potential for integration 
between conversational and cognitive approaches.  
 
1.6 Conversation and cognition  
 
There is no reason to look under the skull since nothing of interest is to 
be found there but brains. (Garfinkel, 1963, p. 190) 
 
DP developed as an alternative to mainstream contemporary psychology and 
as such has a strong anti-cognitivist flavour (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 2000) as it 
has reworked and respecified ‘psychology’ in discursive terms from the outset. 
On the other hand, CA’s disciplinary roots are within sociology. Partly facilitated 
by these disciplinary roots, from the outset CA has eschewed cognitivism 
(Potter, 2006).  In his first lecture Sacks advised that analysts “don’t worry 
about whether they are ‘thinking’. Just try to come to terms with how it is that 
the thing comes off” (1992, p. 11). As Potter (2006) notes, for the most part, 
conversation analysts have followed Sacks’ advice and have not worried about 
people’s ‘thinking’, rarely focussing on topics such as the status of cognition. 
CA researchers recognise that there may be possible reasons to avoid 
introducing cognitive notions as part of analysis. First, we cannot know from 
speakers’ talk and actions what they were ‘thinking’ as they spoke (Drew, 
2005). A central premise of CA is that analysis attends to observable properties 
of data which excludes the necessity to speculate about putative cognitive 
processes. Second, interactional work need not rely on claims regarding 
cognitive processes as research has shown that talk-in-interaction is 
systematically socially organised autonomously of any proposed dispositions or 
mental constructs (Drew, 2005; Wootton, 2006). As Drew (2005) notes “there is 
no necessary congruence between verbal conduct and a speakers’ cognitive 
state” (2005, p. 164). For these reasons, in the main conversation analytic work 
has developed and proceeded without the need to comment on ‘mental states’ 
or cognition.  
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Nonetheless, in recent years researchers in CA have begun to consider the 
status of cognition and the ways in which psychological matters enter into 
interaction (for a general overview of cognition and interaction research see 
Potter & te Molder, 2005; van Dijk, 2006). There are crucial differences in how 
cognition enters into the analysis within the fields of DP and CA as discursive-
psychology’s anti-cognitivist stance is not shared by all language researchers 
(Wooffitt, 2005). DP is firmly incompatible with contemporary cognitive 
psychology, as there is a fundamental argument regarding the status of 
cognition as the driving force behind human behaviour. As Potter notes, “DP 
has systematic metatheoretical, theoretical, analytic, and empirical grounds for 
being opposed to this when it is instantiated in experiments, when it appears in 
a wide range of ways of generating and analysing interviews, and when it is 
played out in perspectives such as interpretative phenomenological analysis or 
grounded theory” (2010b, p. 694). On the other hand researchers in CA have 
started to consider the integration of cognitive and conversational approaches.  
 
As the editor of a special issue of Discourse Studies on ‘Discourse, interaction 
and cognition’ van Dijk states that “the rift between ‘social’ or ‘interactional’ 
approaches on the one hand, and ‘cognitive’ approaches, on the other hand, 
has been a regrettable fact of academic research” (2006, p. 5) . The 
contributions to this special issue address the question of whether there is a 
fruitful way to combine the two. Schegloff (2006) questions the very idea that 
there are reservations as he cites past work in which he openly invites 
speculation from neuro-scientific and cognitive colleagues (Schegloff, 2005). 
He discusses the feature of ‘possibility’ in interaction, a central concept in CA. 
He proposes the discussion of “‘possible Xs’ as a suitable site for potentially 
fruitful interchange between conversation analysis and neuro/cognitive 
analysis” (p. 146). ‘Possibles’ involve speakers being able to entertain multiple 
understandings of utterances and Schegloff argues that any model of 
processing for interaction should incorporate ‘multiple passes’.  
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Drew (2005) claims to identify ‘cognitive moments’ or occasions on which the 
cognitive state of ‘confusion’ is interactionally expressed. For example he 
claims that repair initiation is “the expression of uncertainty and confusion” 
where “this cognitive state comes to the interactional surface” (pp. 175-176, 
original emphasis). Drew claims to reverse the dominant Cartesian view that 
mental states cause conduct as he claims to identify confusion which is 
generated as conversational norms break down; “Instead of regarding 
cognition as a determining action, we can view interaction as a source of 
cognition. It is in the course of interactional sequences, and speakers moves 
and actions within those sequences, that cognition may be shaped- and in this 
way interaction becomes a context for cognition” (p. 181).  
 
On the other hand, Potter (2006) cautions against “a potential drift into 
cognitivism” (p. 133) as he discusses the inherent difficulties involved in 
attempting to identify cognition though an analysis of talk. He argues that any 
approach that does so, such as the type of analysis advocated by Drew (2005), 
accepts and reifies a dualist picture “where cognitive states ‘can come to the 
interactional surface’ or remain ‘disguised” (Potter, 2006, p. 134). Such an 
approach is at odds with a DP analysis, which “treats the distinction between, 
say, what was thought and what was done as a way of talking” (ibid, emphasis 
added). Potter recommends a DP approach, where rather than attempting to 
determine the cognitive bases of talk, one focuses on the activities performed 
through invocations of cognitive notions.  This is the approach which will be 
adopted in the thesis.  
 
So far this review has focused on mainstream approaches to cognition and 
emotion to situate the thesis as developing an alternative understanding of the 
uses of mental states. I then moved on to discuss social constructionist and 
discursive approaches to cognition and emotion. In the second part of this 
review I will move on to discuss the literature which the following analytic 
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chapters will draw on. I begin by reviewing work in the new sociology of 
childhood which frames chapter 5 which focuses on children’s requests.  
 
Part 2: Intentions are not ‘hidden’: Participation in interaction  
 
2.0 Introduction: Research on the sequential organisation of requests  
 
The second part of this review is divided into two subsections. In the first 
subsection I outline previous research which is particularly pertinent to chapter 
5 and chapter 6, which focus on the selection of ‘I want’ and ‘I need’ to build 
directives and requests. I begin by outlining work in the sociology of childhood 
which advocates the detailed examination of children’s talk. Specifically I focus 
on work which has examines the “situated achievement of intersubjectivity” 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 4, original emphasis), specifically how mutual 
understandings are produced and displayed via children’s repair skills and 
request format selection. From this I briefly outline work in sociolinguistics 
which has examined speaker selection of request format in terms of situational 
variables. Finally I outline studies in CA that have examined the sequential 
organisation of requests in adult-adult talk. In the second subsection I discuss 
work on intentionality, motives and accounts for conduct. I first outline work 
which understands intentions as precursors to conduct. I then introduce the 
concept of motives within sociology. The second subsection concludes with a 
discussion of discursive studies of accounts.  
 
2.1 The sociology of childhood 
 
Piaget’s Stage Theory of Cognitive development has been a major influence on 
research in developmental psychology. Since the 1960s empirical work has 
largely followed the tradition that children pass through a series of stages of 
development on their way to adulthood. In this paradigm adulthood is typically 
defined as mature, rational and complete in contrast to childhood which is 
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characterised by deficiency and irrationality (Butler, 2008). This view is 
grounded in assumptions of children’s biological immaturity as a ‘fact’ of 
childhood, a view which is reinforced, for example, by longitudinal studies 
which collect impressive Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans which 
allow researchers to see the trajectories of paediatric brain development over 
time (see Giedd & Rapoport, 2010 for a recent review).  
 
The ‘new sociology of childhood’ emerged out of dissatisfaction with dominant 
explanations of children’s behaviours and has increasingly posed challenges to 
traditional developmental models. As the child’s world is typically viewed as an 
incomplete version of the more important adult world, studies of children’s life-
worlds have been neglected (Goodwin, 1997). Rather than being studied in 
their own right, children are treated as incomplete adults who are primarily 
examined to investigate the trajectory of development into adulthood. The new 
sociology of childhood adopts a ‘competence paradigm’ (Danby, 2002; Hutchby 
2005; Hutchby & Moran-Ellis,1998) and treats children as competent social 
agents in their own right, as individuals who actively construct and develop 
their own social and cultural worlds (e.g. Church, 2009; Corsaro, 2003; Mayall, 
2002). Rather than being defined “by what she is subsequently going to be” 
(Goodwin, 1997, p. 1, original emphasis) the child is examined for who she 
presently is.  
 
Studies of children’s social competence have been approached from a range of 
competing theoretical positions and brings together researchers from diverse 
disciplines such as sociology (Church, 2009; Wyness, 2006), anthropology 
(Montgomery, 2008), education (Corsaro, 2000) and feminist theory (Mayall, 
2002; Burman & Stacey, 2010). There is an emphasis on using inclusive, child-
centred methods to conduct research ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ children. These 
research agendas draw heavily on the methods of ethnography, using 
techniques such as interviews and participant observation to offer descriptive 
accounts of children’s lives. However as Butler notes, these ethnographic 
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methods tend “not to examine actual instances of children’s everyday lives” 
(2008, p. 3) and instead offer “information ‘about’ children’s everyday lives, 
rather than reveal the practices by which children themselves build and 
understand everyday life in the course of interacting with others” (ibid). For 
example, researchers are encouraged to consult with children during all 
phases of research to confront what has been referred to as the “ethical 
considerations and issues of power and control” (Ridge, 2003, p. 5), and 
typically use techniques such as interviews to explore issues which children 
themselves identify as meaningful (see e.g. Ridge, 2003). However as Hutchby 
argues, “other methodologies which focus closely on the organization of 
children’s verbal and non-verbal interactions can reveal a depth range of 
interactional competence that for long remained unremarked in the sociology of 
childhood” (2005, p. 67).  
 
2.1.1 Conversation analysis and children’s talk  
 
A growing body of work in CA has begun to examine children’s talk in everyday 
and institutional settings with the aim of gaining insight into “how children 
themselves understand participating in ‘talk-in-interaction’” (Forrester & 
Cherrington, 2009, p. 167) (see e.g. Butler, 2008, collections in Gardner & 
Forrester, 2010a; Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 2005). Rather than viewing language 
as a resource which offers information ‘about’ children, this work focuses on 
children’s competencies and ability to manage participation in social interaction 
(Hutchby, 2005). As Butler argues, “in order to fully recognize children’s 
competences there is a need to examine these competences in action, as they 
are used and demonstrated in the activities that constitute the doings of 
everyday life” (2008, p. 4). This necessitates an examination of talk “not as a 
means of gaining information about social organization and competencies, as 
in interviews, but as a medium for displaying those things in its own right” 
(Hutchby, 2005, p. 67). In the following subsection I discuss some of the 
ethnomethodological and conversation analytic studies that have considered 
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how children participate in talk-in-interaction. I focus on research that 
discusses the “situated achievement of intersubjectivity” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998, p. 4, original emphasis) and how mutual ‘understandings’ are produced, 
displayed and recognised between speakers during conversation (Gardner & 
Forrester, 2010b). I begin by examining studies of young children’s 
conversational repair skills. From this I review work that has focussed on the 
sequential organisation of children’s requests.  
 
2.1.2 Children’s repair skills 
 
A key sociological theme in ethnomethodology and CA is intersubjectivity, the 
question of how individuals share common understandings of one another and 
of the world. For conversation analysts, the basis of how shared 
‘understandings’ are achieved is to be found in the sequential organisation of 
everyday talk as “in interaction, participants seek to establish intersubjectivity 
and make explicit displays of their understanding of cultural and language 
phenomena through talk” (Gardner & Forrester, 2010b, p. ix). Researchers in 
child centred CA have emphasised the importance of intersubjectivity for early 
development (Hutchby & Moran-Ellis, 1998). As Gardner and Forrester note, 
“understanding the emergence of children’s communicative skills and abilities 
will be closely linked to whatever we take to be the essential attributes of 
engaging in intersubjective relations” (2010b, p. ix).  
 
Following Schegloff (1991,1992) researchers in CA acknowledge that repair, 
the organisation of practices that speakers in conversation use to deal with 
problems in speaking, hearing or understanding, is a primary mechanism by 
which intersubjectivity is managed and maintained during conversation. 
Through turns at talk speakers display their understanding of preceding talk 
and can display “what they take to be misunderstandings” (Schegloff, 1992, p. 
1300). As Schegloff notes, “the ordinary sequential organization of 
conversation thus provides for displays of mutual understanding and problems 
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therein- one running basis for the cultivation and grounding of intersubjectivity” 
(1992, p. 1300).  
 
Research has shown that from an early age children are able to initiate third 
position repair and to clarify their turns in the third position if they have not 
been understood by the recipients of their talk (Corrin, 2010; Filipi & Wales, 
2002; Laakso, 2010; Wootton, 1994). Laakso (2010) documented the 
emergence of self-repair in Finnish children aged between one and four. She 
shows how from the age of one, before a child can even speak, they are able 
to clarify their expression using gesture when misunderstood by a co-
interactant. By the age of five children develop repair practices which are 
similar to those used by adults speaking Finnish. At this age, children use 
particles such as ‘no I mean’ when initiating self-repair to indicate the 
cancelling of the cut-off utterance which is replaced with a new formulation. 
Corrin (2010) documents one child’s  understandings of ‘open-class’ repair 
initiators, such as ‘sorry?’ or ‘what’ which leave ‘open’ what is the repairable 
trouble that the speaker is having problems with (Drew, 1997). Corrin notes 
that these “may hold a particular developmental power for the language-
learning child” (p. 39). As open class repair initiators do not locate the source of 
trouble the child is invited to consider the adequacy of their preceding turn and 
to locate the source of trouble for themselves. As Corrin notes, this involves 
“skills such as working memory, turn-tracking and perspective-taking and ‘do’ a 
self-repair that in some way enables the turn to become a next increment of 
shared understanding” (pp. 39-40).  
 
2.1.3 Children’s requests 
 
A second focus of research is the sequential organisation of children’s 
requests. The examination of request format selection has revealed how 
children’s conduct is organised with reference to understandings reached 
earlier in the interactional sequence. Wootton (1981, 1997, 2005, 2006) made 
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recordings of his daughter Amy’s everyday activities between the ages of ten 
months and four years. He examines the design and sequential organisation of 
Amy’s requests and suggests that “from the age of two onwards her conduct 
displays a special sensitivity to a particular order of knowledge- sequential 
knowledge” (1997, p. 196). He shows, for example, how the design of requests 
is informed by understandings gleaned from the prior interaction such as 
whether or not a request is likely to be granted and whether or not what is 
being requested is a departure from the recipient’s projectable next action. He 
suggests that “it is through coming to take account of that which has gone 
before, through this order of sequential attentiveness, that the child’s actions 
come to be systematically aligned with, and to display recognition of, the 
interactional context within which she is operating” (ibid).  
 
Wootton (1981) compares two request formats that occur frequently during 
Amy’s fourth year, the declarative ‘I want X’ and the interrogative ‘can I X’. 
Wootton shows how, rather than being used interchangeably, the child orients 
to constraints on the use of these formats. As a yes/no interrogative ‘can I X’ 
formally solicit a yes/no response and so propose that either of these are a 
possibility. He shows how these formats function as straightforward requests 
which require either a granting or a rejection. On the other hand, declarative ‘I 
want X’ formats do not formally solicit a yes/no response. At the age of four this 
particular child builds requests using ‘I want X’ when there is some basis in the 
preceding interaction to suppose that the recipient will be unwilling to grant the 
request, for example to re-request following a rejection of an initial request. 
That is, these formats recurrently ask again for exactly that which the recipient 
has indicated they are unwilling to allow. Unlike their interrogative counterparts, 
declarative formats do not officially propose yes or no as response options and 
are co-implicated in objecting to the recipient’s position. 
 
Wootton (2006) describes the child’s understandings and sequential 
knowledge as local, public and moral. These understandings are ‘local’ in that 
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they are tied up with recent events and the specific details of the interaction. 
They are ‘public’ and organised with reference to understandings overtly 
achieved in the preceding interaction. They are moral in that they are tied up 
with entitlement as the child demonstrates her understandings of how the 
sequence should unfold. Wootton’s analyses of request differentiation in young 
children has led him to note that “well before the age of two years nine months 
the child can organize her conduct in relation to alignments taken up in the 
preceding interaction, alignments that can touch on such things as people’s 
wishes, desires, plans and preferences” (2006, p. 194). However rather than 
making claims regarding what the child is thinking or which psychological 
mechanisms are involved, he shows “on a case by case basis, the kinds of 
attribution which are associated with different kinds of turn design, in different 
sequential positions” (2006, p. 192).  
 
Wootton’s work on the organisation of children’s requests is part of a broader 
programme of work in CA which has examined speaker selection of request 
format. I now move on to discuss this work, beginning with an overview of 
classic work in sociolinguistics which situates request differentiation in 
situational variables such as to whom requests are directed.  
 
2.1.4 Traditional work on requests 
 
That requests and directives can be built using a variety of syntactic forms has 
been long documented within anthropology, sociolinguistics and philosophy. In 
one of the most influential studies of requests and directives Ervin-Tripp 
proposed the following typology;  
 
• Need statements, such as ‘I need a match’.  
• Imperatives, such as ‘Gimme a match’ and elliptical forms like ‘a 
match’  
• Embedded imperatives, such as ‘Could you gimme a match?’ In 
these cases, agent, action, object, and often beneficiary are as explicit 
as in direct imperatives, though they are embedded in a frame with other 
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syntactic and semantic properties.  
• Permission directives, such as ‘May I have match?’ Bringing about 
the condition stated requires an action by the hearing other than merely 
granting permission.  
• Question directives, such as ‘Gotta match?’ which do not specify the 
desired act.  
• Hints, such as ‘The matches are all gone’ (1976, p. 29).  
 
There is an inexact relationship between grammar and action, for example it 
was noted by linguists that ‘indirect speech acts’, such as requests (do you 
know the time?) have a literal meaning (I ask you whether you know the time) 
and an indirect meaning (I ask you to tell me the time) (Clark, 1979). Hence a 
central question for philosophers and linguists has been how the intent of a 
speaker is conveyed when “it is possible for the speaker to say one thing and 
mean that but also to mean something else” (Searle, 1975 p. 60).  
 
Austin was amongst the first to develop speech act theory in How to do Things 
With Words (1962). He challenged the idea that to say something is always to 
simply state something, in a propositional sense. Austin proposed that there 
are a class of verbs, which he called performatives, and classes of utterances 
‘performative utterances’ which “looks like a statement” (Austin, 1965, p. 137) 
but which “if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is 
doing something rather than merely saying something” (ibid, original 
emphasis). Similarly, in a series of influential philosophical arguments, Grice 
(1957, 1968, 1982) contended the notion that sentences and words can be 
analysed in terms of what speakers mean. Rather, speakers meaning should 
be understood in terms of speakers having particular intentions. He noted that 
utterances may include not just verbalisation but gesture, grunts and groans 
which signal meaning and that what a particular speaker means by a sign on a 
particular occasion may diverge from the standard meaning of the sign.  
 
Searle later revised some of the ideas of Grice and Austin as he developed the 
idea of ‘indirect speech acts’ (1975), where sentence meaning and utterance 
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meaning come apart and a speaker can mean more than he says. According to 
Searle understanding of such utterances is achieved by combining knowledge 
of three elements to support a chain of reference. These elements are the 
felicity conditions of direct speech acts, the context of the utterance and 
principles of conversational cooperation. Searle’s work on indirect speech acts 
was important as it highlighted that the intent of any verb or utterance cannot 
be determined by lexical analysis, but must be understood as operating within 
a particular context.  
 
Throughout the 1970s there was a great deal of discussion within linguistics of 
philosophical ideas regarding the organisation of conversation. Grice’s ideas 
concerning meaning were particularly influential, which was reflected in 
attempts to develop models of how listeners understand and plan responses to 
utterances (Clark & Clark, 1977; Clark, 1979; Gordon & Lakoff, 1975). For 
example Gordon and Lakoff’s conversational postulates (1975) are rules which 
are put into place whenever a recipient is encouraged by conversational 
principles to search for an indirect meaning. An example of this is a yes/no 
question such as ‘can you close the door?’ which elicits a response (the 
recipient closes the door) rather than a literal answer. Drawing on Gordon and 
Lakoff’s ideas, Clark and Clark proposed that when computing indirect 
meaning the following four steps are involved:  
• Step 1: Compute the direct meaning of the utterance.  
• Step 2: Decide if this is what was intended. Are there sufficient and 
plausible reasons for the speaker to have intended to convey this 
meaning and this meaning alone, in this context?  
• Step 3: If not, compute the indirect meaning by way of the 
cooperative principle and the conventions on speech acts.  
• Step 4: Utilize the utterance on the basis of its indirect meaning. 
(1977, p. 126) 
During the 1970s and 1980s work by anthropologists and sociolinguists shifted 
the focus of the study of language from the processes involved in computing 
meaning to its social context and the circumstances in which utterances are 
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produced. Researchers examined a variety of social parameters related to 
request differentiation. The most widely studied parameter of context is that of 
to whom requests are directed, as it was proposed that even young children 
adjust their speech as they address different listeners (Ervin-Tripp, 1974). In 
this body of work the different syntactic formats are thought to reflect differing 
degrees of politeness and requests tend to have been organised along a 
spectrum according to how direct they are (Curl & Drew, 2008), with politeness 
thought to be “the chief motivation for indirectness” (Searle, 1975, p. 64). It was 
suggested that polite request forms are more likely to be addressed to a 
recipient whose age or profession places them in a superior role. For example 
James (1978) notes that when issuing ‘commands’ 4-5 year old children are 
more likely to use a polite format when addressing an adult rather than a peer 
or a younger child. These findings were corroborated by Ervin-Tripp who 
proposed that elaborate, polite request forms first appear when overtly required 
by adult addressees and it is only later that they are deployed as “rhetorical 
devices in wheedling from other children” (1978, p. 186).  
  
Gordon and Ervin-Tripp note that the implication of this sociolinguistic work 
was that the child operates with “what might be called the ‘checklist’ model of 
speech” (1984, p. 310) where an utterance is selected from a list according to 
current social and situational variables. However such an approach “attributes 
no power of inference or construction to the child” (Gordon & Ervin-Tripp, 1984, 
p. 311). Rather, the request “is hardly more than a ritual incantation that is 
produced according to a simple formula” (ibid). At the same time Gordon and 
Ervin-Tripp showed that request format is influenced by a wide range of 
variables such as whether others are oriented to the speaker’s concerns and 
whether or not granting is expectable. The recognition of the role of these less 
measurable factors highlighted the need to develop approaches which could 
account for variation in request forms, as tracking the relevance for the child of 
social and situational variables on each specific occasion raised issues which 
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the speech act and sociolinguistic traditions are not equipped to deal with 
(Wootton, 2005).  
  
Within CA the study of requests and directives is not dependent on prior 
judgements of politeness or authority. Rather, the criteria governing speakers’ 
selection of one format over another is accounted for in terms of the 
relationship between turn design and local sequential context. Before turning to 
the request literature, I first outline the current literature in the sequential 
organisation of interaction which has informed this work, particularly adjacency 
pair sequences or ‘nextness’ (Schegloff, 2007).  
 
2.1.5 Sequence organisation: adjacency pairs 
 
It is noticeable that within everyday conversation many classes of utterances 
conventionally come in pairs. For example greetings make return greetings 
relevant; requests granting/rejection; invitations acceptance/declination, and so 
on. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) developed an account of what they termed 
‘adjacency pairs’, pairs of utterances which are ordered and compose pair 
types. First parts of a pair make relevant a particular second part, or range of 
second parts. We recognise, for example, that if an interlocutor invites one to 
the cinema, we respond with an acceptance/declination rather than a greeting 
(such as ‘hello’). An invitation is the first part of the ‘invitation-response’ 
adjacency pair. The concept of ‘adjacency pair’ embodies one of the 
constraints which First Pairs Parts (hereafter FPPs) place on their Second Pair 
Parts (hereafter SPPs). That is, the type of action launched by a FPP makes 
relevant a limited range of responses (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 
1984; Raymond, 2003; Robinson, 2004; Schegloff, 1968).   
  
Another aspect of adjacency pair sequences is that certain FPPs make 
relevant alternative, asymmetrical responses which embody different 
alignments towards the action implemented in the first pair part, which is 
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referred to as the organisation of preference/dispreference. For example, if 
invited to the cinema, an acceptance, rather than a declination is preferred. 
Agreement is preferred over disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984). Requests may 
be granted or rejected. Each of these embody different alignments to the 
request or invitation and research has shown that acceptances and grantings 
are produced in systematically different ways than their negative alternatives. 
The format for acceptances, grantings and so on is labelled as ‘preferred’ while 
declinations, rejections and so on are labelled ‘dispreferred’  (Pomerantz, 
1984). In addition to action-type preference the grammatical design of an FPP 
may convey the speaker’s predisposition to a particular type of response 
(Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1972). Interrogatives framed with 
negative polarity (Horn, 1989), such as ‘cant you’ and ‘shouldn’t you’ and so 
on, anticipate or prefer a ‘no’ (Heinemann, 2006; Heritage, 2002). A third type 
of constraint on appropriate SPPs is also imposed by a FPP’s grammatical 
form (Raymond, 2003), such as when a ‘wh’ type interrogative can make 
relevant the formulation of a person, place or time. Yes/no interrogatives exert 
greater constraints as they reduce the relevant response to a choice between 
‘yes’ and ‘no’. In summary, research has shown that FPPs place constraints 
upon SPPs in three primary ways; 1) the action made relevant by an FPP; 2) 
the preference for one type of SPP over another; 3) the ways in which an 
FPP’s grammatical form constrains recipients’ next turn. Within CA an 
understanding of the constraints which constructions place on recipients’ next 
turn has informed work into the selection of different request forms.  
 
Curl and Drew (2008) examine the construction of requests in a corpus of 
ordinary telephone calls between family and friends and out-of-hours calls to 
the doctor. They identified a distributional difference in requests made with 
modal verbs such as ‘could you’ and requests prefaced by ‘I wonder if’. Modal 
requests occurred most frequently in calls between family and friends, while 
those prefaced by ‘I wonder if’ were common in out-of-hour calls to the doctor. 
Rather than referring to intimate versus institutional talk as sociolinguistic 
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contexts to explain this distributional variation, they offer an analysis of different 
types of request based on the entitlement displayed to make the request and 
orientations to the contingencies which may be involved in the recipient 
granting the request. They show that modal forms display more entitlement to 
make a request than those prefaced by ‘I wonder if’. In using modal forms 
speakers “orient to and claim the reasonableness of their request as grounds 
for expecting its granting” (p. 145) and display evidence of their entitlement to 
have the request granted. In contrast an ‘I wonder if’ preface “is a way to 
display one’s lack of entitlement to having a request granted or one’s 
awareness of the contingencies surrounding the granting of a request” (p. 141). 
That is, rather than displaying entitlement to make a request or presuming that 
it will be granted speakers simply wonder whether such a thing can be done, 
showing that they are not making any presumptions about whether a particular 
course of action is the appropriate one.  
 
Displays of entitlement were also found to play a pivotal role in request format 
selection in studies of how care recipients request assistance from home help 
assistants (Heinemann, 2006; Lindström, 2005). Focussing on Danish 
interactions between elderly care recipients and their home help assistants 
Heinemann (2006) compares positive interrogative structures such as ‘can you 
pass the salt?’ and negative interrogative structures such as ‘couldn’t you pass 
the salt?’ and shows that “with a positive interrogative request, the care 
recipient orients to her request as one which she is not entitled to make” (p. 
1081). In contrast, through the use of a negative interrogative request the care 
recipient “orients to her request as one which she is entitled to make” (p. 1081). 
Positive interrogatives project a ‘yes’ response and in terms of 
granting/rejection prefer granting (Lindström, 2005). Heinemann found that 
these requests are built in ways which show the care recipient’s orientation to 
the request as a dispreferred activity and anticipate the possibility that the 
recipient may reject the request. In contrast negative interrogatives such as 
‘can’t you’ are typically not oriented to as dispreferred. These requests tend to 
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be built with no mitigating features and are treated as something which should 
routinely be granted. Although both positive and negative forms accomplish 
requesting, requests which are positively formatted differ dramatically from 
those which are negatively framed. In terms of preference, although both 
formats are designed to prefer compliance, positive formats allow for the 
possibility that the request may be rejected and project compliance less so 
than their negative counterparts.  
  
Landqvist (2005) examines the sequential organisation of advice-giving in calls 
to a Poison Information Center. Landqvist notes that the advice given to call 
takers takes the form of a deferred action request (Lindstróm, 1999) as the 
advice given to callers is to be carried out once the call has ended. Hence the 
advice giver has no way of monitoring whether a recipient will carry out the 
projected action, and is unable to force an unwilling recipient to do so. 
Landqvist shows how call takers increase the likelihood of compliance “by 
walking a tightrope between, on the one hand, displaying knowledge and 
exerting authority and, on the other, maintaining friendly (or at least civil) 
relations with the caller” (2005, p. 207). She shows how advice which requires 
the caller to carry out time-consuming measures, such as visiting the hospital, 
are typically immediately supported by an account for the advice. On the other 
hand, advice-givers use stronger formulations, such as imperatives, when the 
risk of poisoning is greater and the caller is told to carry out an action which 
may involve inconvenience.  
 
Craven and Potter (2010) examine the nature and design of directives as 
distinct from requests. Drawing on Curl and Drew’s analysis of entitlement and 
contingency in types of request they note that directives, typically delivered 
using an imperative format, are built as a telling rather than an asking. They 
show how “in directives, performing the stated action is not treated as 
contingent on the capacity or desires of the recipient. At the same time, the 
lack of attention to issues of capacity and desire (by not embodying these 
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issues in a modal request form) builds a strong display of the speaker’s 
entitlement to direct the recipient’s actions” (p. 19).  
 
In this section I have examined literature within philosophy and sociolinguistics 
which has traditionally examined request differentiation as based on situational 
variables. From this I discussed work in CA which has analysed the sequential 
organisation of requests and directives. This work is particularly pertinent to the 
analyses in chapter 5 ‘Children’s Wants’ and chapter 6 ‘Directing and 
Requesting’ as the analysis in these chapters extends this body of work.  
 
2.2. From intentions to accounts  
 
This review now moves on to discuss work on intentionality, motives and 
accounts for conduct. These are important themes throughout the thesis but 
are particularly pertinent for the analysis in chapter 7 which examines 
invocations of notions of wanting as an account when delivering a refutation or 
a rejection. This section begins by discussing work on intentions and 
motivations as precursors to conduct. From this I discuss the concept of 
motives, or ‘motive-talk’ (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976) in sociology. Finally I review 
work in CA and DP which has examined the sequential organisation of 
accounts.  
 
2.2.1 The individual view: Intentions 
 
‘Intentionality’ is both a technical term of philosophy and a familiar, everyday 
concept. If you are thinking about your local veterinary surgery and taking your 
cat there, your mind, your thinking is directed toward your local veterinary 
surgery, your cat. Intentionality then, is a consciousness ‘about’ or ‘of’ 
something. The term was originally introduced by the philosopher Franz 
Brentano and was meant to distinguish a range of mental states such as 
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‘thinking’ and ‘knowing’ from the object or event in the world which these 
mental states may be ‘about’.  
 
‘Intentions’ have been examined empirically in contemporary cognitive 
psychology as a mental state, or a variable, which causes actions and 
behaviour. Understanding the intentions of others, or recognising others as 
“agents undertaking intentional action based on our underlying beliefs and 
desires” (Wellman, 2010, p. 2) is understood as essential for one to manage 
ordinary life as “human social and cognitive life bereft of such knowledge 
seems virtually unimaginable” (Flavell, 2000, p. 15). Infants’ understanding of 
intentional action has been the focus of intense research (see Sodian, 2011; 
Wellman, 2010 for recent reviews) as it is suggested that the ability to 
understand others as intentional agents marks the child’s first step towards 
attaining a Theory of Mind (Tomasello, 1999). The attribution and 
understanding of others’ intentions has become a major focus of research in 
clinical settings, particularly with individuals with diagnoses of schizophrenia. 
According to Frith’s unitary theory of schizophrenia (Frith,1992; Frith & 
Corcoran, 1996) problems in monitoring one’s own intentions to act causes 
symptoms typically experienced in schizophrenia such as thought insertion, 
delusions of control and auditory hallucinations (see Corcoran, 2000, 2001). 
According to this theory, being unable to recognise one’s own actions as a 
result of one’s own intentions may lead one to experience their actions as 
being under alien control. On the other hand, the inability to infer others’ 
intentions to act may cause symptoms such as delusions of persecution and of 
reference.  
 
These research paradigms endorse and embody the view of individual, isolated 
minds which are faced with the task of ‘figuring out’ the contents of other 
minds. The processes involved in individuals being able to read the minds of 
others becomes a problem to be solved by proposing theories, by identifying 
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mechanisms and structures which bridge the gap between one mind and 
another.  
 
As Astington notes;  
 
Social interaction is really an interaction of minds, of mental states, but 
we have to communicate those states to others. We have to let the 
other person know we want something, or that we want them to believe 
something, and so on. Human beings are not mind readers, not in any 
telepathic sense anyway, and in order to know what is in another 
persons mind we have to give that information to one another…. You 
have your thoughts, your beliefs, desires and so on, and I have mine. 
We share them in language, in the talk that passes between us. (1994, 
pp. 45-47).  
 
Just how thoughts, beliefs and intentions are shared and how this process of 
telementation (Harris, 1981) works becomes an almost impossible problem. 
According to this view of intentions and of language, once individuals have 
successfully understood the contents of others’ minds, this understanding is 
then used to construct explanations of others’ behaviour. This understanding of 
pre-existing intentional states which motivate, drive and can be used to explain 
behaviour, embodies commonsense ideas about meaning and action 
(Heritage, 1990).  
 
This view of meaning and action has its roots in folk-psychology as researchers 
in cognitive and social psychology have adopted and extended folk-
psychological explanations of action by proposing cognitive models to predict 
actions based on factors such as attitudes, intentions and social norms (Azjen, 
1988; Azjen & Fishbein, 1975). For example, according to Azjen and Fishbein’s 
(1975) Theory of Reasoned Action a person’s behaviour is predicted by 
individuals’ behavioural intention, which is a function of individuals’ attitude 
about the behaviour as well as subjective norms surrounding the behaviour (an 
individual’s assessment of how they think others will view them if they carry out 
the behaviour). They propose that “the best single predictor of an individual’s 
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behaviour will be a measure of his intention to perform the behaviour” (p. 369) 
and that the “most efficient thing that one can do is to ask the individual 
whether he intends to perform the behaviour” (ibid). Azjen (1988) later 
extended this in his Theory of Planned Behaviour, a model which includes the 
concept of perceived behavioural control, a person’s perceived ease or 
difficulty in performing an action. These two models continue to be widely 
researched. In particular, the Theory of Planned behaviour has received 
considerable attention in the psychological literature as its efficacy in 
advancing understandings of behaviour change in health psychology (e.g. 
Cooke and French, 2008; Perkins et al., 2007; Sniehotta, 2009) and 
environmental psychology (e.g. Bamberg & Möser 2007; Wauters et al., 2010) 
have been widely debated.  
 
2.2.2 Motivations and accounts for conduct 
 
What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they 
are doing it? (Burke, 1969, p. xv) 
 
In the mid twentieth century philosophers in rhetoric began to discuss the 
notion of ‘motives’, or motive-talk (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976). In contrast to 
psychological research on intentions and motivations which propose private 
states as causes of behaviour, motives were defined as reasons for actions 
which are cited when behaviour is problematic (Mills, 1940). The philosopher 
Kenneth Burke was amongst the first to develop the notion of ‘motives’ as 
rhetorical constructs. He argued that “a motive is not some fixed thing, like a 
table, which one can go and look at. It is a term of interpretation, and being 
such it will naturally take its place within the framework of our Weltanschauung 
as a whole” (1954, p. 25). Sociological attention to motives originated through 
the work of Wright Mills, who noted the linguistic character of motives as they 
arise during the course of social conduct on occasions when one perceives 
that their actions may be questionable to others. Mills developed the notion of 
‘motive talk’ or a ‘vocabulary of motive’ which arise to describe, redefine and 
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normalise problematic actions. Mills questioned the psychological notion of 
motives as determinants of behaviour, as subjective ‘springs’ of action and 
argued that motives “stand for anticipated situational consequences of 
questioned conduct” (1940, p. 905). As Blum and McHugh note, “motive is in 
this regard not a thing in the world but a way of conceiving social action” (1971, 
p. 101). For this group of philosophers and sociologists then, rather than 
individual, discrete sensations which determine behaviour, motives and motive 
talk are resources which are drawn on by speakers when actions may be 
problematic. Similarly to the work on emotions in anthropology these accounts 
were understood as being of a moral, rather than an individual nature (Lutz, 
1988).  
 
This pioneering work on motives was built on by the work of Scott and Lyman 
(1968) who introduced the notion of an ‘account’ which they defined as the 
provision of a justification or excuse for an undesirable or problematic event. 
As Buttny (1993) notes in a succinct overview of the accounts literature, around 
this time, during the first half of the twentieth century, disciplines such as 
linguistics and rhetoric became increasingly concerned with the pragmatic 
functions of language in a diverse range of contexts, leading to a surge of 
interest in accounts as an interactional phenomenon. Buttny (1993) observes 
that within the literature there are several distinct senses of what ‘account’ 
means. A general sense can be found in the work of ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1963; Watson & Sharrock, 1991) and CA (Sacks, 1992) which share 
a common interest in how people’s conduct is organised in ways which make 
sense to each other, how activities are produced so that they are 
understandable and how actions are made ‘accountable’.  
 
Scott and Lyman’s definition provided a more narrow sense of an ‘account’ 
which they describe as “a statement made by a social actor to explain 
unanticipated or untoward behaviour” (1968, p. 46). They identify two types of 
accounts, excuses and justifications, both of which are likely to be cited when 
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an individual has done something that is wrong, bad or otherwise untoward. 
The second type is the explanation which they describe as “statements about 
events where untoward action is not at issue” (p. 47). Scott and Lyman’s work 
was particularly influential as “it is generally agreed in the literature that an 
account is a particular kind of response used to modify a problematic event” 
(Buttny,1990, p. 224).  
 
A key feature of early DP was accountability as a pervasive feature of people’s 
descriptions of events and actions. “That is to say, they attend to events in 
terms of what is normal, expectable, and proper; they attend to their own 
responsibility in events and in the reporting of events…. and they invoke 
notions of motive, causation, justification and cognition” (Edwards, 1997, p. 7). 
This work draws on the discourse analytic notion of variability and notes that 
there are multiple ways to describe a particular action or event, that “there are 
indefinitely many potential versions” (Edwards, 2005a, p. 260) and that 
particular versions of events are constructed in and for the occasion of their 
telling. For example, MacMillan and Edwards (1999) examined British 
newspaper coverage of the death of Princess Diana in the weeks after the 
event. They found that in reports the press handled their accountability as 
agents in the events they were reporting as they assembled factual narratives 
and explanations which assigned and avoided blame. More recently, Edwards 
(2008) approaches intentionality as a practical feature of how events are 
reported, and examines speakers’ management and attribution of intent as 
they account for their actions. Rather than assigning intent to speakers as an 
analyst he shows how, in the context of police interrogation, the intentionality of 
suspects’ actions (in legal terms, mens rea) is a pervasive concern.  
 
In CA research is focussed on the structures of interaction that make activity 
and talk-in-interaction understandable and ‘accountable’ and the robust 
patterns of interaction which speakers orient to. For example, ‘turn-taking’, the 
organisation of who should talk next and when they should do so (Jefferson, 
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1986; Schegloff, 1987, 2000) generates positions where a particular action is 
relevant and if it is not forthcoming is accountably absent (Schegloff, 1972). 
While CA research is typically oriented to a broad sense of accountability, 
researchers have examined the structure and sequential organisation of 
‘accounts’ in the narrow Scott and Lyman sense. One body of work has 
examined the practices of soliciting an account. Sterponi (2003) examines the 
design features of soliciting turns and shows how different features 
retrospectively define different aspects of the accountable event as problematic 
and morally consequential. Bolden and Robinson (2011) examine the practice 
of calling for an account from a co-interactant using a ‘why’ formatted 
interrogative (such as why did you do that?). They show how, rather than 
working as an information seeking question, ‘why’ formatted interrogatives 
index the stance that the item to be accounted for is unwarranted or 
inappropriate. As such, rather than orienting to these turns as seeking 
information, respondents frequently orient to the implied challenging stance of 
the interrogative by either overtly aligning with it or by rejecting the challenge 
and providing an account to justify the reasonableness of the accountable item.  
 
Research has also examined types of accounts and their sequential design. 
Ford (2002) shows how the discourse structure of denial plus account or 
correction is recurrent in everyday interaction. Speakers routinely provide an 
account or a correction of an assumption following a denial and in instances 
when such an account is not forthcoming its absence is treated as noticeable 
as speakers actively pursue a resolution. Dersley and Wootton (2000) 
examined the organisation of sequences immediately following complaints. 
They found that the majority of initial responses fall within two main types 
which they characterise as ‘didn’t do it’ denials and ‘not at fault’ denials. They 
show how following a ‘didn’t do it denial’, where the speaker denies any 
involvement in the complained-of action, respondents typically deliver a further 
assertion of the complaint. They found that typically ‘didn’t do it’ denials are 
delivered without any typical features of dispreference such as delay, as the 
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“delay of a denial may be interpreted as an admission of/evidence of guilt” 
(Garcia, 1991, p. 385). The second category of denial; ‘not at fault’ involves 
speakers implying agreement with the complainer, but denying culpability for 
the action in question. While the delay of the delivery of a ‘didn’t do it’ denial 
may create the basis for recipients to infer that the speaker had some part in 
the complainable action, a ‘not at fault’ denial does not create the same basis.  
 
Although not focussed on accounts or accountability, a further body of work 
which is pertinent to the thesis has examined how speakers use terms such as 
‘think’ and ‘want’ in everyday interaction. Schick (2010) adopts a language 
socialisation approach and examines the uses of ‘want’ in the context of school 
dance classes. Although important, as this work focuses on the uses of ‘want’ 
in sequences of interaction, the focus of language socialisation is on how 
linguistic and cultural practices are acquired by individuals, or how, “through 
their participation in social interactions, children come to internalize and gain 
performance competence in these sociocultural defined contexts” (Ochs, 1986, 
p. 2). The focus of Schick’s analysis is how ‘want’ “makes transparent the kinds 
of thought processes central to a number of socially valued competencies” 
(2009, p. 1), and how ‘want’ “was useful in conveying internal thought 
processes” (p. 2). Schick’s analysis then, retains the dualism inherent in 
contemporary psychology. Kärkkäinen (2003, 2006) examines ‘I think’ as an 
epistemic stance marker in everyday conversation. She considers stance 
taking, marked with ‘I think’ as an interactional activity, “rather than a way of 
framing an isolated ‘thought’ or position of an individual speaker” (2006, p. 
711).  
 
The work in this section is important as it marks a move away from conceiving 
of social understanding as a theoretical accomplishment to examining human 
actions in interaction. What this review has shown is that cognitive notions 
(such as ‘intention’) are ways of talking. This sets the scene for the analysis 
which is to follow, where I examine invocations of notions of ‘wanting’ and 
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‘needing’ as an integral feature of social practices. The work reviewed in this 
part is particularly pertinent for each of the analytic chapters as I draw on work 
which has examined syntactic constraints imposed by first pair parts of 
adjacency pairs (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984; Robinson, 
2004; Schegloff, 1968), the sequential design of requests and directives 
(Craven & Potter, 2010; Curl & Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lindstróm, 
2005) and accounts and their sequential design (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; 
Ford, 2002; Robinson & Bolden, 2010; Sterponi, 2003).  
 
Part 3: Theories and issues: Discursive Psychology and theoretical 
debates  
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
In the final section of this review I introduce the theoretical approach of 
discursive psychology. I begin by discussing the theoretical and intellectual 
roots of DP; the disciplines of ethnomethodology, CA and the sociology of 
science. What this review will demonstrate is how the theoretical approaches to 
DP draw on the notion of language “as a kind of activity, as discourse” 
(Edwards, 1997, p. 1). From this I discuss in further detail the theoretical 
approach of epistemological constructionism which I adopt in the thesis. 
Finally, I discuss work which is critical of cognitivism in psychology, focussing 
on work which has developed a sustained critique of Theory of Mind.  
 
3.1 Ethnomethodology 
 
In everyday life, becoming a competent interactant involves learning how to 
recognise and generate organised situated practices. Social life is anything but 
organised randomly, as activities are generally understood as highly patterned 
and consistent as they are often explained by members in terms of various 
norms (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). The disciplines of ethnomethodology, CA 
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and social studies of science are united in their understanding of the use of 
language and discourse as constructive and constitutive of everyday life (Potter 
& Edwards, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and develop the tools needed to 
explicate the orderly, socially organised, situated practices of which social life 
is composed. Rather than conducting research on society, for example by 
‘applying’ findings from a setting such as the interview, researchers aim to 
study the orderliness of social life as it is produced in situ from the perspective 
of members of society themselves (Boden, 1990; Maynard & Clayman, 2003; 
ten Have, 1999; Wiggins & Potter, 2008).  
 
In Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967) Harold Garfinkel, who founded the 
approach, wrote that ethnomethodology is particularly influenced by the work of 
Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schutz’s work in sociology, and the phenomenological 
philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Aron Gurwitsch. As described by Heritage 
(1984), Garfinkel was a student of the structural functionalist Parsons, who 
proposed that members’ sense of the world “is defined and mediated in terms 
of culturally structured symbols and beliefs” (1951, pp. 5-6). It is through these 
structures, as part of a ‘social system’, that “raw streams of experience” are 
ordered and rendered intelligible (1937, p. 27-42). As Maynard and Clayman 
(2003) note, for Garfinkel there were a range of issues which weren’t dealt with 
by Parsons’ analysis of social action. For example Parsons started from a 
prespecified analytical construct of a ‘unit act’ and “decided against the study of 
actual, particular social actions and organized sequences of them” (Schegloff, 
1987, p. 151). For Garfinkel, Parsons’ “analytic frame of reference forestalls the 
appreciation of the indigenous perspectives of the actors themselves who, as 
purposive agents in social life, use forms of commonsense knowledge and 
practical reasoning to make sense of their circumstances and find ways of 
acting within them” (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 175). Garfinkel placed 
matters which were incidental to Parsons “the orderly practices of the 
participants in interaction” (Schegloff, 1987, p. 102) at the centre of his 
alternate conception of social action (Maynard & Clayman, 2003). In 
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ethnomethodology “it is a feature of the theory that propositions about social 
organization cannot be divorced from ongoing courses of inquiry in real 
settings” (Maynard & Clayman, 2003, p. 175). This rejection of ‘top-down’ 
theorising contrasts with traditional sociology which is largely based on 
Durkheim’s principle that ways of making sense of the world are ‘social facts’ 
that stand outside of the flow of ordinary events.  
 
As a heterogeneous sociological research program inspired by diverse 
theoretical influences, ethnomethodology resists easy definition. With that in 
mind, one such definition is offered by Maanen, Manning and Miller;  
 
In a personal way, it refers to the methods we have available to use to 
make sense of our immediate social surroundings and thus take action 
(and offer an account for such action) in league with our companions. 
As a research field, the term refers to the study of how members of an 
identified social or cultural group manage to make meaningful the 
varied worlds of their experience. The methods of interests to 
ethnomethodologists are those commonplace and more or less taken-
for-granted routines by which working definitions of social situations 
are collectively produced (1995, p. v).   
 
Central concerns are to examine how people make sense of the society in 
which they live, how they learn to act appropriately within its norms, or “how the 
structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and routinely produced and 
maintained” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 38). At the heart of this is a concern with 
practical reasoning, or members’ methods of building a shared sense of their 
common context of action, without which coordinated and meaningful actions 
would be impossible (Heritage, 2001). In plain terms, ethnomethodology 
proposes that people organise their conduct and actions in ways that are 
designed to be intelligible, recognisable and accountable and examines how 
people make sense of the society in which they live by examining these ways, 
or ‘members methods’.  
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A core principle is that of ethnomethodological indifference, that “reality is 
temporarily placed in brackets” (Heritage, 1984, p. 229) . As Edwards notes, 
“adopting no particular prior stance on the nature of external reality, social 
reality, or the nature of mind, ethnomethodology sets out to examine how such 
notions are constructed and deployed within social life, as participants’ 
practical concerns” (1997, p. 62). In order to study the workings of common-
sense talk and practical actions, it is necessary to begin without any 
preconceived notions. One must avoid legitimising one level of structure at the 
expense of others in order to examine the social practices by which structure is 
made to happen (Hilbert, 1990). As Edwards notes “ethnomethodological 
indifference is merely a reiteration of ethnomethodology’s basic project, to 
study rather than presume the workings of common-sense talk and practical 
actions” (1997, p. 63).  The principle of ethnomethodological indifference is 
pertinent to the thesis as I examine how people invoke ‘mental states’ in the 
service of various conversational activities. This requires that any notion of 
experiential reality is bracketed off in order to examine how mental state terms 
are deployed in social life.  
 
3.2 Conversation analysis 
 
The second theoretical influence on DP is that of CA. CA was developed in the 
1970s by Harvey Sacks and his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail 
Jefferson. The discipline is vast and so it is only possible to provide a brief 
overview here (for books which introduce and discuss CA in detail see Hutchby 
& Wooffitt, 1998; Liddicoat, 2011; Wooffitt, 2005 amongst others). Inspired by 
the ethnomethodological focus on social life as it occurs in situ, the aim was to 
fashion an observational science of society and social action that could be 
grounded in the “details of actual events” (Sacks, 1984, p. 26). Prior to Sacks’ 
decision to study the details of interaction, few people believed that the 
structure of conversation was orderly enough to permit formal description 
(Heritage, 1984). The dominant approach was to study invented or imagined 
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scenarios, as it was believed that “social interaction is beset by randomizing 
factors which make any attempt at analysis problematic” (Heritage, 1984, p. 
235). Sacks argued that this reliance on invented scenarios distorted features 
of interaction. As Schegloff notes, “when we encounter something strange that 
has apparently been invented…..  we do not know what we are investigating. 
About the former we can ask, what might its speaker have been doing talking 
that way. About the latter we cannot, for we do not now what underlies ‘that 
way’: an arbitrary decision by the analyst on how to represent an intuited 
utterance type? A decision to put the utterance just that way for the purposes 
of the analysts’ argument? A way someone actually talked? A misremembered 
version of the latter?” (1988, p. 103). For Sacks and his colleagues, the use of 
recordings of conversational data is an essential antidote to these limitations 
and problems inherent in the use of imagined scenarios (Heritage, 1984).  
 
CA has largely followed the work of Sacks and focuses on the organisation of 
conversational materials, identifying robust patterns of interaction and rules 
which speakers orient to. In a useful summary, Schegloff (2004a) eloquently 
sketches out various practices which allow orderly interaction to proceed. First, 
‘turn-taking’, which organises who should talk next and when they should do so 
(Jefferson, 1986; Schegloff, 1987, 2000). Second ‘sequence-organisation’, 
which concerns how turns are produced to coherently follow preceeding turns, 
and the nature of that coherence (Schegloff, 1990,1996a, 2007). Third, the 
intricate workings of ‘repair’ which manages problems in speaking, hearing and 
understanding (Drew, 1997; Jefferson, 1974, 1987). Fourth, ‘turn-design’ and 
lexical choice concern speakers’ selection of components of turns and how that 
selection informs and shapes recipients’ understanding of the turn (Sacks & 
Schegloff, 1979; Schegloff, 1972, 1996b). Finally, there is an overall structural 
organisation of interaction that informs the construction and understanding of 
the talk (Schegloff, 1986; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). These matters are 
fundamental to the situation of people interacting with each other, such that 
conversation analysts hold that language can and should be examined “in 
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terms sensitive to these basic organisational problems that its structure and 
use has most likely evolved to manage” (Raymond 2001, p. 8).  
 
CA is a broadly non-cognitivist approach to discourse which makes problematic 
any approach which adopts the telementation (Harris, 1981) view of language, 
that is, which conceptualises talk as the communication of speakers’ thoughts 
and intentions (Edwards, 1997).  A key feature of CA is a focus on what talk is 
doing as opposed to what it may be communicating. Here the influence of the 
systematic analysis of CA on the thesis is apparent as I examine the mental 
state terms ‘want’ and ‘need’ as performing actions in specific sequential 
environments. In addition, the analysis is informed by conversation analytic 
work which has examined the structural organisation of talk-in-interaction, such 
as syntactic constraints imposed by first pair parts of adjacency pairs 
(Goodwin, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984; Robinson, 2004; Schegloff, 1968) and the 
sequential design of requests and directives (Craven & Potter, 2010; Curl & 
Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lindstróm, 2005).  
 
3.3 Sociology of scientific knowledge 
 
DP has drawn heavily on constructionist thinking in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (henceforth SSK). SSK emerged during the 1970s in the aftermath 
of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). Prior to the 1970s 
sociologists tended to accept the content of scientific knowledge as more or a 
less a reflection of objective, universal truths and while it was acknowledged 
that there may be a legitimate sociological understanding of scientific error, it 
was accepted that there could be no such thing as a sociology of authentic 
scientific knowledge (Ben-David, 1971). As such sociologists were consulted 
only to examine and explain the social factors which led scientists to believe 
false claims about the world (Wooffitt, 2005). This presented a problem for 
sociologists who were interested in science, as their investigations were very 
much dependent on whatever present scientific consensus happened to be 
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(Edwards, 1997). The widely accepted view of current scientific consensus as 
definitive came into dispute as Kuhn fathered the concept of a ‘paradigm shift’, 
arguing that rather than being progressive and evolutionary, scientific 
advancement proceeds in a "series of peaceful interludes punctuated by 
intellectually violent revolutions" (1970, p. 10), where one way of thinking is 
eventually replaced by another.  
 
During the 1980s SSK attracted researchers from within the phenomenological 
and ethnomethodological traditions. Many of these social scientists began to 
adopt a position of methodological relativism (Collins, 1982) with respect to 
scientific knowledge. Collins and Yearley explain methodological relativism as 
follows;  
 
Sociologists of scientific knowledge should treat correct science and 
false science equally; they should analyze what are taken by most 
scientists to be true claims about the natural world and what are 
treated by most as mistaken claims in the same way. The idea was 
that the construction of the boundary between the true and the false 
would become the topic rather than the starting point as in existing 
sociologies of science (1992, p. 302).  
 
Regardless of the ‘truth’ or otherwise of scientific knowledge, sociologists of 
science concerned themselves with the social processes through which 
knowledge claims were produced and validated by the scientific community. 
Sociologists subsequently developed an interest in scientific disputes where no 
consensus had yet emerged, as the social processes underpinning knowledge 
production were still in operation (Wooffitt, 2005). A key study was Gilbert and 
Mulkay’s (1984) examination of scientists’ accounting procedures surrounding 
a dispute within biochemistry (see Edwards, 1997; Wooffitt, 2005 for further 
discussion of this work). They analysed various kinds of documents such as 
textual records and technical reports from the research literature as well as 
interviews with various biochemists. They noted that within the data there was 
variability in accounts as there were a variety of different versions of essentially 
the same thing. Significantly, this variability could not be accounted for with 
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reference to various scientists’ affiliation to one or the other side of the dispute 
as there were conflicting accounts offered by the same scientists. Gilbert and 
Mulkay were the first to recognise that this variability is an inevitable feature of 
discourse. That is, that variability occurs as different expressions are used for 
different purposes, as part of local conversational activities (Potter, 1996b; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987). To deal with this variability Gilbert and Mulkay 
introduced Discourse Analysis, a method of analysis which focuses entirely on 
participant’s accounts and language. Rather then representing a 
methodological problem, variability between accounts is an analytic tool that 
highlights the constructive and action orientated nature of discourse (Edwards 
& Stokoe, 2004).  The classic problem of variability subsequently became an 
analytic lever for a lot of early discourse work (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
 
3.4 Discursive psychology 
 
DP was pioneered by Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (1992) as they set 
out to rework and respecify some of psychology’s most central concepts. DP 
has increasingly drawn on conversation analytic methods, with a distinctive 
focus on how speakers can orient to features of their own or each other’s 
subjective states and dispositions in building their own course of action or 
undermining others’ (Edwards, 2007). Edwards and Potter describe the 
approach as follows;  
 
The focus of discursive psychology is the action orientation of talk and 
writing. For both participants and analysts, the primary issue is the 
social actions, or interactional work, being done in the discourse. But 
rather than focusing on the usual concerns of social interactional 
analyses, such as the way social and intergroup relationships are 
conducted (through forms of address, speech accommodation, etc.), or 
how ‘speech acts’ might be identified, the major concern in this book is 
epistemological. It is with the nature of knowledge, cognition and 
reality: with how events are described and explained, how factual 
reports are constructed, how cognitive states are attributed. These are 
defined as discursive topics, things people topicalize or orientate 
themselves to, or imply, in their discourse. And rather than seeing such 
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discursive constructions as expressions of speakers' underlying 
cognitive states, they are examined in the context of their occurrence 
as situated occasioned constructions whose precise nature makes 
sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the those 
descriptions accomplish. (Edwards & Potter, 1992, pp. 2-3).  
 
The ultimate aim of the thesis is to investigate what is done with the verb 
‘want’, its practical use in everyday talk-in-interaction. As such my concern is 
epistemological as I treat participants’ words as constructions rather than as 
expressions of underlying cognitive states or as labels attached to internal 
referents. As Potter notes, “constructing the research topic as discourse marks 
a move from considering language as an abstract system of terms to 
considering talk and texts as parts of social practices” (2003, p. 785). The data 
for the thesis are conversational materials. However this “is not driven by a 
fascination with language as an abstract system, but by a concern with basic 
social psychological matters, how are actions produced, how do people 
coordinate their activities, how do they support and undermine one another, 
and so on” (Potter, 2010a, p. 658). That is, I consider talk as part of social 
practices and adopt the principles of ethnomethodological indifference and 
methodological relativism within SSK as I bracket off questions concerning the 
nature of mind and reality and treat these as participants’ concerns. 
 
This conception of language makes discursive approaches incompatible with 
methods which presuppose different views of discourse and language. As Billig 
(1997) notes, DP is not a method that can be applied to any topic regardless of 
the researcher’s theoretical orientation, but it is a broad theoretical approach 
towards psychology which represents a major alternative to the scientific 
epistemology associated with the discipline. Attempts to ‘apply’ DP to 
questions formulated in the traditional psychological style, such as ‘what is the 
effect of X on Y?’ is likely to result in incoherence (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). 
‘Psychology’ is not approached from an analysts’ perspective. That is, rather 
than applying predefined categories, terms and explanations to social life the 
 63
focus is on psychology from participants’ perspectives, as something displayed 
in talk-in-interaction (Potter, 2005).  
 
3.5 Ontological and epistemological constructionism  
 
Much of the research in the social sciences treats mental states as discrete 
private experiences and understands language as a realisation or expression 
of mental states. The thesis adopts the stance of methodological relativism with 
respect to the topic of talk, similar to that adopted in many social studies of 
science (Collins, 1982). The primary issue for analysis is the interactional work 
done in talk. Rather than understanding reports as expressions of underlying 
cognitive states they are examined as situated occasioned constructions 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992). For this purpose we do not need to know or be 
concerned with the mental state of individuals. DP distinguishes between 
‘epistemic’ and ‘ontological’ constructionism and as Edwards notes, “in 
discursive psychology, the major sense of ‘social construction’ is epistemic; it is 
about the constructive nature of descriptions, rather than of the entities that 
(according to the descriptions) exist beyond them” (1997, p. 48).   
 
While epistemological constructionism is concerned with how meaning is 
created in interaction, ontological constructionism takes this further and is 
concerned with how non-discursive worlds are discursively constructed and the 
implications of constructions for subjectivity (McAvoy, 2007; Wetherell, 2007). It 
is exemplified by “those approaches which develop a meta-theory of mind, the 
psyche and the nature of social relations using constructionist principles to 
guide their analysis” (Wetherell, p. 672) and is characteristic of constructivism 
in developmental psychology and socio-cultural approaches in anthropology. 
What emerges within interaction is understood as shaped by the norms, rules 
and ideologies that are thought to constrain interactions (McAvoy, 2007).  
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The term ‘epistemic’ construction is meant to distinguish DP from constructivist 
theories in developmental psychology such as work by Piaget, Vygotsky and 
Bruner which examines how ‘actual minds’ (Bruner, 1986) develop and are 
produced within social interaction (Edwards & Potter, 2005). It indicates a focus 
on talk as social practices, as performative and interactive rather than a 
‘telementation’ (Harris, 1981) of thoughts from one mind to another, or as an 
objective expression of the way things are in the world. “Crucially, the 
epistemic label signals a contrast with the standard use of language in 
psychological methods as a pathway along which to pursue mental, social or 
biographical objects beyond talk or text” (Potter, 2010a, p. 658).  
 
An example of constructivism in developmental psychology is the approach 
advocated by Carpendale and Lewis (2004, 2006). They draw on Vygotsky’s 
constructivist theory and Wittgenstein’s private language argument (see 
Shotter, 2004, 2006 for a critique of attempts to produce a Wittgensteinian 
developmental theory), suggesting that Theory of Mind develops discursively, 
that it is “within social interactions an understanding of mental states develops 
and is constituted” (2004, p. 80, original emphasis). Carpendale describes 
constructivism as “a general view of the nature of knowledge and the mind that 
applies equally to cognitive and social cognitive development” (1997, p. 35). 
The project for these researchers is to integrate “the social and individual 
dimensions of development” (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, p. 80) to explain how 
children come to understand the ‘psychological world’. In this arena then, “mind 
is real for the theorist and analyst, and the analytic task is to explain how it is 
built within a real world of cultural settings and practices’”(Edwards, 1997, pp. 
47-48).  
 
For DP the wide ranging debate about the ontological status of mind and ‘the 
mental’ is bracketed off. Just as for the sociologists of science the boundary 
between the true and the false became a topic rather than a starting point for 
analysis (Collins & Yearly, 1992) mind and reality are treated as discourse’s 
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topics and business and analysis focuses on how participants descriptively 
construct them (Edwards, 1997). Shotter notes that although Wittgenstein’s 
investigations are inherently hostile towards the whole scientific approach, he 
is not critical of science as such and that “his remarks are not at all aimed at 
arguing for what is in fact the case” (2006, p. 280, original emphasis). Rather, 
his tradition of conceptual analysis draws attention to how words are ordinarily 
used, what is “always before one’s eyes” (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 129). Rather 
than beginning with a presupposition regarding the ontological status of ‘the 
mind’ and arguing for what is the case the approach adopted in the thesis is 
thoroughly empirically grounded. I examine mental states as practical, “as a 
kitbag of resources for doing things” (Potter, 2005, p. 740). I ask “when, and in 
the performance of what kinds of actions, do people talk as if they were in 
possession of a privately available mental life, which their words may either 
truthfully or falsely express?” (Edwards & Potter, 2005, p. 247).  In analysing 
the uses of the term ‘want’ as an intelligible practice of accountability (Edwards 
& Potter, 2005) I make no claims regarding the ontological status of mental 
states.  
 
3.6 Anti-cognitivism; Against Theory of Mind 
 
Costall and Leudar (2009a) note that during the scientific revolution in the 
nineteenth century psychology faced particular difficulties as individuals know, 
or assume to know, a great deal about themselves without the benefit of 
psychologists. “The New Psychology had, therefore, to establish its own 
epistemological distance from our ‘common-sense’ knowledge of ourselves, by 
developing its own distinct methods, most conspicuously the psychological 
experiment” (p. 43). However as Harré notes, the project of establishing a 
scientific psychology is paradoxical as “for the most part the processes by 
which people carry out cognitive tasks are unobservable” (2002, p. 217). 
Cognitive science maintains a commitment to scientific research using 
empirical methods, but the phenomena which these researchers aim to 
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investigate “are intrinsically unobservable whose existence can only be inferred 
from outward actions, especially language-based actions” (Billig, 2009). 
Scientific psychology’s subject matter then, mental states and cognitive 
processes, can only be studied experimentally by formulating operational 
definitions and models of cognitive behaviour. It is not the case that there are a 
set of cognitive processes out there in the world, or in our minds, waiting to be 
found and explained by psychologists (Edwards, 1997). Cognitive psychology’s 
subject matter must be defined and these operational definitions are “clearly a 
cultural and discursive matter” (Edwards, 1997, p. 28). In cognitive psychology 
language is treated as a representation of inner processes. By studying what 
lies behind behaviour and talk, cognitive psychology has neglected the study of 
that behaviour. As Coulter argues “they frequently aspire to operationalize or to 
substitute for, or to regiment, our mundane concepts of thinking, believing, 
hoping, expecting, remembering, forgetting, reasoning, understanding, 
perceiving and a host of others. They are typically insensitive to the conceptual 
articulations and rules of use which apply to their actual topics of inquiry, 
favoring modes of stipulative theorizing to the analysis of their grammars” 
(2008, p. 21).  
 
I now turn to a body of discourse based work that has begun to develop a 
sustained critique of one particular area of cognitive psychology, especially 
pertinent to the thesis, which is Theory of Mind. Leudar, Costall and Francis 
(2004) note that the Theory of Mind framework is important as it is “fairly 
representative of contemporary cognitive psychology and so of its problems” 
(p. 572). In recent years discourse based researchers have begun to develop a 
sustained critique of the theory, its fundamental assumptions and methods 
(see e.g. collections in Leudar & Costall, 2009; Leudar, Costall & Francis, 
2004). As Leudar, Costall and Francis (2004) observe, prior to the mid 2000s, 
the critical literature on Theory of Mind was relatively limited, consisting of a 
few articles taking issue with its methods (Dunn, 1988, as cited in Leudar, 
Costall & Francis; Reddy, 1991) and findings (McCabe, Leudar & Antaki, 
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2004). Within the Theory of Mind framework the ability to communicate with 
others is seen as a theoretical accomplishment, as a person must construct 
theories in order to appreciate and understand others’ mental states, a 
prerequisite for participation in social interaction. The main thrust of the critique 
is that “the capacity for understanding other human beings that is supposedly 
acquired through speculative theory construction is in fact  acquired with the 
language” (Sharrock, 2009, p. 191).  
 
One focus of this critique has been on the application of Theory of Mind to 
explanations of autism and schizophrenia. Shanker (2004) argues that rather 
than being a predetermined phenomenon, the capacity to experience emotion 
and appreciate the emotions of others develops in the context of the child’s 
interactional experiences. According to Theory of Mind, the symptoms of 
autism are a manifestation of an innate Theory of Mind deficit. Baron-Cohen 
(1995), for example, proposes that this is caused by a malfunction in a Theory 
of Mind Module which results in an inability to engage in ‘mind reading’. 
However Shanker notes that far from being predetermined, there is a growing 
body of work that evidences a developmental trajectory which leads to deficits 
typically seen in individuals with autism (Greenspan, 1997). This work notes 
that a highly prevalent problem experienced by individuals with autism is 
sensory over or under-reactivity; “for example, the sound of a vacuum cleaner 
can be unbearable for a child who is over-reactive to auditory stimuli while the 
intonation changes of motherese might come across as indistinguishable 
murmurs to a child who is under-reactive” (Shanker, 2004, p. 693). These basic 
challenges may severely impair a child’s emotional and social development;  
 
Consider how a child who is over-reactive to visual stimuli may resort 
to tuning out the word as much as possible in order to cope with this 
incessant assault. Simply looking into his mother’s eyes when en face 
may be more than his nervous system can bear. But then, the more he 
avoids interactions with his caregivers, the more he is deprived of 
those very experiences that are critical for normal healthy 
development. Unless the caregiver employs communicational 
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techniques that cater to and if possible help the child overcome his 
sensory challenges, the child is more and more likely to adopt 
behaviours that will exacerbate his or her communicational problems 
(ibid., p. 694).  
 
Rather than understanding social impairments as a result of a malfunction in 
individuals’ ‘Theory of Mind’, Shanker shows how what may otherwise be 
understood as an innate, biological, deficit can be traced to developmental 
issues which arise during the course of child’s early interactions as a result of 
sensory over and under-reactivity.  
 
A Theory of Mind deficit or an impaired ability to appreciate one’s own and 
others’ mental states has also been implicated symptoms typically seen in 
schizophrenia, such as delusions of control, persecution and of reference (see 
Corcoran, 2000, 2001). It has been noted that there are inconsistent, 
seemingly contradictory findings in studies of false belief understanding in 
patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia (Bailey & Henry, 2010; Brüne, 2005). 
However these discrepancies are typically attributed to processing demands 
such as working memory. For example, Apperly et al. discuss the ‘dilemma’ 
faced by researchers as they design Theory of Mind tests as “the tasks must 
be difficult enough to generate errors yet simple enough that errors are not due 
to more general processing demands of the task” (2004, p. 1774).  
 
Conversation analytic research focussed on interactions in clinical settings has 
critically examined the assumption that patients with diagnoses of 
schizophrenia have impaired Theory of Mind abilities. McCabe, Leudar and 
Antaki (2004) examine a corpus of cognitive behavioural therapy sessions 
(CBT) and psychiatrist-patient consultations to examine whether individuals 
with diagnoses of schizophrenia display specific interactional difficulties as 
predicted by the Theory of Mind model. They show how during the course of 
interaction patients display intact Theory of Mind relevant skills, such as 
representing their own or others mental states and engaging in anticipatory 
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interactive planning (Drew, 1995), which relies on the projection of an 
interlocutor’s turn and can only work if an individual has an adequate 
representation of what a co-interactant intends to do. Antaki (2004) examines 
interaction in therapist-patient consultations and critiques the notion that people 
get along by ‘mind reading’. He argues that while researchers in the field of 
Theory of Mind place scare quotes around ‘mind-reading’ as if they use the 
term only metaphorically, they “then proceed essentially as if people do 
actually read minds” (2004, p. 668) and that this “sets the bar impossibly high” 
(p. 667). He shows how an appreciation of the fine details of interaction reveals 
individuals’ competencies.  
 
Colombino (2004) carried out ethnographic fieldwork, over a period of two 
years, in a school that specialises in teaching autistic children. He argues that 
interactions between autistic children and their teachers presents a problem as 
“the children appear to display cognitive and interactional competencies that 
the Theory of Mind claims they should not possess, while teachers treat the 
children as if they observably and accountably possessed those same 
competencies” (p. 726). An example of one such competency is ‘shared 
attention’ which Baron-Cohen (1995) predicts that autistic children cannot 
engage in due to an inability to compute triadic representations of mental 
states; “you, and Me, collaboratively looking at, working on or talking about 
This” (Saxe, 2006, p. 235). Colombino notes that the very physical setup of the 
classroom presupposes that pupils will pay attention and take part in lessons; 
“the physical set-up of the classroom is such that the children are all facing 
Paul and focusing on what he is doing. This is a ‘normal’ set-up for a teaching 
activity, and not one that would take into account any inability on the part of the 
children to deal with activities requiring shared attention” (p. 731).  
 
Researchers are also critical of the adequacy of the Theory of Mind framework 
in explanations of human development. Reddy and Morris (2004) show how 
young children are able to engage in a range of activities that the Theory-
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Theory (e.g. Gopnik, 2008; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) predicts that they should 
not. They note that “theory-theorists argue that telling lies, understanding 
intentions contrary to actual actions, understanding lack of knowledge and 
understanding misunderstandings are all dependent on complex 
representational skills which do not develop until about 4 years” (2004, p. 649). 
They review a range of empirical studies which provide evidence to the 
contrary. For example, it has been argued that children cannot lie until they 
pass the false belief task, and that children with autism and those under the 
age of four cannot pass the false belief task and as such are not able to lie 
(Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, 1986). Reddy and Morris argue that “this 
prediction ran into problems from the start” (2004, p. 649). The ability to 
deceive in fact begins from the first year as children deliberately tease with 
false offers and requests before the age of one (Reddy, 1991). Research has 
shown that children are able to lie from the age of two and moreover that “the 
lies of 2-year-old children are as plausible as those of the older children” 
(Wilson, Smith and Ross, 2003, p. 35).  
 
Sharrock notes that the disagreement between proponents of Theory of Mind 
and alternatives such as interaction analysis is a deep divergence; “mentalists 
think that there problems are to be solved by empirical research, whilst my 
argument against them is that this is not what they are really engaged in at all, 
and that the crucial understanding is in terms of how the natural language 
works when put to everyday use in practical affairs” (2009, p. 192). That is, 
there is a fundamental argument regarding emotions and cognition as the 
driving force behind behaviour. Cognitivism maintains that thoughts and 
emotions are a priori entities which motivate and drive behaviour. As this 
review has shown, this view is opposed by discourse based researchers who 
maintain that emotions and intentions are conceptual resources which are 
drawn on during the course of our everyday interactions. In the analysis which 
follows I extend this work as I consider ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ as practical 
resources which speakers drawn on during the course of interaction.  
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Part 4: Chapter summary  
 
This chapter has outlined the literature which is relevant to the thesis. It began 
with an overview of work in Theory of Mind and mainstream, essentialist 
approaches to emotion. Both of these bodies of work are grounded in a 
referential view of language and share common themes such as how 
individuals understand the mental states and emotions of others and the causal 
relations between affect, intentions and action. I discussed methodological and 
theoretical problems which are inherent in this work, and took issue with the 
assumption that an innate, individual ‘mind-reading’ ability is a prerequisite for 
participation in social interaction. The purpose of reviewing work in these areas 
was to situate the thesis by identifying how it will contribute to understandings 
of ‘mental states’ and ‘emotions’ by presenting an alternative understanding of 
human action. I then introduced social constructionist approaches to emotion 
and the problems which this approach raised for essentialist work. I then 
discussed studies in contemporary DP, situating the thesis in a body of work 
which is critical of, and is developing an analytically based alternative to 
mainstream cognitive psychology (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005). In part 2 I 
discussed work in CA and DP which informs the analysis in order to show how 
the thesis will contribute to this body of work by extending knowledge of the 
sequential organisation of requests, directives and accounts. Finally I gave an 
overview of DP and discussed in detail the theoretical approach of 
epistemological constructionism. Having now introduced the background 
literature and the theoretical approach of the thesis, in the next chapter I move 
on to discuss the practicalities of the thesis. I begin by introducing the dataset 
and my rationale for choosing to collect this data. I then outline the 
methodological procedures and the stages involved in data collection, 
transcription and analysis.  
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3 
 
Method 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the specific methodological procedures and 
practicalities of the thesis. The chapter is divided into two subsections. First I 
introduce the dataset and provide observations related to the use of the data. 
In the second section I set out the specific procedures for recording, 
transcribing and analysing the materials and discuss ethical issues and 
procedures involved as part of the data collection and analysis.  
 
Part 1: The data set 
 
The data in the thesis were taken from two sources; television documentary 
data and videotapes made during mealtimes by three families. The decision to 
collect mealtime data was a practical one as mealtimes tend to be occasions 
where families are gathered in one location, which allows recordings to be 
made easily and regularly. This is reflected by the large body of work within 
conversation analysis, sociolinguistics and ethnography which has focussed on 
mealtime interaction (see Laurier & Wiggins, 2011 for a review).  The use of 
video recordings made by families for the purpose of the research project 
raises issues concerning reactivity to the presence of recording equipment (this 
will be discussed in further detail below). While I am not seeking naturalistic 
data as a more ‘pure’ or natural form of data which is supposedly 
uncontaminated by the presence of recording equipment (Speer & Hutchby, 
2003), I began the project with a broad interest in ‘family disputes’ and 
arguments. This posed the problem of how to gain access to ‘dispute’ 
episodes. I viewed examples of mealtime data available in the archives of the 
Discourse and Rhetoric Group at Loughborough University and it became 
apparent that participants may orient to the presence of recording equipment 
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and present their ‘best behaviour’. I was also unsatisfied with relying on 
mealtime data simply because of practical convenience. As my analytic interest 
is not in food or mealtimes per se I decided to supplement the mealtime data. 
‘Fly-on-the-wall’ documentary series for television, which document the lives of 
a particular family for an extended period of time, were particularly suitable as 
these shows aim to capture everyday family life as it occurs naturally, without 
intervention.  
 
1.1 The television documentary data  
 
The predominant source of data used in the thesis was a set of video 
recordings taken from a series of ‘fly-on-the-wall’ documentary programmes 
that focus on a particular family for an extended period of time. Table 1 
provides details of the family members and the dates during which the 
documentary series were aired.  
 
The first of these, ‘The Family’, aired in the autumn of 2008 on Channel 4. This 
corpus is referred to as ‘TF2008’ and comprises approximately seven hours. I 
made contacts via the internet and gained access to two similar series. ‘An 
American Family’ originally aired in 1973. This corpus is referred to throughout 
the thesis as ‘AAF’ and comprises approximately seven hours. The final 
programme, ‘The Family’ first aired in 1974. This corpus is referred to as 
‘TF1974’ throughout the thesis and comprises half an hour. 
 
‘Fly-on-the-wall’ television programmes closely observe individuals or 
institutions and aim to capture the flow of ‘everyday life’. Programmes are 
typically filmed by a quasi-invisible recording team and unlike the traditional 
documentary have no host, no interviews and participants are not given any 
scripted materials. The genre aims to break down “fixed distinctions between 
public and private, reality and spectacle, serial narrative and nonfiction, 
documentary and fiction, film and television” (Ruoff, 2002, p. xii). The name ‘fly-
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on-the-wall’ derives from the idea that events are filmed as they occur, as a fly 
on the wall would see them. The AAF and TF1974 corpuses were filmed by a 
recording team who followed the families. Filmmakers Alan and Susan 
Raymond filmed AAF over a period of eight months. TF1974 was recorded by 
a camera crew for eighteen hours a day over a period of six months. TF2008 
was recorded by twenty-one remote controlled cameras installed within the 
family’s home.  
 
Table 1: Guide to documentary data family members  
Series code Names & relation Age at recording Broadcast period 
TF2008 Simon (father) 
Jane (mother) 
Jessica 
(daughter) 
Charlotte 
(daughter) 
Emily (daughter) 
Tom (son) 
Unknown 
39-40 
21 
 
17 
 
19 
14 
September-
December 2008 
AAF Bill (father) 
Pat (mother) 
Lance (son) 
Grant (son) 
Kevin (son) 
Delilah (daughter) 
Michele 
(daughter) 
50 
46 
20 
17 
18 
16 
14 
1973 
TF1974 Margaret (mother) 
Marian (daughter) 
Tim (Marian’s 
fiancé) 
Unknown 
18 
Unknown 
1974 
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1.2 The family mealtime data  
 
The second source of data were videotapes of mealtimes recorded by three 
families. I used personal contacts to locate one family, the ‘Potts’ family. The 
criteria for the selection of the family was that they have children aged between 
ten and nineteen and regularly share household meals. The family were 
approached by me via telephone. The research was outlined to one member of 
the family, Don, to elicit their potential involvement in the study. The research 
was described to the family as a study of ‘family interaction’ which aims to 
investigate how families interact with each other during the course of their 
everyday lives. An information sheet with further information (see appendix A) 
was subsequently given to the family.   
 
The remaining set of recordings were taken from the archives of the Discourse 
and Rhetoric Group, a set of data which is available to members of the group 
for general use. These recordings were made by the ‘Crouch’, ‘Olivers’ and 
‘Potts’ families. Table 1 includes details of participants in each family.  
 
Table 2: Guide to family members 
Family name Names and 
relation 
Age at recording Recording period 
Potts Judy (mother) 
Don (father) 
Jamie (daughter) 
Wayne (son) 
43 
45 
15-16 
10 
 
April-May 2009 
Olivers Rachel (mother) 
Phil (father)  
Julie (daughter) 
Carla (daughter) 
 
45 
Unknown 
11 
8 
March-May 2008 
 76
Crouch  Mike (father) 
Linda (mother) 
Katherine 
Anna 
Unknown 
Unknown 
4-5 
2 
July-September 
2006 
 
 
1.3 Advantages and limitations of the dataset  
 
There are some issues regarding the use of television documentary data within 
studies of interaction which must be noted. One potential problem with using 
data from television series is that it is often heavily edited and so great care 
has to be taken in the selection of extracts and examples. I began with an initial 
examination of the video recordings to identify where disruptions occurred and 
whether this would create analytical problems. Second, as the families were 
being recorded for the purposes of making a television programme it is 
possible that some aspects of their conduct may be designed for a viewing 
audience. As Harris notes, the use of televised programmes which are 
broadcast for the purposes of entertainment “introduces questions about how 
‘real’ the behaviour of these participants is” (2006, p. 37).  
 
It is often seen as essential that conversation analytic research draws on 
naturally occurring, spoken interaction (see Heritage, & Atkinson, 1984). 
Indeed, the term ‘naturally occurring interaction’ “has become a slogan built 
into many definitions of CA” (Speer, 2002, p. 514, original emphasis). This 
focus on ‘natural’ talk has generated extensive debate (Billig, 1999; Griffin, 
2007; Potter & Hepburn, 2005, 2007; Speer, 2002). It is a central premise that 
data should not be “produced for the purpose of study” (Drew, 1989, p. 96). 
Methods such as focus groups, interviews and other materials that have been 
produced for the purposes of research are considered less appropriate as they 
fail to capture talk as it occurs during the course of everyday, ordinary life. 
There is a programme of work which has engaged with how social science 
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methods work in practice, drawing on data such as interviews and focus 
groups (e.g. Antaki, Houtkoop-Steenstra & Rapley, 2000; Potter & Puchta, 
2007; Puchta & Potter, 2002; Schaeffer & Maynard, 2005). This research is 
oriented towards social research instruments as social events in their own 
right, as a topic rather than a resource.  
 
On the other hand, there are several benefits associated with the use of 
documentary data. First, this data would truly have existed regardless of my 
own activities as a researcher. It passes what has been referred to as the 
‘dead social scientist test’ (Potter, 1996c) at least with regard to this thesis and 
its concerns.  That is, it would still exist if the researcher had been run over on 
the way to work. It has not been ‘got up’ or produced specifically for the 
purposes of the research. Second, the recordings were not limited to 
mealtimes and continuously captured the families’ everyday lives over an 
extended period of time. This provided ample opportunity for family members 
to become acclimatised to either the presence of members of a camera crew 
(as in the case of the AAF and TF1974 corpuses) or recording equipment (as 
in the case of TF2008). As such the recordings provide a rich source of data as 
every aspect of their lives in the home was captured. Additionally, these 
professional recordings are of notable superior technical quality to the data 
generally used for research in interaction analysis. Recordings were made by 
several cameras in various positions, there is superior sound and lighting 
quality and details such as participants’ facial expressions were captured much 
more clearly.  
 
Several studies of interaction have used televised media data for research. For 
example Harris (2006) uses CA and Membership Categorisation analysis to 
investigate the social organisation of crying in interaction. She draws on data 
taken from counselling sessions, medical training and the Australian reality 
television programme ‘Big Brother’. As Harris notes, these “data are 
unscripted, spontaneous and sequentially-based” (p. 37). In other words, 
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although reality and ‘fly-on-the-wall’ documentary series are recorded for 
television viewing purposes, these series are not ‘fictional’ and scripted.  
 
With regard to the mealtime data there is an issue of potential recorder 
influence. This is generally the case with family interaction research, where 
consent must be obtained from participants prior to recording for ethical 
reasons. Thus, as families made recordings of meals for the specific purpose 
of the research project it is possible that some aspects of their conduct were 
governed by this purpose. For example, participants may present their ‘best 
behaviour’. At this point it is necessary to note that the level to which the 
researcher can never be present in the research has been the focus of intense 
debate. As Speer (2002) remarks, the necessity of obtaining the informed 
consent of participants along with the presence of a tape-recorder makes it 
difficult to see how any data could be collected without researcher intervention. 
Holstein and Gubrium (1997) argue that “contamination is everywhere” (p.126) 
and so the notion of a pristine domain of social interaction which is only 
contaminated and distorted by the presence of recording equipment (Speer & 
Hutchby, 2003) is somewhat misleading. An exception where data arguably 
may be considered ‘natural’ is that where the recording used for analysis is part 
of the interaction itself, and the phenomenon being analysed. For example, in a 
series of papers which examine various aspects of police-suspect 
interrogations Stokoe and Edwards (Edwards, 2006, 2008; Edwards & Stokoe, 
2011; Stokoe & Edwards; Stokoe, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) draw on a corpus of 
recordings of actual police interrogations. Ethical permission for the use of 
these recordings was obtained in retrospect, and so recordings were made 
with no orientation to their use for academic research. As the thesis uses 
documentary data to gaze into family life (rather than analysing media data as 
media data, for example to study how documentaries are made), it is prudent 
to understand the materials which form the basis of the thesis as naturalistic 
rather than natural. This distinction was made by Potter (2002) to mark the 
contrast between data that are produced specifically for the research project, 
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such as interviews, and those data that are not, while recognising the limits of 
that distinction and appreciating issues of ‘reactivity’ that arise when recording 
what people do (see also Wiggins & Potter, 2008).  
 
Part 2: Procedures 
 
2.1 Recording 
 
The mealtimes were recorded using a Sony video camera and with an 
additional Dictaphone that was attached to a flat microphone. The use of a 
microphone with Dictaphones ensured that sound was recorded clearly, as it is 
sometimes the case that audio recorded by a video camera is not sufficiently 
clear. The family were given a tripod and chose where to place the camera and 
which meals they would record. They were asked to record approximately 
fifteen meals over the period of one month. During the initial visit when the 
family were given the camera they were told that they were able to delete any 
recordings during the filming period should they wish to do so. They were also 
given the opportunity for recordings to be deleted during the second visit when 
I collected the camera. The family chose not to do so.   
 
2.2 Transcription  
 
All of the data was initially transcribed verbatim by me. This allowed me to get 
close to the data, familiarise myself with the range of conversational topics and 
to begin to identify where disruptions occurred in the television documentary 
data. The second stage of transcription involved transcribing in full sections 
related to the emerging themes within the thesis, specifically, sections which 
contained uses of the verbs ‘want’ and ‘need’. These transcripts were produced 
using the Jefferson notation system, which was designed to highlight the 
sequential features of talk and various phonetic and articulatory features of 
speech (see Appendix for transcription symbols). The use of the Jefferson 
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notation system is standard in CA, where transcripts aim to capture how things 
are said, with a view to analysing the actions talk performs, as well as talk’s 
verbal content. This includes paralinguistic features of talk such as intonation, 
emphases and pauses in talk, which are routinely omitted by orthographic 
transcriptions that focus merely on what was said (see Wooffitt, 2005).  
 
2.3 Analysis  
 
The analytic procedure was to produce, read and re-read the transcripts 
alongside repeated viewings of the video recordings to identify phenomena of 
interest. The first stages of research in CA have been characterised as 
unmotivated looking (Psathas, 1995). Rather than beginning with predefined 
hypotheses and theories to explore, the procedure is to identify examples of 
phenomena upon which to build generalisable descriptions. As the analysis 
progressed the attention focussed on sequences in which participants use the 
verbs ‘want’ and ‘need’. Separate documents were composed according to 
particular areas of interest. For example where ‘I want’ was used as part of a 
two-part ‘I’m not X, I want Y’ structure, these formed a separate collection. The 
first stage of analysis involved identifying what participants were doing through 
their talk in sequences where ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ were invoked. The second 
stage was identifying how this was done and the interactional import of these 
terms in specific interactional sequences.  
 
2.4 Ethics and confidentiality 
 
The project conforms to the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics 
(http://www.bps.org.uk/the-society/code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct_home.cfm 
) as well as Loughborough University’s Ethical Code of Practice 
(http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/index.html) that all research 
must follow.  
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With regard to the Potts, Crouch and Olivers corpuses, there are ethical issues 
related to the use of video material that allows individuals to be identified and 
the use of minors as participants.   
 
The data taken from the Discourse and Rhetoric Group archives (the Crouch 
and Olivers corpuses) were collected under a set of ethics protocols designed 
for use with child participants. Feedback from participants has been used to 
make materials clearer and to identify the issues that are of most concern to 
participants. The researchers who collected these materials have developed 
ways of presenting and talking about the research that are clear to younger 
children. At each stage it was ensured that younger participants were directly 
addressed rather than having parents answer on their behalf.  These same 
protocols were adopted as I collected the Potts corpus. Participants were 
asked to record only when they were happy and able to do so. They were 
informed that they were able to delete any particular recording during the 
recording period and were given a further opportunity to do so upon collection 
of the recording equipment at the end of the recording period.  
 
Each participant was given a participant information sheet with full details of 
the study and it was ensured that each individual fully understood the 
information provided on this sheet. Participants over the age of eighteen were 
asked to sign two copies of informed consent forms, one to be retained by 
them for their personal records and one which was retained by me as the 
principal researcher. Participants under the age of eighteen were asked to sign 
two copies of willingness to participate forms and a parent or guardian was 
asked to sign two copies of parental consent forms. Parents retained a copy of 
each for their personal records. Initial permission was sought for the use of 
video data and transcripts to be used as part of the research project for my 
thesis. Participants were able to opt in or out of further levels of permission 
which were for data to be used in grant reports, research publications and 
presentations. A further option which participants were asked to opt in or out of 
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was for data to be donated to the Discourse and Rhetoric Group archives 
following completion of the study. Participants were assured confidentiality and 
were informed of their right to withdraw at any point during the study. 
Participants were also informed of their rights for anonymity and so far this has 
not been requested. However pseudonyms are used in publications. A copy of 
the informed consent form, willingness to participate form and parental consent 
form are included in appendix B.   
 
All participants in the AAF, TF1974 and TF2008 datasets provided their 
informed consent for these recordings to be made to the respective production 
companies. As each participant has given informed consent to be filmed for the 
purposes of a television documentary, the use of these datasets conforms with 
the BPS code of conduct (2009) clause 1.3 (ix) which states “unless informed 
consent has been obtained, restrict research based upon observations of 
public behaviour to those situations in which persons being studied would 
reasonably expect to be observed by strangers”. As these data have been 
publically broadcast, the use of pseudonyms and changes of names and 
locations were not required.  
 
Summary  
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the practicalities of the thesis. 
Building on chapter 2, where I discussed my theoretical approach, the chapter 
began with an introduction of the data set and a consideration of the benefits 
and limitations of the data. I then moved on to outline the methodological 
procedures followed as data for the thesis was recorded, transcribed and 
analysed. The following four chapters present the analysis of the data.  
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4 
 
‘Want’ as an interactional resource 
Saying that you want something - demanding it - does not necessarily mean 
that you will get it, but not saying what you want more or less guarantees that 
you will not get it. And even if you do, you may not recognise it. Before you can 
say what you want, you have to know what that is. You have to think about it, 
discuss it, agree on it. (Fairburns, 2002, pp. 9-10). 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The quote above raises important issues for any speaker of the English 
language. Does saying what you want mean that you will get it? And if one 
doesn’t say what they want, how on earth will they ever get it? The ability to 
‘say what you want’ is held in high esteem in Western culture, and forms an 
important part of assertiveness training, for example in organisational settings 
(e.g. Eggert, 2011). The assumption underlying programmes such as these is 
that individuals ordinarily proceed by expressing what they want and that some 
individuals find it difficult to do so. This thesis takes a very different view and 
examines uses of the verb ‘want’ as a specific example of mental state talk, 
implicated in various kinds of conversational activities. Before examining 
specific activities in detail, I begin by showing how speakers construct their 
own and others’ wants in talk and discuss some of the kinds of conversational 
activities in which these constructions are involved. I begin by surveying work 
in developmental psychology which is concerned with children’s developing 
understanding of desire, the fundamental assumptions of this work and the 
associated methodological and theoretical problems. This work can be 
contrasted with my own discursive approach, which examines ‘wants’ as 
constructions which work within a flow of interactional considerations. In 
section 2.1 the analysis begins with an explication of what is meant by ‘wants’ 
being implicated in various conversational activities. Specifically, I examine the 
kinds of sequences in which young children use ‘I want’ constructions. In the 
second part of the analysis I focus on adult-adult talk and examine in further 
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detail the various kinds of activities in which invocations of one’s own or others’ 
wants are implicated. The aim of this chapter then, is to begin to reveal some 
of the fundamental issues for research into mental states, such as that carried 
out under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which hinges on an assumption of 
speakers’ communication of discrete, private mental states.  
 
1.1 Developing understanding of desires: Experimental testing  
 
Theory of Mind is often understood as a single cognitive capacity, which is 
equated with succeeding in the false belief task. Nonetheless, it is widely 
documented that acquiring a ‘Theory of Mind’ involves the development of 
multiple concepts throughout childhood in a hierarchical fashion (see Wellman, 
2010 for a review). This notion has its roots in Wellman and Woolley’s (1989) 
influential proposal that children understand others in terms of their desires 
before they understand them in terms of their beliefs. Consequently there has 
been increasing interest in studying children’s understanding of desires, 
intentions, knowledge and other states using a battery of tasks which are 
methodologically comparable to the false belief task (Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
These tests focus on differing constructs, such as emotions, intentions and 
other states. For example Wellman and Liu (2004) examined children’s 
performance on five kinds of Theory of Mind tasks; diverse desires, diverse 
beliefs, knowledge access, contents belief and real-apparent emotion. They 
argue that children’s performance was scaleable (Guttman, 1950, as cited in 
Wellman & Liu, 2004) and that children understand contrasting desires before 
they understand contrasting beliefs and that understanding differing knowledge 
states is more difficult still. Experimental tests of children’s understanding of 
desires are based on several assumptions regarding the nature of desire, 
which have been summarised as follows;   
 
• Children need to understand that desire is a mental state rather than 
simply identify desires with actions. They also need to understand the 
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causal link between desires and actions and that different desires may 
cause different actions.  
• Children need to understand the relationship between desires and their 
satisfaction conditions and that satisfaction conditions for desires are 
outcomes, rather than actions.  
• Children need to understand the representational nature of desire, that 
desire is an intentional state and represents attitudes towards things, 
rather than the things themselves. (Astington & Gopnik, 1991).  
 
A central research issue is whether children understand that mental states are 
subjective; that they can differ from reality and that people can have mental 
states which differ from one’s own. This understanding is believed to mark the 
shift to a representational Theory of Mind. Consequently research typically 
involves creating a conflict between the child’s own desires and those of a 
protagonist and asking the child to predict how the protagonist will act in a 
specific situation. For example, the child will be shown several objects such as 
stickers, items of food or pictures of different activities. They will either be told a 
story about the protagonist (from which they are required to infer the 
protagonist’s ‘desires’) or told explicitly which item the protagonist prefers. 
They are then asked to predict which item or activity the protagonist will 
choose. If children respond by predicting that the protagonist will choose the 
item or activity which the character ‘wants’ this is interpreted as a reflection of 
the appreciation of the subjective nature of desires. If the child ‘fails’ the task 
and predicts that the character will choose the item or activity which the child 
themselves have indicated that they ‘want’, this is interpreted as an inability to 
appreciate that others may have desires that differ from one’s own (e.g. 
Carlson, Mandell & Williams, 2004; Cassidy et al., 2005a; Wellman & Liu, 
2004) (for further discussion of experimental testing of desires, including an 
example of a vignette, see chapter 2).  
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We can note that this experimental paradigm is based on several assumptions. 
The first is that the experimental set-up is an adequate ‘stand in’ for reality. 
Typically, experimenters read vignettes to participants, from which they are 
required to draw inferences regarding the protagonist’s (often a doll or puppet)  
‘wants’. Children are shown pictures of items or activities and are asked to 
make predictions regarding what a protagonist will do or feel, based on the 
story told by the experimenter (for discussion of the problems associated with 
the use of vignettes from a discursive perspective, see Potter & Edwards, 
1990; Edwards & Potter, 1992). The second is that children have sufficient 
information-processing resources required to understand and adequately take 
part in tasks (Apperly et al., 2004; Lind & Bowler, 2009). As Bloom and 
German (2000) note, false belief tasks are inherently difficult and place several 
non-trivial processing demands on participants. The third, which is particularly 
pertinent to the analysis in this chapter, is that people ordinarily act in ways 
which are consistent with the fulfilment of their desires. That is, children are 
given information regarding the protagonist’s preferences or desires and are 
asked to predict the protagonist’s actions based on this information.  
 
1.2 Methodological problems 
 
Several basic problems with the methodology and assumptions of Theory of 
Mind research were discussed in detail in chapter 2. Here it is sufficient to note 
that ‘mental states’ are understood as discrete private states which are 
communicated via language. As Leudar and Costall (2004) note, although 
contemporary psychology claims to set aside Cartesian dualism, it inherits and 
reproduces the problem of ‘other minds’ as mind is distinguished from 
behaviour and mental states are accepted as being private. We can also note 
that the typical experimental set-up involves questions and answers regarding 
the actions of a puppet and as such is a clear departure from what happens 
during everyday interactions (Antaki, 2004; McCabe, 2009; Wootton, 2006). As 
McCabe (2009) notes, in the typical experiment the support structures inherent 
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in everyday interaction that are available for making inferences are removed. In 
interactional sequences information regarding speakers ‘intentions’, and so on, 
is provided so that formal inferences are not necessary. Further, the focus of 
these experiments is on the activities and mental states of the puppet, which 
forecloses any insight into how notions of wanting may be used functionally, by 
the speaker, with regard to the speaker’s own ‘first person’ projects.  
In what follows I begin to examine speakers’ invocations of wants in 
interactional sequences and discuss the kinds of activities within which these 
claims are embedded. In doing so I show that the typical experimental set-up, 
designed to assess children’s understandings of ‘desires’, is a clear departure 
from everyday interaction. The aim is to highlight some fundamental problems 
with the dominant methodology of Theory of Mind research.   
 
2.0 Analysis 
 
The analysis is divided into two subsections. I first illustrate how claims 
regarding ‘wants’ are fruitfully understood as interactional resources produced 
within specific sequential contexts, rather than as simply referring to a private 
‘mental state’. The analysis in this subsection begins by examining young 
children’s talk and the kinds of sequences within which ‘I want’ constructions 
are embedded. The analysis in this subsection leads to the conclusion that in 
everyday interaction, ordinarily ‘wanting’ is not understood or treated as a 
sufficient basis for ‘doing’ or for ‘acting’. This has specific implications for work 
which is based on the assumption that individuals act in ways that are 
consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘desires’. In the second section I consider 
in further detail how claims regarding ‘wants’ are embedded within various 
conversational activities in conversation. For example, I examine the practice 
of ascribing ‘wants’ to others to achieve a particular rhetorical effect. Rather 
than understanding actions as a consequence of pre-existing intentional states 
I approach the relationship between ‘desires’ and ‘intentions’ as “a practical 
concern in how actions are reported” (Edwards, 2008, p. 177). The ultimate 
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aim of the thesis is to illustrate that claims regarding ‘wants’ are performative 
and interactive. Rather than communicating an individual, discrete entity, these 
constructions accomplish particular activities in specific settings.  
 
2.1 ‘Wanting’ in interaction  
 
In the first section the analysis focuses on young children’s uses of ‘I want’ 
formulations during the course of conversation. I begin to show how the 
formulation of what proponents of Theory of Mind may take to be an internal 
mental experience of desire, or which may otherwise may be dismissed as 
uninteresting (for example, utterances which are disregarded as they are used 
“purely for social convention” [Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, p. 67]), functions as a 
device in and for interaction.  
 
Extract 4.1 Crouch 3 02:10 
01    (7.2) 
02  Kat: I don’t ea:t (.) all mi::ne (.) ↑↑yoghurt (       )↑↑ 
03   (2.0) 
04  Lin: >you’re have to have< so[me chee]rios as well=  
05  Ann:                         [hh     ]              
06  Lin: =th[en if you’re not goinna eat that one] 
07  Ann:    [bee: gesu::h                        ] neh!ver 
08  guu:h  ((singing)) 
09  ((reaches over and points at Kath’s yoghurt)) 
10   (2.0) 
11  Ann: [gu::h yoghu::rt        ] 
12  Ann: [((taps Kath’s yoghurt))] 
13   (0.8) 
14  Kat: don’t want ↑ea::t↑ that o:ne  
15   (0.3) 
16  Lin: if you don’t eat that one you’re going to need to eat 
17  some cheerios cause that’s not enough one little 
18  yoghurt¿ before you go to schoo:l.  
19  | (1.6)                   | 
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20  Lin: |((separates full yoghurt from Kath’s eaten one and 
21  places towards middle of table))| 
22  Ann: o:[:h!] 
23  Lin:   [  w]’you have some cheerios?  
24  Kat: ((nods head slightly and quickly)) 
25 →  Ann: [I w[a:nt     o::]:ne               ]  
26  Ann: [((reaches for Katherine’s yoghurt))]  
27  Lin:     [or a banana?]  
28  |((moves yoghurt away from Anna))| 
29  | (0.2)                    | 
30  Kat: °mum[ee::°   ]  
31  Lin:     [you need] to finish that fi:rst darling ((to 
32  Anna)) 
33 →  Kat: I want cheerios please 
34  Lin: °°alri:ght eat your gra[pes ]°° 
35  Ann:                        [I wa]nt two (.)  woghurts 
36   (2.2)  
37  Lin: [ea:t those first,        ] 
38  Lin: [((passes grapes to Kath))]  
 
I will begin by considering Anna’s use of ‘I want’ at line 25 and the 
conversational sequence within which the turn is embedded. We can begin by 
noting that during the sequence Anna is attempting to retrieve a yoghurt that 
has been discarded by Katherine (lines 2, 14) and that is subsequently placed 
in the middle of the table by Linda (lines 20-21) during breakfast. Let us begin 
by noting the various features of this sequence. Katherine announces that she 
will not be eating the second yoghurt at line 2. As Linda tells Katherine that in 
this case she will have to eat some Cheerios instead of the yoghurt, Anna 
begins to reach over and point at the yoghurt (line 9), before reaching out and 
physically tapping it (line 12). Katherine then makes a second announcement 
and rejects the yoghurt using a negative formulation of her ‘wants’ ‘don’t 
want ↑ea::t↑ that o:ne.’. Linda then picks up the yoghurt, which is still 
attached to an empty pot, and separates the two before placing the uneaten 
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yoghurt towards the middle of the table (lines 20-21). Anna then delivers the 
target turn ‘I wa:nt o:::ne’ as she reaches out for the yoghurt for a second 
time.  
 
There are several things to note at this point. First, Anna’s ‘I want’ construction 
is delivered to request a specific object that was previously part of Katherine’s 
breakfast and which was rejected by Katherine using an ‘I don’t want’ 
construction. It is notable that both Katherine’s rejection and Anna’s request 
are built using ‘I want’ and so Anna’s request stands in direct contrast to 
Katherine’s rejection. Analysis of the dataset reveals that children often deliver 
‘I want’ constructions to request something which is also available to a sibling. 
What distinguishes this from a typical request (such as ‘can I have the 
yoghurt?’) is that the turn is built using a declarative, rather than an 
interrogative format and so does not formally solicit a yes/no response and 
thereby propose either of these as a possibility. Further, the use of a ‘I want’ 
emphasises the subject-side (Edwards, 2005) of the request. By this I mean 
that the ‘I want ’ construction foregrounds Anna as the speaker and requests 
the object as simply a relation between speaker and object, irrespective of the 
sibling. This proposes that the request is delivered independently of other 
considerations that may be circumstantial to the request, such as to emulate 
Katherine. This will be taken up in further detail in chapter 5 ‘children’s wants’. 
At this point it is sufficient to note that Anna’s claims regarding her ‘wants’, 
realised through an ‘I want’ construction, has a practical use in this particular 
sequential environment.  
 
The second thing to note is the very nature of the action of using ‘I want’ to 
build a request. As an action requesting may be defined as asking for 
something to be given or done. As such the very act of requesting presupposes 
that permission, assistance or agreement is needed from the request recipient 
for the request to be granted. Note that Anna is able to reach the yoghurt and 
does so at line 12 as she reaches out and taps it. Thus if Anna were acting in a 
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way which is consistent with the fulfilment of her ‘desires’ she could simply take 
the yoghurt. The very act of delivering a request using ‘I want’ presupposes 
that permission is needed and that in fact, one cannot simply act on one’s 
‘desires’, ‘wishes’ and ‘wants’. Rather, Linda is treated as an arbitrator of 
Anna’s ‘wants’ as Anna seeks permission to eat the yoghurt.  
We can also note that Linda responds by moving the yoghurt away from Anna 
(line 28) as she instructs her to finish her cereal first, using a ‘need’ 
construction. The use of ‘need’ as a way of delaying the delivery of a second 
part of an adjacency pair will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6. At this 
point it is sufficient to note that Anna’s claim to ‘want’ the yoghurt is not treated 
as a sufficient basis for her to be given it. Rather, Anna is told what she needs 
to do first and so it is clear that there are obligations and necessities which 
must first be fulfilled before Anna can do as she ‘wants’.  
 
Let us now move on to consider Katherine’s ‘I want’ construction at line 33. 
Again, rather than understanding this as simply a reference to a private 
experience of desire, a more fruitful approach is to consider the turn as part of 
the interactional sequence within which it is embedded. The sequence starts at 
the beginning of the extract as Katherine announces that she will not be eating 
the second yoghurt (line 2). Linda responds by informing Katherine that she will 
‘have to have< some cheerios as well’ (lines 4-6). Linda delivers a 
second directive at lines 16-18 and an account that minimises the amount of 
food that Katherine has eaten (‘one little yoghurt¿’) and which restricts 
Katherine’s response options (she is going to school, has not eaten enough 
and so must eat more). Linda then asks Katherine whether she will have some 
Cheerios (line 23) or a banana (line 27).  
 
At this point Anna launches a side sequence (Jefferson, 1972) as she attempts 
to retrieve the yoghurt, disrupting the contiguity of the ongoing sequence 
between Linda and Katherine. At line 30 Katherine delivers the address term 
‘°mumee::°’ which displays an orientation to re-establishing recipiency and 
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the re-initiation of the interaction between herself and Linda. This is 
unsuccessful, however, as Linda continues interacting with Anna as she directs 
her to finish her cereal before she can have a yoghurt (line 32). Following this 
directive Katherine delivers the target turn ‘I want cheerios please’.  
There are two things to note at this point. First, Katherine’s ‘I want’ construction 
is produced in a position where the second part of a directive-compliance pair 
is due, with Linda’s turns at lines 4 and 6, 16-18 and 23 serving as the first 
parts. Katherine could conceivably have responded with ‘I’ll have some 
Cheerios’. However the turn is built as a request, as a first pair part. The turn 
terminal ‘please’ also marks the turn as a request (a canonical first pair part), 
rather than ‘I want Cheerios thank you’ which would imply acceptance of an 
offer. By delivering a request format in the space where compliance with a 
directive is due, Katherine marks the turn as a new first pair part which makes 
relevant a response from Linda. This works to establish intersubjectivity and to 
reinitiate the interaction with Linda following the intervening side sequence. 
The second thing to note is the selection of an ‘I want’ format, rather than an 
interrogative such as ‘can I have Cheerios please?’. An interrogative format 
formally solicits yes or no as response options. However within the preceding 
sequence the understanding (Wootton, 2006) that Cheerios are on offer was 
reached. The use of ‘I want’ rather than an interrogative format displays an 
orientation to this understanding. As Butler notes, “the detailed examination of 
children’s talk in natural settings has the potential to take theorising about 
children’s competence beyond the realms of theory, and towards an 
understanding of children’s competences in action” (2008, p. 5). Examination of 
the practices which inform the organisation of children’s conduct, such as 
request differentiation, may reveal the operation of certain kinds of skill (c.f. 
Wootton, 2006). This matter will be taken up further in chapter 5.  
 
With regard to the issue of whether people ordinarily act in ways which fulfil 
their desires, and whether ‘wanting’ is a sufficient basis for ‘doing’ or for 
‘having’, Linda’s response at line 34 is particularly informative. Katherine’s turn 
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at line 33 is delivered as a first position request to be granted. The status of the 
utterance as a first pair part is subsequently accepted by Linda as she delivers 
a receipting response (‘alri:ght’). It is notable that rather than immediately 
granting the request and acting on the basis of what Katherine ‘wants’ Linda 
instructs Katherine to first eat her grapes, using a ‘need’ construction. What is 
notable about this sequence, for our purposes of questioning the notion of 
whether individuals ordinarily act in ways which are consistent with the 
fulfilment of their desires, is that although Katherine has been directed within 
multiple turns to eat Cheerios and has subsequently expressed a ‘want’ to do 
so, this is not treated as a sufficient basis for her to immediately eat them. 
Rather, the provision of Cheerios is contingent on her first eating her grapes 
and fulfilling this obligation before she can eat what she ‘wants’.  
That people do not ordinarily act in a manner which is consistent with the 
fulfilment of their ‘desires’ is evident as one considers the fine weave of 
interaction in the following two fragments. Both examples are taken from the 
same family meal. Extract 4.2 is fourteen and a half minutes into the recording, 
while extract 4.3 is taken from twenty minutes in, towards the end of the meal.  
 
Extract 4.2 Crouch 1 14:00 
01 Kat: plea::se have a no:::ll 
02 Ann: ont another [o::ne                 ] 
03 Lin:             [(y’just) eat some more] UH vegetables.  
04 Kat: [anna no::ll                        ] 
05 Kat: [((reaches towards packet of rolls))] 
06 Lin: Katherine >y’need to eat some< eat so:me vegetables. 
07 Kat: I’VE ETTON SOME VEGETA~BU:::[LS~] 
08 Mik:                             [ we]ll, why not eat a 
09   few more. 
10     (0.3) 
11 Kat: no::huo:::  
12    (1.0) 
13→ Kat: [~#I don’t wa:nt! to I don’t li:ke the:m.#~] 
14 Kat: [((picks up fork))                         ] 
 94
15     (1.0) 
16 Kat: [((holds fork above plate))        ] 
17   → Kat: [~I don’t li:::ke vegetabu[:::lls~]]  
18 Ann:                           [AYE!  I]:: I eaa unt=  
19 Kat: ((eats corn))        
20 Ann: =fwuntable:s  
21 Lin: yeah 
22  Mik: I’m eating all mi:ne.  
23     (0.4) 
24   → Kat: u::n, I: don’t li::ke the:::m. 
25  | (4.2)                         | 
26 Kat: |((puts piece of corn in mouth))| 
27 Kat: thi:s (one) went rou::nd all arou:nd the [circa:]:  
28 Lin:                                          [hmm:: ] 
29     (2.5) 
30 Lin: °s’looks like a (.) (cannibal)° 
31     (1.6)  
32 Mik: °ghu:m ghu:m°= 
33 Kat: [=I’ve etton some vegetabu:::ls] 
34 Kat: [((puts fork down))            ] 
35     (0.6) 
36 Lin: put your sausage do::wn, (.) please and use your (.) 
37  knife and fo::rk.  
 
A preliminary observation is that Katherine makes a claim regarding her 
‘wants’, in this instance what she does not want at line 13. To understand this 
turn one must consider it as part of the conversation within which it is 
produced. Linda (lines 3, 6) and Mike (lines 8-9) deliver a series of directives 
as they tell Katherine to eat more vegetables. Katherine repeatedly and 
emphatically defies and rejects these in a series of turns (lines 4, 7, 13) which 
can be heard as complaint implicative, evidenced, for example, by the claim 
that she has ‘ETTON SOME VEGETA~BU:::LS~’. Katherine then delivers a 
further objection ‘~#I don’t wa:nt! to I don’t li:ke the:m.#~’ as 
she picks up her fork to eat. Notably then, although Katherine resists Mike and 
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Linda’s directives verbally by claiming ‘~#I don’t wa:nt! to’ she 
physically begins to comply as she picks up her fork, an action which 
recognisably precedes ‘eating more’. As Craven and Potter note, as a class of 
actions, directives “embody no orientation to the recipient’s ability or desire to 
perform the relevant activity” (2010, p.1), in that as speakers deliver directives 
they display authority and entitlement to involve themselves in the recipient’s 
business without being asked to do so. It is precisely by claiming ‘~#I don’t 
wa:nt! to I don’t li:ke the:m.#~’ as she begins to comply with the 
directive, that Katherine characterises her actions as obedience. It is clear that 
rather than fully ‘going along’ with the directive Katherine complies against her 
will. As Katherine holds her fork above the plate she produces a further 
negative evaluation the relevant food item (lines 17, 24). She then immediately 
picks up a piece of corn and eats it before announcing ‘I’ve etton some 
vegetabu:::ls’ (line 33). In doing so she characterises her actions as 
obedience, displaying an orientation to the notion that one must do as they 
should rather than as they want.  
 
Clearly then, when we consider the fine weave of interaction, the notion that 
individuals ordinarily proceed in a manner which is consistent with the fulfilment 
of their desires (a key assumption of work within Theory of Mind), is a 
departure from what goes on during the course of our everyday lives, and a 
gross simplification of the meaning, for children and for adults, of expressions 
of wanting. Let us further explore the divergence between the typical 
experimental set-up and everyday interaction as we consider extract 4.3.  
 
Extract 4.3 Crouch 1 20:44 
01    Ann: .HHHHH ((exaggerated outbreath)) heh heh heh 
02    Lin: no::  
03   Ann: ↑heh heh heh↑ 
04    Kat: heh hmm hem 
05    Lin: no Anna no not silly noises.  
06    Mik: nah 
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07    Ann: [((kneels up on chair))] 
08    Ann: [BLU!HAH               ]    
09   →  Mik: well I think because it’s such a lovely hot da:y 
10      toda::y,  
11    Ann: NUAA:::H!  
12   →   Mik:      [((holds out finger))] 
13    Mik: wauh [li:ste:n, (2.0)     ]>I:: think because it’s  
14      such a lovely hot day today, think we might be able  
15      to have ani- ice lolly outsi:de as a  
16      spec[ial treat.]< 
17    Ann:     [↑hu:h     ]hu::h! ↑ 
18        (0.6) 
19    Lin: right Kath[erine fuh- finish i:t] 
20    Ann:           [look peeka          p]eeka apleek luke.  
21        (1.2) 
22    Ann: ((turns head and looks at Linda)) 
23    Ann: ↑hah! heh [heh >heh heh heh] heh heh<↑ 
24    Kat:           [heh heh .hhh!   ] 
25    Mik: £wass he s[a::y£] 
26    Ann:           [ peek]a peeka peek lu[::ke.]  
27    Kat:                                 [↑heh ]heh↑ 
28    Ann: ↑heh heh peeka peeka luke↑ 
29        (0.3) 
30    Ann: [pee-]  
31    Mik:         [((points at Anna))                       ] 
32    Mik: [bu::]t [you’ll have to eat one of your potatoe:s,] 
33      before you have an ice lolly:,  
34      [.hh you’ll        ]have to eat some of your ve:g  
35      [((points at Kath))]           
36      before you have an ice lolly. 
37      |  (3.3)                | 
38    Ann: |((remains kneeling in chair)| 
39    Mik: (let’s) see you eat your potato the:n.  
40       | (4.4)                              | 
41    Ann:  |((puts hands over face, picks up potato))| 
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The first thing to note about this extract is Mike’s offer of an ice lolly at lines 9-
10 and 13-16. In some ways this can be compared with tasks designed to 
assess children’s understandings of desires. As noted earlier, researchers 
ostensibly create a conflict between the child’s desire and that of the 
protagonist by presenting items which are designed to be particularly desirable 
or particularly undesirable to the child. Several design features of Mike’s turn 
work to present the lolly as particularly attractive, as this is a ‘special 
treat.<’ as it is ‘such a lovely hot day’ (a somewhat rare occurrence 
during the English summer!). Earlier in the meal Linda asked Anna to try eating 
her potatoes, to she responded by stating ‘don’t want to’ (data not shown). In 
extract 4.2, taken from the same meal, Katherine resists eating vegetables, 
claiming ‘~#I don’t wa:nt! to I don’t li:ke the:m.#~’. Both girls 
then, have claimed not to ‘want’ to eat these food items.  
Recall that during the typical experimental set-up children are presented with 
several items or activities, one of which is typically designed to be particularly 
attractive in contrast to the other items which are designed to be unattractive. 
Children are then typically told which item the protagonist prefers and are 
asked to predict the protagonist’s reaction in a specific situation. To ‘pass’ this 
task, children are required to predict that the protagonist will act in a way which 
is consistent with the fulfilment of their own, rather than the child’s, ‘desires’. 
However it is immediately apparent that there is a departure between this 
experimental design and what goes on during the course of everyday 
interaction.  
 
One notable feature of the extract is that the ice lolly is offered to persuade the 
girls to eat more of their main meal. This is evidenced as Linda directs 
Katherine to ‘finish i:t’ (line 19) while Mike explicitly presents the provision 
of an ice lolly as contingent on Anna eating a potato (line 33) and Katherine 
eating more vegetables (line 35). As Núñez and Harris note, “adults often seek 
to guide young children by means of conditional rules in which children are 
given permission to engage in some desired activity provided that a special 
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condition is fulfilled” (1998, p. 153). Although the ice lolly is presented to 
Katherine and Anna as something particularly ‘desirable’, it is clear that they 
will only be given this only when once less ‘desirable’ food items (potato, 
vegetables) have been eaten. Here we see again that expressions of ‘wanting’ 
occur in relation to, and in the service of, interactions involving obligations and 
constraints. Rather than simply acting in ways which fulfil one’s desires, Linda 
and Mike are the arbitrators of Katherine and Anna’s wants as the moral nature 
of doing as one should before doing as one wants is put into place.  
The analysis so far has focussed on the kinds of environments in which 
children make claims regarding their ‘wants’. When studying children’s talk 
researchers in the field of social cognition code utterances as either genuinely 
reflecting a private mental state, or otherwise as doing some sort of action, in 
which case they are treated as uninteresting and unrevealing for the purposes 
of studying the workings of ‘the mind’. Here we have begun to reveal that 
children’s claims regarding ‘wants’ are fruitfully examined as resources in and 
for interaction and that considering children’s competencies in action may 
reveal certain kinds of skill. This will be explored further in chapter 5 which 
focuses in further detail on the practical uses of children’s ‘I want’ 
constructions.  
 
Before moving on to examine in section 2 the kinds of conversational activities 
in which claims regarding ‘wants’ are embedded, let us consider one final 
extract which shows that claims regarding ‘wants’ may be designed to achieve 
a particular effect in a specific sequential environment. As noted in chapter 2, a 
key assumption of work on Theory of Mind is that the function of ascribing 
‘mental states’ to others is to explain and predict their actions. An inability to do 
so is implicated in explanations of autism and schizophrenia (Frith, 1992; Frith 
& Corcoran, 1996; Corcoran, 2000, 2001). The following extract shows us how 
the ascription of others ‘wants’ may be organised to achieve a particular 
rhetorical effect. Here Bill ascribes ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’ to Grant as they 
are discussing Grant’s plans for work that summer.  
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Extract 4.4 AAF5 2959 
01 Bil: well you know I- I was- (.) I was talki:n’ to 
02   Mother you know and uh to:ld her that uh you 
03   weren’t very interested in doing any more work 
04   ya’ see, 
05  Gra: mmm, 
06  Bil: and I do:n’t blame ye:r, I think that’s a very 
07    (.)  
08   honest rea:ction (.) there’s nothi:ng wro:ng (.)  
09   with that kind of feel:ing,  
10  Bil: [((turns head away front Grant, looks at arm))] 
11   [ (1.0)                                 ] 
12   → Bil: uhm: (1.2) it’s a natural thing to feel like you  
13       don’t wanna work  
14  Gra: I don’t- it’s not that I don’t wanna work, it’s 
15   just u:h, 
14   | (0.6)        | 
15  Pat: |((leans head on arm))| 
16  Pat: what kind of work did you have in mi:nd then 
17   Grant*  
18    (1.4) 
19  Pat: [((scratches forehead))                       ]                     
20  Pat: [watching the television? and listening to the]      
21    recu:rds, and playing guita:r              
 
The key thing to note about this extract is Bill’s ironic formulation of Grant’s 
being ‘interested in’, ‘feeling’ and ‘wanna’. At the beginning of the extract Bill 
claims that Grant is ‘not interested’ in doing any more work, which he 
subsequently formulates as an ‘honest rea:ction’ with which ‘there’s 
nothi:ng wro:ng’. Following a gap in the turn space projected for a 
response from Grant (line 11), Bill continues his turn at talk and claims that 
Grant doesn’t ‘wanna’ work but that this is a ‘natural thing’.  
Bill’s turns at lines 1-4, 6-9 and 12-13 may be glossed as follows; Bill knows 
that Grant isn’t interested in doing any more work and he has told Pat about 
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this. Bill does not blame Grant for feeling like this as he recognises that it is 
natural to not want to work. However deliberation and close inspection of the 
fine weave of the conversational sequence suggests that this glossed report of 
Bill’s turn is inadequate and insufficient. We must consider the interactional 
import of what may otherwise be taken to be a cognitive accomplishment; the 
attribution of Grant’s mental states made by Bill. Rather than Bill using a theory 
to explain and predict Grant’s actions, we can explore what the turn is built to 
achieve within the conversational sequence. That is, that Bill’s claims regarding 
Grant’s ‘interests’ and ‘wants’ is built to lexically separate motivations and 
‘wants’ from actions in order to present a case for Grant to find a job that 
summer, regardless of his ‘wants’.  
 
The claim that ‘it’s a natural thing to feel like you don’t 
wanna work’ implies that the majority of people experience this feeling but 
have to work regardless. The effect of this is to challenge Grant’s overt actions 
and current lack of a summer job. Bill’s turn is built to endorse Grant’s ‘wants’ 
while appealing to a normative order which dictates that ‘not being very 
interested in’ or ‘not wanting’ to work is not a sufficient basis for not doing so. 
Also note Bill’s ascription of ‘honesty’ to Grant. ‘Honesty’ is normatively 
required when what is being confessed is problematic (Edwards & Fasulo, 
2006). That it takes ‘honesty’ to admit to not want to work implies that there is 
something untoward about this. In sum, Bill produces a formulation of Grant’s 
‘wants’ in order to separate these lexically from his actions and to imply that not 
‘wanting’ to work is not a legitimate reason for not doing so. Rather than 
accepting the rather naive and simplistic gloss detailed above, assuming that 
Bill has used a process akin to scientific theory formation in order to explain 
and predict Grant’s actions, we can see that Bill’s formulation of Grant’s ‘wants’ 
is rhetorically organised and deployed in a way that undermines and 
challenges Grant’s current actions of not working.  
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2.2 Sequential environments 
 
As noted above, rather than being understood as simple references to private 
states, or otherwise as functional uses which should be disregarded for the 
purposes of analysis, utterances in which speakers make claims regarding 
their own or others ‘wants’ are fruitfully examined as performing actions within 
sequences of action. This section builds on the analysis in the preceding 
section and begins to consider the range of activities within which ‘want’ 
constructions are embedded.  
 
Within my materials, ‘I want’ and ‘you want’ constructions are used in a diverse 
range of activities such as offers, accounts, requests, directives and rejections. 
Requests, directives and rejections will be examined in detail in chapters 5, 6 
and 7. To illustrate what is meant by considering ‘want’ constructions as 
embedded within various activities in conversation, in what follows I outline two 
environments in which speakers systematically make claims regarding their 
own and others’ ‘wants’, and consider the interactional import of these 
constructions on these specific occasions. In section 2.2.1 I examine the 
construction of one’s own and other’s ‘wants’ as a way of challenging an 
interlocutor. In section 2.2.3 I examine ‘I want’ constructions as a way of 
providing an account for one’s actions when those actions are challenged by a 
co-interactant.  
 
2.2.1 Challenging an interlocutor: ‘What you Want X?’ 
 
In this section the analysis focuses on the practice of making claims regarding 
others’ ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’ as a way of building a complaint regarding 
their actions. As noted in chapter 2, according to Theory of Mind and Folk 
Psychology individuals manage everyday life by constructing theories 
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regarding other’s mental states and using these to explain and predict others’ 
behaviour. In what follows I show how claims regarding others’ wants may be 
rhetorically organised to challenge a co-interactant’s actions. Thus, rather than 
understanding the attribution of others’ ‘wants’ as a cognitive insight, I examine 
this as a practice in and for interaction. Specifically, I examine how claims 
regarding others ‘wants’ may be used to convey a challenging stance towards 
recipient’s actions by proposing that those actions are nonsensical or 
illegitimate.  
 
Two prototypical examples of using ‘you want X’ to convey a challenging 
stance towards recipient’s actions are seen below. I begin by identifying 
generic features across the extracts before discussing each in further detail.   
 
Extract 4.5 TF2008 6:10 
01 Sim: just having a little blip, you had one of these  
02  befo:re, and [you worked through it.]  
03 Cha:              [YEAH and then I       ] tried to do it  
04  agai:n, (0.2) and now I ↑hate↑ it again 
05    (1.0) 
06   → Jan: what do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip sho:p  
07  Charlotte for the rest of your life¿  
08 Sim: |((puts hand on Jane’s arm))| 
09  | (0.2)                   | 
10 Cha: ye::ah, I’ve already got a plan  
11 Sim: [((looks towards Jane))] 
12 Sim: [↑uh- uhh uhhh↑        ] 
13 Emi: both me and dad (do[n’t] )- 
14 Sim:                    [ Ja]:ne (.) let’s not es:calate  
15  this con[versation.     ] 
16 Cha:         [I’m gonna ha:ve] a job right?  
17    (0.3) 
18 Cha:  (.) ‘scuse me[:]  
19 Sim:             [[m]inimi:se=      ] 
20 Sim:              [((looks at Jane))] 
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21 Cha: =let me tell you, (.) <I will save u:p for two years  
22  and then go travelling>  
 
Extract 4.6 TF2008  40:10 
01 Sim:                     [((starts to hold up thumb))] 
02 Sim: she’s feeling a bit [lo::nely, (0.4) a:t      ] 
03  schoo:l,(0.8) cause her main friends aren’t  
04  the:re. (0.2).h she’s feeling- 
05 Sim:                   [[((puts arms down))] 
06 Jan: let me just sto:p [you there          ]and say why  
07  couldn’t we have had that conversation downstairs  
08  togethe:r instead of you: havin a go at me:, 
09 Sim: ((puts arm over face)) 
10 Sim: .hh c[uh-] 
11 Jan:      [ ma]king me look like the crap pare:nt, 
12  .h and then co:min’ up here and he coming to talk to  
13  you because y’know she’s in a position now where  
14  she’s got to talk to you and calm it do::wn  
15   → Sim: what (.) you wanna have a row about it.  
16    (.) 
17 Jan: oh I’m sorry you were allowed to row downstai:rs.  
18 Sim: ah wasn’t rowing >I were just saying< I did not  
19  agree:: 
20 Jan: shouting  
 
Both examples are taken from the TF2008 corpus and took place on the same 
day. In the first extract the family are discussing Charlotte’s plans to leave sixth 
form school. Throughout the day Simon and Jane have repeatedly objected to 
these plans (data not shown). The second example occurs later on the same 
day as Simon and Jane are alone together and are about to go to sleep. 
Immediately preceding the start of the extract Simon attempted to engage Jane 
in conversation while she responded minimally. Simon then asked Jane 
whether she has ‘the raging hump’ (data not shown), which is a colloquial term 
for being annoyed or angry while implying subjective investment which 
counters a complaint’s objectivity (Edwards, 2005).  
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In extract 4.5 Charlotte claims to ‘hate’ school and cites her past experience 
(she tried to work through it before and now ‘hates’ it again) as a basis for her 
to leave. Jane challenges Charlotte’s proposed plan to leave school with ‘what 
do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip sho:p Charlotte 
for the rest of your life¿’ . In extract 4.6 Jane accuses Simon of 
‘having a go at her’ and making her ‘look like the crap pare:nt,’. 
Simon responds to this with ‘what (.) you wanna have a row about 
it.’  As ‘wh’ interrogatives that are delivered in an established environment of 
disaffiliation, both examples can be heard as a challenge rather than seeking 
information (Koshik, 2003). In both extracts the proposition that the recipient 
‘wants’ to carry out the particular action is hearably ironic and designedly 
‘nonliteral’ (see Edwards, 2000). Working in a fish and chip shop for the rest of 
your life and having a row are states of affairs which are recognisable as things 
that nobody would ‘want’ to do. My argument is that these constructions 
convey a challenging stance towards the recipient’s actions by formulating the 
outcome of those actions as particularly undesirable and by proposing that the 
recipient ‘wants’ this outcome to occur. Let us now examine each example in 
further detail.  
 
At the start of extract 4.5 Simon builds a case for Charlotte to continue at 
school. He characterises her current problems (which have been discussed at 
length during the preceding days) as a ‘little blip’ the kind of which she 
has worked through before, implying that she will work through them again and 
so that she should stay at school. In direct contrast to Simon’s formulation of 
her problems as a ‘little blip’  Charlotte emphatically claims to ‘↑hate↑’ 
school, citing her past experience (trying to work through things and failing to 
do so, and now ‘hating’ it again) as a reason to leave.  
 
Following a slight gap of silence (line 5) Jane delivers the target turn; ‘what 
do you wanna do:, work in a fish and chip sho:p Charlotte 
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for the rest of your life¿ ’. There are several design features of this 
turn which evidence its status as a challenge. First, as a ‘wh’ interrogative 
delivered in an established environment of disaffiliation, the turn can be heard 
as a complaint, or a challenge, rather than seeking information (Bolden & 
Robinson, 2011; Koshik, 2003). Second, rather than establishing recipiency, 
the address term which is embedded within the turn can be heard as 
underscoring personal concern for the problem (Lerner, 2003). Third, the 
notion of working in a fish and chip shop ‘for the rest of your life¿’ 
is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986). As Edwards (2000) notes, 
“denying or insisting on something in an extreme way can highlight the action 
of denying or insisting, as a kind of stance or investment” (p. 365). Here the 
extreme rejection of Charlotte’s plans indexes a challenging stance towards 
those plans as it is recognisable nobody would ‘want’ to ‘work in a fish and chip 
shop for the rest of your life’. Finally, what Charlotte ‘wants’ to do is a matter 
which Charlotte has more rights to know about than Jane. ‘B-events’ of this 
type make relevant an answer that confirms the speaker’s belief about the 
recipient (Labov & Fanshell, 1977), that is, that Charlotte ‘wants’ to work in a 
fish and chip shop. However such an answer would be heard to be in 
disagreement with Jane. Neither is disconfirming response an alternative, as 
this contrasts with the information provided by Charlotte in the preceding talk. 
In sum, both confirming ‘yes’ and disconfirming ‘no’ response are accountable 
and problematic. As Heinemann (2008) notes, recipients tend to treat these 
types of questions as unanswerable and rather than treat them as an 
information seeking question, orient to them as a challenge.  
 
In this example then we can see that Jane challenges Charlotte’s plans to 
leave school by proposing that these plans are illegitimate and nonsensical. 
This is realised through a formulation of a recognisably undesirable outcome of 
her proposed actions, something that nobody would ‘want’ to do (working in a 
fish and chip shop for the rest of your life) and by proposing that Charlotte 
‘wants’ this to occur. At this point we can note that a Theory of Mind 
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psychologist may argue that it is precisely because Jane is able to read 
Charlotte’s mind that she ascribes to Charlotte a desire to work in the fish and 
chip shop. However such an analysis relies on speakers accurate, 
straightforward reports of their ‘wants’. My argument is that any conversational 
deployment of a notion of wanting will always be a means of performing some 
kind of action within an interactional sequence. Far from Jane making a 
cognitively based inference regarding Charlotte’s intentions, or ‘reading’ 
Charlotte’s mind, an ironic formulation of Charlotte’s ‘wants’ is deployed as a 
way of conveying a challenging stance and displaying disalignment and 
disaffiliation.  
 
Extract 4.6 provides a further example. Jane and Simon are about to go to bed 
following the arguments which took place throughout the day, regarding 
Charlotte’s plans to leave school. Immediately preceding the start of the extract 
Simon attempted to initiate conversation with Jane, who responded minimally. 
Note that in extract 4.5 following Jane’s challenging ‘what do you wanna 
do:, work in a fish and chip sho:p Charlotte for the rest 
of your life¿’, Simon put  his hand on Jane’s arm as he launched a 
complaint against Jane. He accuses Jane of ‘escalating’ the conversation and 
instructs her to ‘minimi:se=’, implying that Jane has ‘gone too far’ and that 
her actions are antagonistic.  
 
Immediately preceding extract 4.6 Simon has asked Jane whether she has the 
‘raging hump’ (data not shown), a colloquial term which denotes a dispositional 
mood and implies than an individual is primed for trouble rather than 
responding to a troubling event (see Edwards, 1999, 2007 on the rhetorical 
uses of moods and emotions). In his turn at lines 2-4 Simon begins to 
formulate Charlotte’s ‘feelings’ about school, namely that she is ‘she’s 
feeling a bit lo::nely,’  ‘cause her main friends aren’t 
the:re.’ Jane breaks into Simon’s turn and accuses him of ‘havin a go’ at 
her and making her look ‘like the crap pare:nt,’ earlier on in the day. 
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Notably, not only is this utterance interruptive of Simon’s turn, but it is explicitly 
formulated as interruptive with ‘let me just sto:p you there’, marking 
the turn as particularly antagonistic. The notion that they could have ‘had 
that conversation downstairs’ formulates a sense of grievance 
towards Simon’s earlier display of disalignment. As a ‘why’ formatted 
interrogative Jane’s turn at lines 6-8 and 11 calls for an account from Simon 
while displaying a challenging stance (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). In sum, 
Jane’s turn launches a complaint regarding Simon’s conduct earlier in the day 
during the discussions with Charlotte.  
 
The target turn ‘what (.) you wanna have a row about it.’ does not 
deal with the specific accusations embedded in Jane’s turn, neither does 
Simon provide a relevant response in the form of an account for his actions. 
Rather he challenges Jane as he proposes that she ‘wants’ to have a row. The 
turn is built using a ‘wh’ interrogative and can be heard as challenge (Bolden & 
Robinson, 2011; Koshik, 2003). Both a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response are accountable 
and problematic and so the turn can be heard as asserting rather than 
questioning (Heinemann, 2008). While the notion of ‘wanting’ to have a row is 
hearably ironic and nonsensical, the proposal that Jane is ‘motivated’ to do so 
emphasises her subjective investment in the complaint. This works to counter 
the complaint’s evidential basis and objectivity (Edwards, 2005b) as it is 
implied that the source of Jane’s grievance is personal and subjective, rather 
than related to the object of the complaint, i.e. Simon’s earlier conduct. In sum, 
Simon formulates the outcome of Jane’s actions (a row will occur) and 
proposes that this is the motivating force behind her pursuit. The notion that 
Jane is intentionally motivated and ‘wants’ to have a row delegitimizes and is 
used to counter her compliant.  
 
In sum, in this section I have examined one practical function of formulating the 
‘wants’ of others which is to challenge their actions. These ‘what you want X’ 
constructs formulate the outcome of recipient’s actions as something which is 
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recognisably ‘undesirable’ and propose that this outcome is what the recipient 
‘wants’. Rather than constructing theories to explain and predict others’ 
behaviour, we can see that ascribing ‘wants’ to others is a practical feature of 
the ways in which actions are discussed, as formulations may be rhetorically 
organised to undermine and challenge recipients’ actions.  
 
 
2.2.2 Challenging an interlocutor: ‘I don’t want X’ 
 
In the preceding section we saw how speakers may challenge an interlocutor’s 
actions by producing an ironic formulation of their ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’. In 
this section I will examine a further way of challenging an interlocutor which is 
to make a claim regarding one’s own wants. ‘I don’t want’ constructions may be 
used to implement rejections and refusals. Analysis of the dataset reveals that 
‘I want’ constructions deployed in the service of rejecting and refusing are 
frequently co-implicated in other actions such as criticising and blaming. In 
contrast to inability accounts, which propose that the reasons for rejecting are 
outside of speakers’ control, ‘I want’ constructions invoke personal investment 
and emphasise the subject-side of a rejection. For this reason rejections and 
refusals built using ‘I don’t want’ may be co-implicated in challenging an 
interlocutor. The following extract, taken from the start of a meal taken from the 
Potts corpus, provides a prototypical example.  
 
Extract 4.7 Potts 2 00:00 
01  Jam: |((pulls out chair and sits down))| 
02    | (2.9)                      | 
03  Jam: no::! (.) I’ve just had a bowl, (.) ‘flaming  
04    porridge I can’t eat all them pieces of pizza. 
05  Jam: |((tries to take plate of pizza from Wayne))|  
06  Way: |((moves away from Jamie’s reach))          | 
07    | (2.0)                                | 
08  Jam: what are you doin  
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09  Jud: d’you want any brea:d 
10     (2.0) 
11  Don: [((sits down at table))           ] 
12  Don: [yeah I’ll have bread.            ] 
13  Way: [((arranges pizza amongst plates))] 
14   →  Jam: [↑I don’t want a:ll ah them↑] 
15  Jam: [((shakes head))            ] 
16  Don: two please.   
 
At the start of the extract Wayne picks up a plate of pizza from Jamie’s place at 
the table. Jamie treats this as objectionable with the emphatic, elongated 
‘no::!’,. It is unclear whether the division of the pizza was discussed prior to 
the beginning of the recording. In any case, it is a recurrent theme within the 
family that Wayne does not eat enough food and so it may be expectable that if 
Wayne is responsible for portion sizes, his own portion will be relatively small. 
Indeed it emerges that the division of pizza is the source of the trouble as 
Jamie delivers the complaint implicative ‘I’ve just had a bowl, (.) 
‘flaming porridge I can’t eat all them pieces of pizza’ as 
Wayne begins to rearrange the pizza amongst the plates.  Several design 
features of this turn evidence its status as a complaint. First, the turn initial ‘no’ 
is delivered exaggeratedly, treating Wayne’s actions as particularly 
complainable. Second, the extreme formulation of the pizza which Wayne 
places on Jamie’s plate (‘all them pieces of pizza.’) constructs the 
offer and the notion that she would be expected to eat all of the pizza as 
unreasonable. The lexical description of the ‘flaming porridge’ also 
displays a sense of grievance at the expectation of eating pizza after porridge. 
Jamie then tries to physically take the plate from Wayne to prevent him from 
distributing the pizza before asking ‘what are you doin’. This turn can be 
heard as a challenge (Koshik, 2003) as it is implied that Wayne’s actions are 
puzzling and non-sensical.  
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Wayne continues rearranging the pieces of pizza between the plates, leaving 
only a few pieces on his own plate (line 13). The target turn  ‘↑I don’t want 
a:ll ah them↑’ is delivered in response to the distribution of pizza. There 
are several things to note about this sequence. First, the ‘I don’t want’ 
construction is the second refusal of pizza in the sequence, with the first at 
lines 3-4. Second sayings take place in a different environment to first sayings 
(Schegloff, 2004b) and here the second refusal of pizza draws on the ‘not 
oriented to’ nature of the first refusal. As Jamie’s first refusal was ignored by 
Wayne who then gave her a large portion of pizza, his actions are particularly 
complainable. The second thing to note is that the target turn is delivered 
exaggeratedly with raised pitch as Jamie shakes her head, further evidencing 
its status as a complaint. In sum, the turn can be heard as complaint 
implicative as the ‘not oriented to’ nature of the first refusal is sanctioned. The 
use of an ‘I don’t want’ construction invokes personal investment and 
subjective reasons for refusing and constructs Wayne’s failure to orient to 
Jamie’s first refusal as particularly complainable.  
 
That the use of ‘I don’t want X’ to deliver a refusal invokes a sense of grievance 
and can be heard as complaint implicative is evident as we consider the 
following extract, taken from the Potts corpus.  
 
Extract 4.8 Potts12 06:30 
01 Jam:  ((looks at pizza box)) 
02 Jam:  have you fi:nished  
03    (1.8) 
04 Jud:  [((picks up pizza box from table))        ] 
05 Way:  [(loads of) p[ieces          ](.) pi:zza:,] 
06 Jud:       [((   )) (yours)] 
07    (.) 
08 Don: pi:zza. 
09    (0.4)  
10 Way:  [((looks at Judy))               ] 
11 Way:  [NO DON’T! put it >>in bin bin.<<] 
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12    (0.6)  
13 Jud:  half chewed  
14 Jud:  |((shows pizza box to Don))| 
15      | (0.4)              | 
16   → Don:  ↑I don’t want↑ (.) half chewed pizza¿  
17 Jud:  [((walks out of camera shot with pizza box))] 
18 Jam:  [º↑heh heh↑º                                ] 
19    (0.2) 
20 Way:  ºº((    ))ºº  
21    (0.6) 
22 Jam:  º£half che::wed£º 
23    (0.2) 
24 Don:  tha::lf che:wed, 
25    (2.0)  
26 Way:  thought you’d ate a:ny- thought you’d eat   
27       anything. 
28 Don:  |((turns over page of newspaper))| 
29       | (1.6)                   | 
30 Don:  ((coughs)) 
31    (0.2)  
32 Don: I do: eat anything. 
33 Jam:  juss’ not eat half eaten pi:z[za]  
34→ Don:                             [I ] don’t  
35       want half eat- half eat- (0.5) eaten pee (.)  
36       zu:h.   
37 Don:  |((puts forkful of food in mouth))| 
38       | (0.6)                      | 
39 Way: ºpizzaº 
40 Don:  |((looks at newspaper))| 
41      | (0.2)          | 
42 Don:  hm:  
 
The extract is taken from the towards the end of the meal as Judy begins to 
clear the table, removing a takeaway pizza box (line 4). In his turn at line 11 
Wayne tells Judy not to put the leftover pizza in the bin. The turn is delivered 
with a sense of urgency, with raised volume and exaggerated intonation. It is a 
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recurrent theme within the family that Don will ‘eat anything.’ (lines 26-27, 
32) and so it is a reasonable assumption that it would be Don, rather than any 
other family members, who would eat the pizza. Indeed Judy treats Don as the 
potential pizza eater as she shows him the remaining food (line 14) and offers 
an assessment of it as ‘half chewed’. Note that the choice of lexical 
description ‘chewed’, rather than ‘half eaten’ implies that the food may have 
been in someone else’s mouth, providing an account for throwing the pizza 
away.  
 
Don responds with the target turn ‘↑I don’t want↑ (.) half chewed 
pizza¿’. This turn is more than a rejection of the pizza. Several design 
features display a sense of offense regarding the very suggestion that he 
would eat the pizza. First, the turn is delivered exaggeratedly with raised pitch 
and questioning intonation or what Sacks & Schegloff (1979) have called a try 
marker. Try markers are used to confirm intersubjectivity and recipients’ 
understanding and so the notion that Don would not want ‘half chewed 
pizza¿’ is presented as something which should be recognisable to others. 
This constructs Wayne’s failure to recognise this as sanctionable and 
offensive. Second, Don could have responded with ‘I don’t want it’ or simply 
‘no’. The use of the locally initial reference form in a locally subsequent position 
(Schegloff, 1996a) highlights that rather than an objection to eating this 
particular pizza on this occasion the objection and rejection is relevant to any 
‘half chewed pizza¿’ as a category of food. Thus the turn can be heard as 
complaint implicative. This is further evidenced as Wayne subsequently 
formulates a disposition on behalf Don, accounting for his emphatic instructions 
not to throw the pizza away earlier in the sequence; ‘thought you’d eat 
anything.’ Don subsequently concedes that he will indeed ‘eat 
anything.’ (line 32) however ‘half chewed pizza’ does not fall into the 
category of anything ‘edible’. The exact repetition of the turn at line 16, 
including the initial reference form in a locally subsequent position (lines 34-36) 
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again constructs a sense of offense and grievance at the notion that he would 
eat ‘half chewed pizza’.  
 
In summary, in this section I have shown how using ‘I don’t want X’ as a way of 
delivering a rejection may be co-implicated in criticising and blaming. In extract 
4.7 Jamie’s use of ‘‘↑I don’t want a:ll ah them↑’ was deployed to 
display a sense of grievance at the suggestion that she should eat large 
amounts of pizza after eating  ‘a bowl,(.)‘flaming porridge’. In extract 
4.8 Don delivers ‘↑I don’t want↑ (.) half chewed pizza¿’ following 
the offensive presupposition embodied within Wayne’s turn at line 11 that he 
would do.  Rather than a simple rejection in each example the ‘I don’t want’ 
construction is used to convey a sense of grievance.  
 
2.2.3 Accounts 
 
In the final section of this chapter I examine a further environment in which 
speakers systematically produce ‘I want’ constructions which is to account for 
their actions when challenged by an interlocutor. Prototypical examples can be 
seen in the following two fragments.  
 
Extract 4.9 TF2008E1 12:59 
01  Jan: nickki’s le:ft hasn’t she 
02  Emi: yeah 
03  Jan: ↑she wants↑ to train you u:p, (0.6) in her position. 
04  Emi: [((looks at table))                ] 
05 Emi: [°I [know that’s what I told you:°]] 
06  Jan:     [<BUT SHE IS NOT              ]GOING TO DO IT*   
07   IF YOU’RE A:LWAYS OFF SICK* EMILY BECAUSE YOU ARE  
08   A:LWAYS OUT*.>  
09     (0.4)  
10  Jan: ↑↑and that (.)really↑↑ ma:kes me quite, (0.2)  sa::d, 
11    (.) and frustrated, (.) ↑and then a bit↑ angree:.  
12  Emi: |((looks down at lap))|  
 114
13   | (2.0)         | 
14 → Sim: so if you’re signed off work what you doing going out 
15   tonight¿ 
16    (1.6) 
17 → Emi: °because I want to:° 
18  Jan: .hhh 
19  Sim: because you want to. 
20    (1.0)  
21  Jan: this who:le thi:ng (.) >is not* ohka:y,<  
 
Extract 4.10 TF2008E7 40:19 
01 →  Sim:  why duh we haff tuh have thuh teevee ↑on then, why 
02    can’t we have a conversation 
03 →  Emi:  becuz I wan[n the ↑teevee o:n] 
04    Sim:              [why can’t you    ]  
05     [tell me what you were up to at  the weekend.]  
06    Sim: [     ((switches television off))            ] 
07    Emi: becuz I want (.) thuh teevee o:n 
08 Emi: ((moves away from counter towards television)) 
09   Sim: >↑te:ll me what you were up to at thuh weekend< 
10    Emi: ((switches television on))              
11   Emi: >ar:: a wen and saw hollee:< we sta:yed (.) ah her 
12    house (.) an then we went tuh ↑london. yes::   
 
In each of the arrowed turns the speaker calls for an account from a co-
interactant. In extract 4.9 Simon asks Emily what she is doing going out that 
night if she is signed off sick from work. In extract 4.10 Simon asks Emily why 
they have to have the television on rather than having a conversation. The turn 
at lines 14-15 in extract 4.9 is built using a ‘wh’ interrogative. As noted by 
Koshik (2003, 2005) ‘wh’ interrogatives such as why and how come may be 
heard as doing challenging or complaining, rather than questioning. In extract 
4.10 the turn at line 1 is built using a ‘why’ formatted interrogative. As Bolden & 
Robinson (2011) note, why-formatted account solicitations convey a 
challenging stance and as such “are co-implicated in other/additional actions 
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such as complaining, criticizing and blaming” (p. 99). The point that I am 
making is that an utterance such as ‘why duh we haff tuh have thuh 
teevee ↑on’ is not a neutral, information-seeking question. Rather, by the 
way in which the turn is formed, the speaker displays a challenging stance 
towards the accountable item. The supposition that there is no adequate 
account (Bolden & Robinson, 2011; Koshik 2003) is built into the turn. This has 
strong implications in terms of the kind of response which is relevant next.  
Bolden and Robinson (2011) note that following a ‘why’ formatted interrogative 
respondents often orient to the challenging stance embodied within the 
preceding turn by responding with a defensive justification, invoking 
“commonsense norms as grounds for defending themselves (or others) against 
the challenge” (p. 104). In each example above recipients respond using an ‘I 
want’ construction. Responding to a challenge by invoking one’s ‘wants’ has 
two effects. On the one hand, indexing one’s ‘mental states’ without providing a 
further account may concede that there is no adequate account in 
environments in which speakers’ response options are severely limited. On the 
other hand, these constructions invoke authority and entitlement to do as one 
‘wants’. The selective emphasis of the ‘subject-side’ of the accountable item 
deletes the contingencies and considerations of the recipient and rejects the 
challenge embodied within the preceding turn. Let us now consider each 
example in further detail.  
 
Extract 4.9 begins several minutes into a discussion between Simon, Jane and 
Emily regarding Emily’s recent absences from work and her frequent nights out 
clubbing.  
 
At first glance, this extract seems like one form of evidence that speakers’ 
actions are driven by their desires, beliefs and intentions. The turns at lines 14-
17 may be glossed as follows;  
 
1. Why are you going out tonight?  
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2. Because I want to.  
This gloss of what was said may lead researchers to conclude the following; 
Simon asks Emily for information about her motivations for going out that night. 
Emily replies by reporting that she has a desire to do so. This provides 
evidence that Emily’s actions are caused by her desires and that she is able to 
understand and to communicate her mental states to others. However as 
Antaki (2004) notes, such glossed reports of interactions are inevitably 
misleadingly inadequate. Rather “CA reminds us that what a speaker says is to 
be understood at least in part by reference to the dimensions of space the 
previous speaker has left open” (p. 673). A consideration of the fine weave of 
how Emily’s turn fits into the interactional sequence sheds light on what is 
going on within the sequence and the practical use of the ‘I want’ construction 
in this environment.  
 
We can begin by noting that at the start of the extract Jane builds a complaint 
against Emily, using a formulation of Emily’s boss’s ‘wants’. That is, her boss 
wants to ‘train her up’, presumably with a view to promoting her, but because of 
Emily’s frequent absences from work this is not going to happen. Emily’s 
agency and culpability is made clear; ‘YOU’RE A:LWAYS OFF SICK* EMILY 
BECAUSE YOU ARE A:LWAYS OUT*.’That is, rather than legitimately taking 
time off work because of illness, she does so because of frequent late nights 
out clubbing. Following Jane’s formulation of her emotional reaction to the 
situation (lines 10-11) Simon asks Emily why she is going out that night; ‘so 
if you’re signed off work what you doing going out 
tonight¿’. Several design features of this turn foreground the accountability 
of Emily’s actions and evidence its status as a complaint. The turn initial ‘so’ 
builds the turn as a logical or narrative consequence of Jane’s complaint while 
its grammatical formulation as a ‘wh’ question in an established environment of 
disaffiliation marks it as a challenge (Koshik, 2003). The notion that Emily is 
signed off work is treated as done, and this is contrasted with her ‘going out 
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tonight¿’. There is a normative expectation that if one is too sick to go to 
work, they do not go out to nightclubs, and so the design of the turn highlights 
that there is an inconsistency and transgression in Emily’s actions.  
In sum, rather than an information-seeking question regarding Emily’s 
motivations for going out that night, as the gloss of the conversation above may 
lead us to infer, the turn displays a challenging stance towards Emily’s actions. 
It is built as an example of what Koshik (2005) has called reverse polarity 
questions, which are treated by recipients as assertions of the opposite polarity 
to that of the question (i.e. that Emily should not be going out that night). Close 
examination of the design of the turn as part of the sequence within which it is 
embedded reveals that it is best understood as a challenge of Emily’s actions, 
rather than as an elicitation of her ‘wants’ or ‘motivations’.  
In her response, Emily orients to this challenge; ‘°because I want to:°’. 
As noted above, this turn may, at first glance, be glossed as Emily citing a 
desire to go out that night as the basis for her actions, following Simon’s 
question regarding her motivations for doing so. However having identified 
Simon’s turn as a challenge rather than an information seeking question, it is 
clear that such a gloss is inadequate. We can note that by this point Emily’s 
response options are severely limited. At the start of the extract Jane presents 
a problem for which Emily is responsible (her boss wants to train her up, but 
won’t do so because Emily is always off sick after going out clubbing). As noted 
above, Simon’s turn at lines 14-15, which treats Emily’s being signed off work 
as done, embodies a clear challenging stance, heavily implying that Emily 
should not be going out that night. Emily’s response ‘°because I want 
to:°’is delivered with several features of dispreference (Pomerantz, 1984). 
The delay of 1.6 seconds before she begins to answer is relatively long, 
considering that a response from her is immediately relevant. Further, the turn 
is audibly quieter than the surrounding talk. Both of these non-lexical features 
display an orientation to the utterance as an insufficient account.  
On the other hand, the use of an ‘I want’ construction and the invocation of 
‘wanting’ as a sufficient basis for acting invokes authority and entitlement. 
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Normally, individuals are expected to have privileged access to their own 
thoughts, what Pomerantz refers to as ‘type 1 knowables’ (1980, p. 187). For 
Simon, access to Emily’s ‘mental states’ and ‘wants’ is limited relative to 
Emily’s access, which is authoritative. The selective emphasis of the subject-
side of the accountable item deletes the contingencies and considerations of 
the recipient. That is, Emily is going out that night because she ‘wants’ to, 
regardless of the challenge presented by Simon.  
 
Let us now consider extract 4.10. Emily and Simon are in the kitchen preparing 
food. There is no prior context available because the extract begins 
immediately after an edit by the television producers.  
We can begin by noting that, in a manner which is comparable to extract 4.9, 
Simon’s turn at lines 1-2 is not designed to elicit a factual answer. As a ‘why’ 
formatted interrogative (Bolden & Robinson, 2011), it calls for an account and 
is hearable as a complaint that they must have ‘thuh teevee ↑on’ rather 
than have ‘a conversation’. It emerges that the proffered topic of 
conversation is Emily’s activities the preceding weekend. Incidentally this is not 
the first time Simon has attempted to initiate this topic as he did so earlier in 
the day (data not shown). Several design features of the turn evidence its 
status as a complaint. First, as a reverse polarity interrogative (Koshik, 2005) 
the turn can be heard as asserting Simon’s preference for turning the television 
off and having ‘a conversation’ instead. Second, as a negative 
interrogative (Heritage, 2002) Emily is heavily held accountable for the 
complainable matter.  
 
When responding to multiunit turns, speakers normatively orient to the final 
part of the turn (Schegloff, 2007). That is, Simon’s two-part structure (in which 
the complaint regarding the television is delivered in the first TCU while the 
notion of having a conversation is dealt within in the second TCU) makes 
immediately relevant a response to the matter of ‘having a conversation’. 
However rather than engaging in the activity of having a conversation, or 
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otherwise rejecting this, Emily deals with the first part of the turn ‘becuz I 
wann the ↑teevee o:n’. A rejection of the activity of having a conversation, 
via, for example ‘I don’t want to have a conversation’ is susceptible to 
challenge. ‘Having a conversation’ is a joint activity to which Simon and Emily 
have equal rights and access.  However the notion that Emily ‘wants’ the 
television on for Emily is a type 1 knowable (Pomerantz, 1984) and a matter to 
which Emily has authoritative access relative to Simon. The use of an ‘I want’ 
construction selectively emphasises the subject-side of the matter, deleting any 
contingencies or obstacles to her ‘wants’ being satisfied.  
 
Simon challenges Emily’s turn as he begins a turn in overlap, immediately 
upgrading his objection with a negative interrogative (Heritage, 2002). He also 
offers a more specified version of what the proffered conversation will be, 
further restricting Emily’s response options. He physically turns the television 
off, a move which stands in direct defiance to, and, in the interactional sense, 
deletes Emily’s preceding turn. Emily responds to the challenge by delivering 
an exact repetition of her preceding turn, directly defying and challenging 
Simon. Note that as she is speaking she moves across the room towards the 
television to switch the television back on. Thus, it is clear that regardless of 
the obstacles put in place by Simon, Emily still ‘wants’ the television on.  
In sum in this example it is clear that rather than an elicitation of Emily’s 
‘mental states’ Simon’s turns at lines 1-2 and 4-5 embody a clear challenging 
stance towards having the television on rather than having ‘a conversation’. 
Emily’s ‘I want’ construction is responsive to and rejects this challenge as Emily 
invokes the authority to act on her own behalf.  
 
In summary, in this section I have shown how speakers may respond to a 
challenge towards their actions using an ‘I want’ construction. There are 
particular qualities of the types of turn which precede these constructions that 
we have explored briefly; one being the ways in which they call for an account. 
Second, there is a challenging stance embodied within these interrogatives as 
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they are co-implicated criticising and blaming the recipient and implying that 
there is no adequate account for their actions (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). ‘I 
want’ constructions then, may be delivered as accounts for actions in 
environments in which speaker’s actions are challenged and where response 
options are limited. While on the face of it these turns may be glossed as 
speakers seeking information regarding recipient’s ‘motivations’, to which 
speakers respond truthfully by communicating their ‘wants’, consideration of 
the fine weave of the interactional sequence within which these turns are 
embedded reveals that this is an inadequate account of what is going on in the 
interaction.  
 
3.0 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has shown that rather than accounting for people’s claims 
regarding their ‘wants’ as the communication of an individual mental state, 
these constructions are produced to achieve particular actions during the 
course of conversation. Cognitive explanations, such as Theory of Mind, then, 
are inadequate for understanding how and when these claims are used in 
conversation. In the first section I began by illustrating how claims regarding 
‘wants’ have practical uses in specific sequential environments. I showed, for 
example, how young children’s selection of ‘I want’ when requesting something 
which is available to a sibling foregrounds the requester and proposes that the 
request is delivered independently of other considerations that may be 
circumstantial to the request, such as to emulate a sibling. In this section I 
examined whether ‘wanting’ is ordinarily treated as a sufficient basis for ‘acting’ 
or for ‘having’ and showed that ordinarily, people do not proceed and act in a 
manner which is consistent with the fulfilment of their ‘wants’. Rather, the very 
act of stating that one ‘wants’ something (for example, in order to perform a 
request) presupposes that the proposed object, action or state of affairs is not 
readily available and that permission or assistance is needed. This has 
important implications for work within Theory of Mind that uses an experimental 
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set-up to examine children’s understandings of ‘desires’. These implications 
will be discussed further in the final chapter of the thesis. I also touched on how 
the examination of children’s competencies in everyday interaction may reveal 
the operation of certain kinds of skill (Butler, 2008; Wootton, 2006). I will return 
to this as I consider children’s uses of ‘I want’ in further detail in chapter 5. At 
this point we can note that when we consider the sequential organisation of 
claims regarding ‘wants’ it is apparent that coding schemes which are designed 
to identify genuine references to psychological states are inadequate as they 
do not take into account the intricacies of interaction and the action orientation 
of talk.  
 
In section 2 I examined in further detail how claims regarding ‘wants’ are 
produced as part of various activities in conversation. In this section I 
considered two types of activities in which ‘wants’ are used, which are to 
challenge an interlocutor and to account for one’s actions when those actions 
are challenged by a cointeractant. I showed how speakers may build a 
complaint regarding others’ conduct using an ‘what you want X?’ construction. 
These turns formulate a recognisably ‘undesirable’ outcome of the recipient’s 
actions and propose that the speaker is motivated for that outcome to occur. 
This constructs recipient’s actions as illegitimate and nonsensical. I then 
showed how using ‘I don’t want X’ to deliver a rejection indexes a challenging 
stance and may be complaint implicative. Finally, I showed how speakers may 
use ‘because I want to X’ to account for their actions when challenged by an 
interlocutor. These accounts are Janus-faced in that they have two sides. On 
the one hand, invoking one’s ‘wants’ may concede that there is no adequate 
alternative account for one’s actions. On the other hand, the selective 
emphasis of the subject-side of these accounts invokes authority and 
entitlement to avow one’s ‘wants’ and can therefore be used to reject the 
challenge embodied in the preceding turn.  
 
 122
The analysis presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that avowals and 
ascriptions of ‘wanting’ can and should be examined as interactional 
constructions designed to achieve a particular action in a specific sequential 
environment. This shifts our attention towards considering further what these 
constructions achieve and how they do this, which will be the focus of the 
following 3 chapters. 
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5 
 
Children’s ‘wants’ 
 
1.0 Introduction: ‘I want’ formatted requests 
  
This chapter focuses on young children’s uses of ‘I want’ to build requests. 
Research has shown that from around the age of two and a half children are 
able to build requests using a range of formats (Gordon & Ervin-Tripp, 1984; 
Wootton 1981, 1997, 2005) and so when delivering a request select from a 
range of possible alternatives. Consider the following extract, which is taken 
from the end of a breakfast meal;  
 
Extract 5.1 Crouch 2 09:43  
 
01  Ann: [ [A:::M GONNA EA::D IT A::LL=            ]  ] 
02     [((picks up empty bowl, shows it to Linda))] 
03           [((puts bowl back on table))] 
04    =[U::::[:P ]                  ] 
05  Lin:        [shh] GOOD GIRL ANNA 
06  Kat: there’s (.) free pe[as on my foot and it hu::rts] 
07   →  Ann:        [mu::mmy I’m            hu::n]gry 
08   g[ai::n] 
09  Lin: [[   no] no mo:re no:w,] 
10  Lin: [((shakes head))       ] 
11    (0.2) 
12   →  Ann: I:::: wa- just want ↓my yoghu::rt.↓ 
13   → Kat: can we wa:tch  [lazy                        ] to::wn? 
14  Lin:                [[y[ou didn’t want it darling]] 
15           [((shakes head))           ] 
16    (1.0) 
17  Lin: ta:ke your so:ck, put your ↑sock↑ on lo::ve 
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In this extract we see that Anna, aged two and Katherine, aged four deliver 
requests using declarative (lines 7-8, 12) and interrogative formats (line 13). 
Anna announces that she has finished her breakfast (lines 1-4) and then uses 
a declarative format to request more food. This turn is not built as an 
interrogative, (‘can I have more food?’) but as a reporting in which Anna 
formally, grammatically reports some circumstance, rather than make an 
explicit request. Linda ratifies the turn’s status as a request for more food as 
she delivers an emphatic rejection ‘no no mo:re no:w,’. Anna then delivers 
a second, downgraded, minimised request as she asks for a yoghurt which she 
was given and refused to eat earlier in the meal ‘I:::: wa- just want 
↓my yoghu::rt.↓’. Again the turn is built as a declarative, in this instance 
using an ‘I want’ format. The minimiser  ‘just’ is a key design feature as Anna 
makes it clear that rather than asking for new food she is simply asking for her 
yoghurt, which works to downgrade and minimise the request (this will be 
discussed further below).  
 
Katherine also delivers a request, using an interrogative format;  ‘can we 
wa:tch lazy to::wn?’.The turn is built with interrogative syntax  and 
officially solicits a yes/no response. That is, it is built as a straightforward 
request which requires either a granting or a rejection (Wootton, 1981).  Clearly 
then, from an early age when delivering requests children select from a range 
of alternative formats. Language is couched in and is built for specific moments 
in interaction and so the aim of this chapter is to examine the occasions on 
which young children select an ‘I want’ format when delivering requests.  
 
The structure of the chapter is based around two recurrent environments in 
which children produce ‘I want’ formatted requests which are as follows;  
 
1. When there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child 
to suppose that the request will not be granted.  
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2.  When there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child 
to suppose that the request will be granted. In this section I focus on one 
specific subset, which is when the object of the request is something 
which is available to a co-interactant.  
 
At first glance, it may seem that these two sequential environments are 
contradictory. We shall see that across all examples, the use of an ‘I want’, 
format displays an orientation to understandings reached in the preceding 
interaction (c.f. Wootton, 1981). That is, at the time of building the request 
there is some basis for the speaker to suppose that the request either will or 
will not be granted.  
 
1.1 A developmental view: Desire, language and cognition  
 
The idea that desire is central to cognition is fundamental in both 
psychoanalytic and philosophical theorising (Raphael-Leff, 2010). The German 
idealist philosopher Hegel (as cited in Raphael-Leff, 2010) saw desire as the 
condition for subject formation as ‘I’ is first produced with ‘I want’. That the child 
is absorbed with his or her own desires and intentions to act is one explanation 
of the ‘terrible-two’s’ (Travis & Brown, 2011). Work on Theory of Mind has 
focussed on children’s uses of ‘desire terms’ in everyday talk, for what these 
may reveal about the child’s mind. These philosophical ideas and body of work 
are based on a picture of semantic and cognitive development which has been 
described as the ostension paradigm (Montgomery, 2002); semantic 
development occurs as the child establishes word-referent relations with 
mental state terms developing as names referring to private mental 
experiences. There are close relations between specific linguistic and specific 
cognitive developments with particular words emerging in the vocabulary that 
are relevant to the acquisition of particular cognitive capabilities (Gopnik & 
Meltzhoff, 1986, 1987). The child has mental experiences, categorises them 
and then labels each category (Montgomery, 2002). Consequently, when 
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studying talk in naturalistic settings, researchers are concerned with 
uncovering “genuine references to psychological states” (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995, p. 31) as distinct from ‘functional uses’ such as simple requests, 
idiomatic expressions and “mere repetition of someone else’s utterances” (p. 
67).  
 
1.2 An interactional view: ‘Wanting’ in request sequences 
 
Children’s use of ‘I want’ to deliver requests was previously examined by 
Wootton (1981) as he compared a four-year-old child’s uses of ‘I want X’ with 
the interrogative ‘can I X’. He shows how the selection of request format is 
informed by understandings reached in the preceding interaction, specifically 
whether or not it is expectable that the recipient will be willing to grant the 
request. Wootton notes that as a yes/no interrogative, ‘can I X’ formats formally 
solicit a yes/no response and so propose that either of these are a possibility. 
As such, these formats function as straightforward requests which require a 
granting or a rejection. In contrast, declarative ‘I want X’ forms do not formally 
solicit a yes/no response and so do not propose either of these as a possibility. 
Wootton shows how this format is used when there is some basis within the 
preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the recipient will be unwilling 
to grant the request, where the format is used to object to the recipient’s 
position, rather than as a straightforward request. Wootton proposes that in 
using declarative ‘I want’ and interrogative ‘can I’ requests in different ways in 
similar sequential positions, this four-year old child evidences the ability to 
make use of the constraints each of these constructions places on the 
recipients’ next turn.  
 
While Wootton’s study was important as he pioneered an approach to 
examining the sequential organisation of children’s request formats, rather than 
examining situational variables such as to whom requests are directed, I note 
that it is not the case that young children select ‘I want’ exclusively when there 
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is some basis to suppose that the request will not be granted. Rather, in what 
follows I show how children may select an ‘I want’ format when there is some 
basis to suppose that a request will be granted. Across all examples the use of 
an ‘I want’ format displays entitlement to make the request and orients to the 
expectability, or otherwise, that the request will be granted.  
 
2.1 ‘I want’ requests display heightened entitlement 
 
Requests built using ‘I want’ have several features which suggest that 
speakers orient to these requests as ones which they are entitled to make. 
First, this is displayed through the use of a modal which indexes the speaker 
and invokes their ‘wants’. As Curl and Drew (2008) point out, interrogative 
request forms such as ‘can you X?’ display speakers’ understandings of the 
contingencies involved in granting a request. The execution of the requested 
action or object is treated as dependent on the recipient’s ability or willingness 
to comply (Vine, 2009) and requests built in such a way, in theory, can be 
refused (Craven & Potter, 2010). In contrast, one of the strong features of 
requests built using ‘I want’ is that the verb in first person indexes the speaker, 
rather than the contingencies of the recipient’s compliance. A second 
interrelated feature is that the subject-side (Edwards, 2005, 2007) of the 
request is selectively emphasised. That is, the request is built as simply a 
relationship between speaker and object, irrespective of other considerations 
which may be circumstantial to the request. Finally, the grammatical form of 
these turns, as a declarative, does not formally solicit a yes/no response and 
so do not project refusal as a response option (Craven & Potter, 2010; 
Wootton, 1981). These features can be seen in combination in the following 
extract, in which Anna uses an ‘I want’ construction to ask Linda to give her 
some more cereal during breakfast.  
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Extract 5.2 Crouch 7 05:52 
 
01   Ann: where is ↓i::t? 
02   Lin: where’s what darling. 
03    (0.4) 
04   Ann: where my picCHA? 
05  Lin: e::hm, 
06  Ann: ((coughs)) 
07  Lin: [just the:re next to you.      ] 
08  Lin: [((nods at chair next to Anna))] 
09    (0.6) 
10  Ann: ((cough)) ((cough)) 
11  Ann:  (0.7) 
12 Ann: #dhah ah#  
13  Lin: [mm      ] 
14  Lin: [((nods))] 
15   | (0.8)                 | 
16  Ann: |((starts to pick up picture))| 
17  Lin: don’t get it out now finish your break[fast       ]= 
18  Ann:             [((coughs)) ]  
19  Lin: =fi::rst.  
20    (1.7) 
21  Ann: fi:nish::ed l[ook ] 
22  Lin:        [good] GI::RL WELL DONE.  
23 → Ann: #I:: wa::nt some mo::re plea::se.# 
24    (0.1) 
25  Lin: [m’ka::y c’have some more. (     )] 
26  Lin: [((nods and starts to get up))    ] 
27    (0.2) 
28  Lin: you must be hu:ngry cause you didn’t eat any of your 
29   dinner la:st night Anna:,  
30  Ann: cuz ah 
31    (0.3) 
32 Ann: don’t like it a::ll u:p.  
33 Lin: |((looks at Anna while walking to kitchen))| 
34  |  (0.5)                             | 
35 Lin: ((walks out of camera shot)) 
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36  Lin: yea:h but that was naughty not eating your (.) dinner 
37   last night you’re not going to do that toda:y ar:e 
38   you 
39  Ann: ˚(mm nah)˚  
40    (0.4) 
41  Ann: um (.) un::: 
42   | (2.5)                     | 
43  Lin: |((pours cereal into Anna’s bowl))| 
44  Ann: dowi doh ah:: in my nah:: 
45   | (3.1)     | 
46  Ann: |((picks up spoon))| 
47  Ann: [I got lo:ts:::              ] 
48  Ann: [((turns and looks at Linda))] 
 
Anna delivers the target turn at line 23 (#I:: wa::nt some mo::re 
plea::se.#) to ask for more cereal. The first thing to note is that the turn is 
not built as an interrogative such as ‘can I have some more please?’. Rather 
the use of ‘I want’ predicates only Anna herself, rather than the recipient with 
none of the contingency for compliance that would be implied by ‘could you’ or 
‘can I’. As a declarative the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and 
so does not propose either of these as a possibility or project the possibility of 
refusal. If we consider requests on a continuum of contingency and entitlement 
as suggested by Curl and Drew (2008), this is a high entitlement way of 
delivering a request, which contains few contingency markers. The turn 
terminal ‘plea::se.#’ clearly marks the turn as a request for action rather 
than a simple statement about Anna’s ‘wants’. Note that the request is 
delivered immediately after Linda’s preceding turn, which offers a positive 
assessment and praises Anna for finishing her breakfast. As Anna has been 
told that she is a ‘good] GI::RL’ for finishing her cereal it is expectable that 
the request will be granted and that further cereal will be forthcoming. While the 
turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and does not orient to the 
contingencies involved in granting the request, Linda treats the turn as a 
contingent request. That is, she verbally accepts the request and reports that 
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Anna ‘c’have’ (line 25) some more as if the request was built as contingent on 
Linda’s willingness to grant it.  
 
In sum, in using an ‘I want’ request format Anna pointedly does not orient to 
Linda’s ability or willingness to grant the request. Only Anna herself, as the 
requester, is predicated. The turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response 
and so does not make acceptance or declination relevant and the possibility of 
refusal is not projected. Delivering a request using an ‘I want’ format embodies 
high entitlement as the contingencies involved in the recipient granting the 
request are pointedly not oriented to. We can also note that Anna delivers the 
request when there is some basis in the prior interaction for her to suppose that 
it will be granted, as it is delivered immediately following Linda’s positive 
assessment of Anna having finished her first bowl of cereal. We can see then 
that Anna orients to understandings reached in the preceding interaction and 
that the request format displays recognition of the interactional context within 
which Anna is operating (c.f. Wootton, 1981, 1997).  
 
Now that I have explicated what is meant by ‘I want’ formats being a high 
entitlement way to build a request I will examine in further detail two recurrent 
environments in which young children select this format. The first of these is 
when there is some basis within the preceding interaction for the child to 
suppose that the request will not be granted. 
 
2.2 When it is expectable that a request will not be granted 
 
The analysis in this section is divided into two subsections. I begin in section 
2.2.1 by showing how speakers may use ‘I want’ to request precisely that 
which it is expectable will not be forthcoming. This may occur following either a 
rejection of a first request or when there is some other basis within the 
preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the request will not be 
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granted. In section 2.2.2 I show how speakers may use ‘I just want’ as a way of 
downgrading and minimising second requests.  
 
2.2.1 Requesting precisely that which it is expectable will not be 
forthcoming 
 
As discussed above, that children build requests using ‘I want’ when there is 
some basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that the 
request will not be granted was previously documented by Wootton (1981). He 
compared the use of the interrogative ‘can I’ and the declarative ‘I want’ in the 
talk of a four year old child. He shows how rather than working as a 
straightforward request, ‘I want’ is co-implicated in complaining and objecting 
when there is some basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose 
that the request will not be granted. Wootton’s analysis centres around the 
syntactic constraints imposed by the use of the declarative ‘I want’. He notes 
that in contrast to the interrogative ‘can I’, an ‘I want’ format does not formally 
solicit a yes/no response and so does not propose either of these as a 
possibility. I note that it is not a simple matter of syntactic constraints that 
informs request format selection. The imperative is the prototypical 
grammatical form for a directive, an action which is pointedly designed to 
restrict recipients’ response options (Craven & Potter, 2010). As such if 
syntactic constraints were the sole determinant of format selection, we would 
expect to see the selection of an imperative format in this environment, just as 
Simon uses an imperative format to tell Tom to remove his earring in the 
following example;  
 
Extract 5.3 TF2008E7  30:43 
01 Sim: can you put your ea:rring on the side plea:se  
02 Tom: ºI’m wearing itº 
03 → Sim: now. (.) you hear:? >juss-juss< do it. put it the::re, 
04  next to mum’s stuff so she can see where it is.   
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In his turn at line 1 Simon asks Tom to take out an earring which he had put in 
the previous day without permission to do so. The turn is built using an 
interrogative format ‘can you put your ea:rring on the side plea:se’ and 
formally at least, solicits yes or no as a response option. Following a non 
compliant response (‘ºI’m wearing itº’) Simon tells Tom to do it  ‘now.’ as he 
specifies the required action using a directive construction ‘put it the::re,’. 
By removing the markers of contingency, such as Tom’s capacity to carry out 
the action (indexed by ‘can you?’) Simon heightens his display of entitlement to 
direct Tom’s actions (see Craven & Potter, 2010). In sum, in moving from an 
interrogative to an imperative format Tom’s response options are restricted as 
the imperative format does not project the possibility of refusal.  
 
For the child, who is not entitled to direct a parent’s actions, there is a major 
consideration which must be managed when delivering a request when there is 
some basis to suppose that it will not be granted. Namely, that it is expectable 
that a further refusal will be forthcoming. In this section I show how ‘I want’ 
constructions are a way of managing this consideration. Let us now turn to the 
first extract which provides a clear example of the use of ‘I want’ to deliver a 
potentially unacceptable request.  
 
Extract 5.4 Crouch 2 08:00 
01   →  Kat: why ca::n’t, why: uh- (0.2) am I on holiday when  
02  sar- (.) when it’s Sarah’s birthday <a:nd she  
03  invi#ted me::.#>  
04    (1.2) 
05 Kat: and she’s gonna be fi:::ve 
06  Lin: actually:, (0.5) I don’t think you a:re on hu- let me 
07   just check. 
08     (8.5) 
09  Lin: yeah, it’s the fifteenth w’on holiday. 
10     (0.8) 
11  Kat: YE:::S:[:!] 
12  Lin:        [ w]e’re at the carava:n 
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13     (0.2) 
14   Ann: at Gra:MA’S  c[arava::n  ] 
15  Kat:               [I’m    goi]ng I’m going to Sara:h’s  
16   pa:::r[ty::   g]oing to Sara::h’s pa::rty((sings)) 
17  Lin:        [(where?)] 
18  no! we’re at the caravan darling.   
19  Kat: o::h you sai::::d. 
20    (1.6) 
21 → Kat: I wa::nt! to go to Sarah’s pa::rty:: 
22  Lin: I’m so:rry darling.  
23    (0.4) 
24  Lin: hi:c- we’re at- (.) we’re on holiday sometimes you 
25   can’t do everything.  lo:ts of children can’t come to 
26   your birthday cause they’re on holiday.  
27    (1.0) 
28 Lin: a:ren’t they 
29 →  Kat: I really wa:nt to go to #Sar#ah’s party you’re 
30   allowed to go in the swi:mm!i:ng ~poo:::l~ 
31  Lin: okay well liste:n, liste:n, (0.6) you can come ho:me, 
32     (0.4) 
33   we’ll put you on the tra:in, you can go ho:me, (0.7) 
34   go to Sarah’s party, (0.3) n’ we:’ll have fun on 
35   holida::y. without you. 
 
In this extract Katherine uses an ‘I want’ construction to re-request precisely 
that which Linda has indicated will not be able to happen. Although the turn at 
line 1 proffers a new topic and is the first mention of the party during this meal, 
there are several design features of this turn which suggest that this is a matter 
which has been discussed at an earlier point in time. First, the turn is delivered 
with elongated, ‘whiny’ prosody, marking the turn as an objection. Second, 
Katherine begins to launch a ‘why’ formatted interrogative, which was 
presumably headed for ‘why can’t I go to Sarah’s birthday party?’. As Bolden 
and Robinson (2011) note ‘why’ formatted account solicitations are frequently 
co-implicated in actions such as complaining. As such the turn clearly 
presupposes that there is something to challenge. The turn is also built as a 
 134
negative interrogative and can be heard as assertive, rather than questioning, 
holding Linda accountable for Katherine’s inability to attend the party (Heritage, 
2002). Finally, the turn terminal ‘<a:nd she invi#ted me::.#>’ (lines 2-3) 
and the incremental ‘and she’s gonna be fi:::ve’ (line 5) provide an 
account to justify why she should be allowed to attend the party. These 
elements orient to the possibility that Katherine may not in fact be able to 
attend the party and substantiate the force of the turn as a challenge.  
 
Note that somewhat ingeniously Katherine restarts the turn with  ‘am I on 
holiday when Sar- (.) when it’s Sarah’s birthday’ (lines 1-3), 
presenting this as something which has not yet been determined, opening the 
topic up for further discussion. Katherine initially treats the news that the family 
will be on holiday as confirmation that she will be able to attend the party (lines 
11, 15-16). Once this source of trouble is resolved by Linda (line 18) Katherine 
delivers the complaint implicative ‘o::h you sai::::d.’, an introductory 
quotative marker which usually precedes reported speech (Couper-Kuhlen, 
2007). However note that Katherine does not quote Linda’s talk and hence the 
elliptical use of ‘o::h you sai::::d.’ (including the emphasis, and final 
intonation fall, marking the utterance as finished) implies that what would 
complete the turn is something available in the current talk, such as ‘you said I 
could go to Sarah’s party’. The initial news receipt ‘o::h’ treats the prior 
(confirmation that she cannot attend the party) as news. She then delivers the 
target turn ‘I wa::nt! to go to Sarah’s pa::rty::’ (line 21). As 
noted by Wootton (1981) as a declarative this turn does not formally solicit a 
yes/no response and thereby does not propose either of these as a possibility. 
The modal indexes the speaker and pointedly does not orient to the 
contingencies or obstacles to the fulfilment of the request. Rather than working 
as a request which seeks a granting or a rejection, then, the turn can be heard 
as a complaint implicative objection.  
 
 135
The action import of the turn as an objection rather than a straightforward 
request is further evidenced by the second ‘I want’ construction following 
Linda’s further refusal (lines 24-28) ‘I really wa:nt to go to 
#Sar#ah’s party you’re allowed to go in the swi:mm!i:ng 
~poo:::l~’. Second requests typically orient to a new trajectory brought 
about by the recipient’s refusal of an initial request. This turn pointedly does not 
orient to Linda’s right to refuse the request as it is again built using an ‘I want’ 
format, with ‘I really wa:nt’ upgrading the request and in selectively 
emphasising the ‘subject-side’, deletes recipient considerations, refusals and 
contingencies. As Katherine offers a further account to justify why she should 
be allowed to attend the party (she would be allowed to go in the swimming 
pool), she further specifies and upgrades the request. Normatively at least, 
everyone is entitled to their own beliefs, opinions and desires and to know what 
these are, regardless of whether they are ‘right’ to hold them or not. The use of 
an ‘I want’ construction following the rejection of a request proposes that 
Katherine ‘wants’ to go to the party irrespective of Linda’s refusal and the 
obstacles in the way. Thus ‘I want’ is a request form which predicates the 
speaker and can be upgraded irrespective of the contingencies and obstacles 
to the request being granted. The format encodes and emphasises the 
request’s subject-side rather than the object of the request, which has already 
been refused. While request recipients may be entitled to and choose to refuse 
requests, the notion that requesters still ‘want’ the object of the request is 
something that can persist beyond its refusal, and which is not so easily 
denied. This selective emphasis of the subject-side of a request then, is one 
way of managing the contingencies involved in delivering a request when it is 
expectable that it will not be granted.  
  
Let us consider a further example, taken from towards the end of a meal from 
the Crouch corpus.  
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Extract 5.5 Crouch 1 10:25 
01  Ann: £laeck pick a poo::£ ((singing)) 
02    (1.2) 
03  Ann: chhuhh ((coughs)) 
04    (1.0) 
05  Mik: I think you’re being a silly sausage.  
06 Ann: ↑heh heh heh he::h↑ 
07   →  Lin: come on darlin eat your dinner u:p  
08   | (0.2)                                         | 
09  Ann: |((puts kitchen roll down, reaches for food on plate))| 
10  Ann: i:s- 
11  Lin: you di:d you wen’on the sli:de and you did puzzles 
12   you told me di[dn’t you¿] 
13  Ann:               [    pizze]::h  
14  Lin: mm:: 
15    (0.6) 
16  Lin: sausa:ge  
17    (1.4) 
18 Lin: [↑put your >leg roun front love.↑<] 
19 Lin: [((points at Anna’s legs))        ] 
20    (1.4) 
21  Ann: [silly sausha::ge.         ] 
22  Ann: [((moves legs under table))] 
23    (2.0) 
24  Kat: what abou:t a silly sausage 
25    (0.6) 
26  Ann: ↑I’m! ↑ silly sausage I a::m he:h hum. I’m gonna  
27  hi::de.  
28  | (0.4)                    | 
29 Ann: |((holds kitchen roll over face))|  
30  Mik: oh where’s Anna gone 
31    (1.0) 
32  Ann: °hoh° 
33    (1.0)  
34  Mik: whe:re’s she gone?  
35    (1.8) 
36  Mik: hm the:re you are::.  
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37   | (5.4)                 | 
38  Ann: |((puts kitchen roll on head))| 
39   → Mik: eat some more of your dinner please.  
40  Ann: [QUACK! QUACK QUACK.                               ] 
41  Ann: [((remains in same position, kitchen roll on head))] 
42    (0.3) 
43  Mik: oh is there a du:ck here? 
44  Lin: look at Katherine eating her co:rn really nicely.  
45    (0.4) 
46  Mik: ha:h!  
47    (0.4) 
48  Mik: wo::w what a big gi:rl. 
49   → Ann: [ah wa:nt puddi::ng.               ] 
50  Ann: [((removes kitchen roll from head))] 
51 Lin: ↑no no, ↑ 
52    (1.8) 
53 → Ann: I do::::[:] 
54  Lin:          [n]o darling cause you haven’t eaten your- 
55   [(0.6) uh u::m,            ] 
56  Lin: [((points to Anna’s plate))] 
57  Kat: can I have another roll please °Daddy::° 
58   | (0.8)                    | 
59  Ann: |((picks up corn and takes bite))| 
60  Mik: (   ) eat some of your pra:wns first.  
 
We can begin by noting that Anna delivers an ‘I want’ formatted request 
precisely when it is expectable that this request will not be granted. Rather than 
eating her dinner as instructed to by Linda (line 7), she holds a piece of kitchen 
roll over her face and announces that she is going to hide (lines 26-29), an 
activity which provides further distraction from the task of eating dinner. After 
putting the kitchen roll on top of her head, she is directed to eat more of her 
dinner by Mike (line 39). In direct defiance of this directive she remains 
kneeling on her chair and begins making quacking noises (lines 40-41). Linda 
and Mike both positively assess the manner in which Anna’s older sister 
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Katherine is eating (lines 44, 48), which is hearably designed as instructing or 
persuading Anna to do the same. Immediately following Mike’s assessment of 
Katherine as a ‘big gi:rl.’ (line 48), a typically desirable identity for ‘little 
girls’, Anna delivers the ‘I want’ format; ‘ah wa:nt puddi::ng.’. Normally 
the children in this family are not given ‘pudding’ (a term used in England for 
‘dessert’) if they have not eaten enough of their dinner (the first course). As 
Linda and Mike have been at pains to persuade Anna to finish her dinner and 
she has so far refused to do so, it is expectable that pudding will not be 
forthcoming. Indeed ‘eating pudding’, which comes after the first course and 
normally follows the plates and leftover food from the first course being cleared 
from the table, directly contrasts with ‘finishing dinner’.  
 
The point to note here is that ‘can I have pudding?’ is not a question that is 
being asked. The request posed in this interrogative form would seek 
permission from Mike and Linda. It concedes authority and control to the 
recipient. In contrast an ‘I want’ construction pointedly does not orient to the 
contingencies and obstacles to the request being granted. Rather the subject-
side of the request is emphasised, and the request is built as a relationship 
between requester and object, regardless of any obstacles to the request being 
granted. As noted above, in principle one is allowed to have ones’ own beliefs 
and desires regardless of whether they are ‘right’ or not. This emphasis of the 
subject-side of the request is a way of claiming entitlement to deliver a 
potentially unacceptable request and, as it does not project the possibility of 
refusal, manages the contingencies involved in doing so.  
 
The request is treated as unacceptable in that it is emphatically rejected by 
Linda (line 51). Anna’s pursuit ‘I do::::[:]’ (line 53) which is produced with 
elongated, whiny intonation, further encodes and embodies the request’s 
subject-side. The turn does not orient to the object of the request, rather it 
designedly treats Linda’s rejection as a challenge to Anna’s ‘wants’. While 
Anna may not be entitled to insist upon the provision of pudding, she is entitled 
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to express her ‘wants’. In sum, the selective emphasis of the subject side of the 
request allows Anna to insist upon and upgrade the request irrespective of 
other considerations which may be circumstantial to the request, such as 
Linda’s refusal to grant it.  
 
2.2.2 Using ‘I want’ to minimise re-requests 
 
The analysis in the preceding section examined the use of ‘I want’ 
constructions to deliver potentially unacceptable requests. Rather than being 
built as an interrogative which concedes authority and control to the recipient, 
the selective emphasis of the subject-side of the request allows speakers to 
deliver the request irrespective of other considerations which may be 
circumstantial. In the examples thus far speakers use ‘I want’ to request 
precisely that which it is expectable will not be forthcoming. In what follows I 
show how speakers may make claims regarding their ‘wants’ as a way of 
minimising and downgrading second requests. This can be seen in the 
following fragment (an extended version of extract 5.1), taken from the end of a 
breakfast meal, in which Anna requests a yoghurt following Linda’s refusal to 
give her more food. Originally, the yoghurt was part of Anna’s breakfast, which 
she chose to discard.  
 
Extract 5.6 Crouch 2 09:43  
01    (1.3) 
02  Ann: I DIDN’T DO th[at      ] 
03  Kat:               [#it’s be]cause my foo:t hu::rts#=] 
04  Kat:               [((leans over, touches foot))     ] 
05  Lin: no everything hurts. your tummy hurts, your foot 
06   hurts <EV’ry night 
07   there’s something else that hu:rts.  
08   [(so I’m- Katherine don’t-) no listen now,]  
09  Ann: [ [A:::M GONNA EA::D IT A::LL=            ]  ] 
10     [((picks up empty bowl, shows it to Linda))] 
11             [((puts bowl back on table))] 
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12    =[U::::[:P ]                   ] 
13  Lin:        [shh] GOOD GIRL ANNA 
14  Kat: there’s (.) free pe[as on my foot and it hu::rts] 
15   →  Ann:          [Mu::mmy I’m            hu::n]gry 
16   g[ai::n] 
17  Lin: [[   no] no mo:re no:w,] 
18  Lin: [((shakes head))       ] 
19    (0.2) 
20   →  Ann: I:::: wa- just want ↓my yoghu::rt.↓ 
21  Kat: can we wa:tch  [lazy                        ] to::wn? 
22  Lin:                [[y[ou didn’t want it darling]] 
23          [((shakes head))             ] 
24    (1.0) 
25  Lin: ta:ke your so:ck, put your ↑sock↑ on lo::ve 
 
The extract is taken from the end of breakfast. Linda and Katherine have both 
finished eating and Linda has cleared away their empty bowls as well as a half 
eaten yoghurt which Anna refused to eat earlier in the meal, stating that she 
‘doesn’t like’ the yoghurt (data not shown).  At line 8 Anna breaks into Linda’s 
turn to announce that she has finished her food. Linda continues to speak and 
both turns are produced in overlap. Anna competes for this turn space as she 
continues speaking with raised volume and an accompanying embodied action 
as she picks up her bowl and shows it to Linda (line 9).  Linda reclaims the turn 
with a ‘shh’ which is deployed as an interruption marker followed by a positive 
assessment of the speed at which Anna ate her breakfast, delivered with 
exaggeratedly raised volume (line 12). Anna continues to compete for the floor 
as she delivers a turn in overlap with Katherine’s turn at line 13; ‘Mu::mmy 
I’m hu::ngry gai::n’, which is hearable as a request for more food.  
 
The notion of being hungry ‘again’ displays an orientation to breakfast time 
being finished. As the breakfast things have been cleared away, it is 
expectable that Anna will not be given more food. Indeed, Linda begins a turn 
in overlap in which this request is decisively rejected (line 16). This rejection is 
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emphasised as she shakes her head throughout the delivery of the turn. This 
emphatic rejection provides the environment for Anna’s request at line 19 
‘I:::: wa- just want ↓my yoghu::rt.↓’.  The central thing to note 
about this turn is that Anna restarts her utterance which is repaired from ‘I 
want’ which was presumably headed for ‘I want my yoghurt’. As Laakso (2010) 
notes, by cutting off and modifying a turn in self repair, the speaker displays an 
analysis of her ongoing speech. The notion that Anna ‘just wants’ her yoghurt 
orients to Linda’s ‘no mo:re no:w,’ as rather than requesting more food, she 
simply wants the yoghurt which was hers earlier in the meal. By minimising the 
request in this manner the likelihood of it being granted is increased; she had 
the yoghurt earlier in the meal and asks to finish it, rather than requesting a 
new food item.  
 
Note that there are two bases upon which recipients of ‘I want’ constructions 
can reject requests. First, they may deal with the object-side of the request and 
refuse to provide the requested item. Second, they may deal with the subject-
side of the request. As noted above, while speakers may be entitled to refuse 
to grant the request, that the speaker ‘wants’ the object is not so easily denied. 
However in this example, rather than dealing with the object of the request 
through an explicit rejection (which may lead to further objection from Anna), 
Linda orients to the subject-side of the request. That is, she challenges Anna’s 
claim to ‘want’ the yoghurt as earlier in the meal she explicitly stated that she 
did not like the yoghurt (line 21). Thus, while speakers may build potentially 
unacceptable requests by invoking their ‘wants’, irrespective of the obstacles to 
compliance, claims regarding ‘wants’ are in fact defeasible. In this example 
Linda challenges Anna’s claims regarding her ‘wants’ on the basis of its 
inconsistency with what she said and did previously.  
 
The following fragment contains a further example of the use of an ‘I want’ 
construction to minimise a request. Here the target turn is comparable to that in 
extract 5.6 as while it is used to re-request that which the recipient previously 
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indicated they are unwilling to allow, the turn is not a simple re-request and 
orients to this refusal by minimising the request. The extract is taken from the 
Olivers corpus and Phil, Carla and Julie are present.  
 
Extract 5.7 Olivers 8 12:10 
01  Phi: yeah but what if you look at the video::, (0.4) 
02     a::nd it gives you horrible nightma::res.  
03       (0.8) 
04  Phi: I don’t want that to happen to you 
05     darling. ((shakes head throughout turn)) 
06     |  (6.6)         | 
07  Phi: |((drinks out of mug))| 
08  Phi: its very important (.) that you:, don’t watch 
09     certain thi::ngs, or only watch the right 
10     thi:ngs.  
11     |  (7.0)                                 | 
12   Car: |((drinks from cup, holding it in front of 
13     face))                                      | 
14   Jul: |((does Thriller dance))                     | 
15  Phi: I don’t mind you listening to the music 
16     y’can listen to the music (0.8) as much as you 
17     wa:nt 
18       (2.4)  
19   →   Car: the o::nly actual thing that I rea::lly want to 
20     see, .h I only want to see the Thriller da::nce 
21  Phi: >yeah but< the wa- (0.2) the way that they’re 
22     dre::ssed (.) i:::s e::rm like >they’re< you know 
23     mmm [they’ve got ma::sks on (.) and they’re 
24     ma::de up                                    ] 
25  Phi:     [((gestures with hands in front of face))] 
26       (.) 
27  Jul: they h[ave] n’all weird makeup 
28  Phi:      [to-] 
29     <to look* like dead people, who have come out* 
30     o::f, e::r the graves.>  
31     |  (2.4)                          | 
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32  Car: |((holds glass in front of face, nods))| 
33  Phi: and I think that would be a bit too scary 
34     for you. 
 
The family are discussing the Michael Jackson video ‘Thriller’, as Julie will be 
performing the dance as part of a school production. Phil has told Carla that 
while Julie will be fine watching the video, Carla herself is likely to be scared 
(data not shown). In the turn at line 1, using a ‘wh’ interrogative, Phil 
challenges Carla’s earlier suggestion that she watch the video early in the 
morning, to avoid having bad dreams that night (data not shown). Within this 
sequential context, where Phil has indicated that he is unwilling to allow Carla 
to watch the video, the ‘what if’ can be heard as implying ‘this will give you 
horrible nightmares’ (Koshik, 2003). Phil then delivers a series of accounts in 
which he formulates his ‘wants’ and ‘motivations’ to justify his rejection of the 
request (lines 4-5), produces a general rule about the suitability of certain 
viewing material (lines 8-10) and specifies that the restriction applies only to 
the video, rather than the music (lines 15-17). Throughout the delivery of these 
accounts Carla holds her cup in front of her face and does not respond. 
Following a slight gap (line 18) she delivers the target turn ‘the o::nly 
actual thing that I rea::lly want to see, .h I only want to 
see the Thriller da::nce’. There are a series of minimisers within her 
turn (‘only actual’ ‘only want to see’ ) which make it clear that her interest is 
restricted to the dance itself, rather than the actors who are made up ‘<to 
look* like dead people,’. There are several features of this turn which 
suggest that Carla is at pains to selectively emphasise the subject-side of the 
request. The emphatic ‘rea::lly want’ proposes that the request was 
previously on the agenda, rather than having arisen out of the current 
discussion about the video. Note that as Carla restarts the turn she retains a 
formulation of her ‘wants’ ‘I only want’, evidencing the subject-side of the 
request as a key feature of the turn.  
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Carla could have built the turn as ‘can I just watch the thriller dance?’. As a 
yes/no interrogative this turn projects the possibility of refusal and concedes 
authority to Phil. In contrast, the declarative, ‘I want’ format does not project the 
possibility of refusal. A further feature of the ‘I want’ format is that it is 
formulated in such a way that seeing only the dance is complete compliance 
(as she only wants to see the dance and nothing else) rather than partial 
compliance (seeing what she is allowed to see).   
 
In sum, Carla uses an ‘I want’ construction to re-request that which Phil has 
indicated he is unwilling to allow, namely that she watch the video. The ‘I want’ 
formula, together with the minimiser ‘only’, allows her to specify restricted 
interest in seeing the dance, rather than the entire video. Rather than a re-
request of the precise same thing, the request is downgraded, minimised and 
restricted in scope.  
 
In summary, this section has shown how speakers may use an ‘I want’ 
construction to deliver a request when it is expectable that it will not be 
granted. This may follow an explicit rejection, or otherwise when there are 
events earlier in the sequence for the child to suppose that what they are 
asking will be refused. Often speakers use ‘I want’ to re-request precisely that 
which the recipient has indicated is not going to happen. As Wootton (1981) 
notes, these turns can be heard as complaint implicative, rather than 
functioning as a straightforward request which seeks a granting or a rejection. I 
have also shown how speakers may use ‘I just/only want’ to downgrade and 
minimise requests following a rejection by proposing that their interests are 
restricted and limited to a specific element of the projected action or object. 
This section has documented how the use of ‘I want’ which pointedly does not 
index the object of the request, is a way of managing the contingencies 
involved in delivering a potentially unacceptable request. This format 
selectively encodes the subject-side of the request, irrespective of any 
considerations which may be circumstantial to the request being granted. 
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Rather than an interrogative, which concedes authority to the request recipient 
and leaves the request open to refusal, in theory, speakers are entitled to 
narrate their ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ whether they are right or not. While request 
recipients may be entitled to refuse requests, that the object of the request is 
something that the recipient ‘wants’ is not so easily denied.  
 
2.3 When it is expectable that a request will be granted 
 
Wootton (1981) examined the request formats of a four year old child and 
showed that this child primarily selected an ‘I want’ format when there is some 
basis in the preceding interaction for the child to suppose that a request will not 
be granted, where the turn functions as an objection rather than a 
straightforward request. We saw several examples of this in the preceding 
section. However I note that it is not a simple case of speakers selecting this 
format when it is expectable that the request will not be granted. In this section 
I show how young children, specifically a two-year-old child, recurrently uses 
an ‘I want’ format when there is some basis to suppose that the request will be 
granted. Similarly to the examples in the preceding section, the speaker 
displays an orientation to understandings reached in the preceding interaction. 
Consider the following examples;  
 
Extract 5.8 Crouch 7 05:52 
01 Lin: don’t get it out now finish your break[fast       ]= 
02  Ann:             [((coughs)) ]  
03  Lin: =fi::rst.  
04    (1.7) 
05  Ann: fi:nish::ed l[ook ] 
06  Lin:        [good] GI::RL WELL DONE.  
07 → Ann: #I:: wa::nt some mo::re plea::se.# 
08    (0.1) 
09  Lin: [m’ka::y c’have some more. (     )] 
10  Lin: [((nods and starts to get up))    ] 
11    (0.2) 
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12  Lin: you must be hu:ngry cause you didn’t eat any of your 
13   dinner la:st night Anna:,  
 
Extract 5.9 Crouch 1 01:30 
01  Kat: mummy please c]n I have some sauce on my  
02    bread plea::se 
03    | (6.9)                                        | 
04  Lin: |((picks up sauce and puts it over Katherine’s food))| 
05  Ann: <I! do too on my brea::d>  
06     (2.5) 
07   →  Ann: I want it [tuh u::h ] 
08  Kat:           [Mummy::! ]ih- it keeps falling ou:::t 
09     (.) 
10  Kat: o[::::h!       ] 
11  Mik:  [okay don’t wo]rry just try your best.  
12     (0.7) 
13  Kat: u.hhh 
14   → Ann: [I wa:nt sau:ce here plea::se.]  
15  Ann: [((passes roll to Linda))     ] 
 
In each of the arrowed turns Anna delivers a request using an ‘I want’ format 
and in each example we can note that there is some basis within the preceding 
interaction for Anna to suppose that the request will be granted. In extract 5.8 
she requests more food immediately following Linda’s positive assessment and 
praise for finishing her breakfast. In extract 5.9 Anna asks for sauce on her 
bread as Linda is putting sauce on Katherine’s bread. As a declarative format, 
‘I want’ requests do not formally solicit a yes/no response and so do not project 
refusal as a response option. In contrast to interrogative forms, the ‘I want’ 
indexes the speaker rather than the contingencies of the recipient. This request 
format then, displays entitlement to make the request and orients to the 
expectability of the request being granted. In one large group of cases ‘I want’ 
constructions are used to request something which has been made available to 
someone else, in these examples a sibling. I now focus on these cases in 
further detail.  
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2.3.1 Requesting something that is available to a sibling  
 
‘Sibling’ rivalry is an age old concept and a recurrent theme in religion and 
literature. One of the first stories in the Bible discusses the rivalry between 
Cain and Abel, the two sons of Adam and Eve. Because of his jealousy 
towards his brother, Cain murders Abel after God rejects Cain’s offering of 
produce but accepts Abel’s offer of animal sacrifices. In Western culture, Freud 
is credited with the ‘discovery’ of the phenomena and consequently within 
psychoanalytic theory interest with regard to siblings has focussed mainly on 
the concept of sibling rivalry (Wallerstein & Lewis, 2007). The main emphasis 
has been on the burdens on a first child following the birth of a second child. It 
is proposed that all children experience themselves as holding a unique 
position as the only child of their parents (Mitchell, 2000) and are eventually 
shocked to realise the presence of their siblings as rivals (Vivona, 2007). As 
such the arrival of a second child is understood to be a traumatic experience 
for firstborn children (Adler, 1927).  
 
In contemporary psychology sibling rivalry has been a source of concern as it 
is considered a common developmental occurrence. Researchers have 
reported on a range of aspects of development which are purported to be 
affected by sibling relationships including social development, cognitive skills 
and adolescent psychosocial adjustment (Noller, 2005). Positive sibling 
relationships have been found to be a protective factor against mental illness 
(Gass, Jenkins, & Dunn, 2007) while conflict amongst siblings has been related 
to a range of pathologies such as eating disorders (Preston, 2010), deviant 
behaviour (Stormshak, Comeau, & Shepard, 2004), and depression 
(Waldinger, Vaillant, & Orav, 2007).  
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In this body of work ‘sibling rivalry’ is considered as an independent variable 
which is typically measured using self report scales which measure 
participant’s perceptions of their sibling relationships. The nature of ‘sibling 
rivalry’ as it occurs in situ has not yet received analytical scrutiny. Here I am 
interested in how siblings manage their relationships in their everyday 
interactions. I consider one aspect of this, which is requesting something which 
has been made available to a sibling. Let us now consider several live 
examples.  
 
Extract 5.10 Crouch 3 02:10 
01  Lin: ((separates full yoghurt from Kath’s eaten one and 
02   places towards middle of table)) 
03  Ann: o:[:h!] 
04  Lin:   [  w]’you have some cheerios?  
05  Kat: ((nods head slightly and quickly)) 
 06   →   Ann: I w[a:nt     o:::ne                    ]  
07  Ann:    [((reaches for Katherine’s yoghurt))]  
08    (18.0) 
 
Extract 5.11 Crouch 3 05:20 
01   →  Ann: I want two: of tho:::se.(.) like  
02    K[atherine      ]  
03    Lin: ((shakes head)) 
04      Lin:  [no >you’ve go-] you’ve g- you’ve had lots of 
05    weetabix  darling and you’ve got grapes as 
06    we:ll. 
07     Ann: I’m h:ungry agai:n 
08    |  (3.0)                         | 
09    Ann: |((kneels up on chair, looks at Linda))| 
10     Lin: you haven’t finished your brea:kfast yet darling, 
11    (0.5) you haven’t finished your weetabix ye:t,  
12      (1.8) 
13    Lin: have you:? 
14      (8.0) 
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Extract 5.12 Crouch 1 00:27 
01  Mik: does any’ne w[ant a] roll to make a hot dog 
02  Lin:              [Anna?] 
03   what d’you say [Anna:]   
04  Kat:                [↑me  ]me me me↑ me:: 
05  Ann: me m[e me m]e:: 
06  Lin:     [(    )] 
07   | (1.2)                | 
08  Mik: |((takes rolls out of packet))| 
09  Ann: gye:p 
10  Kat: mum it’s only little piece of (     ) 
11    (0.4) 
12  Mik: well you can make it (.) like a sort of [hot dog] 
13   ((to Kath)) 
14   →   Ann:              [ I WAN]T*  
15   →   WA:[N ]  
16  Mik:    [y’]can 
17   [put some prawns there as well if you want.]  ((to 
18   Kath)) 
19  Mik: [((cuts roll with knife))                  ] 
20  Lin: [sa:lt                             ] 
21  Lin: [((gets up and walks into kitchen))] 
22   →   Ann:  >#huh.hh#< I want one like tha::t 
 
In each of the arrowed turns the speaker uses an ‘I want’ construction to 
request something which has been made available to a sibling. In extract 5.10 
Anna asks for a yoghurt which has been discarded by Katherine. In extract 
5.11 which is taken from later on during the same meal, after an extended gap 
in the conversation Anna repeats her request for yoghurt, specifying that she 
wants two ‘like Katherine’. In extract 5.12 Anna asks for sauce on her 
bread as Linda is putting sauce onto Katherine’s bread. As noted throughout 
the thesis, stating that one ‘wants’ something as a way of doing a request is 
quite different from using a modal form (such as ‘can I have X?’). In the former 
case the speaker foregrounds themselves as the subject of the construction, in 
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the place of the sibling. Further, the speaker avoids orienting to the willingness 
or ability of the speaker to grant the request. In attending to one’s own ‘wants’, 
and selectively emphasising the ‘subject-side’ of a request, rather than the 
contingencies of the recipient’s compliance, speakers display entitlement to 
make the request and an expectation that the request will be granted.  
 
There are several considerations which are likely to influence the selection of 
request format when requesting something which has been made available to 
an interlocutor. First, if something is available to one interactant, it is 
expectable that the same thing be available to the requester. Also note that in 
each example there is an additional basis for the speaker to suppose that the 
request will be granted. In extract 5.10 Anna delivers the target turn just as 
Katherine’s discarded yoghurt is placed in the centre of the table and it is clear 
that Katherine will not be eating it (lines 20-21). In extract 5.11 earlier in the 
meal Linda told Anna to eat her Weetabix first, before she would be given a 
yoghurt (see the extended version of extract 5.10 below) and so it is 
expectable that yoghurt will eventually be forthcoming. In example 5.12 Mike 
offers a roll to both Anna and Katherine (line 10), but responds to Katherine 
without orienting to Anna. Note that in each example the first request is 
produced with the omission of an overt reference form, using a pro-term ‘I want 
one’ or ‘I want two of those’. The omission of an overt reference form requires 
that the recipient refer back to the prior interaction to make sense of the turn 
and the connectedness and continuity between the request and the preceding 
interaction is emphasised (Oh, 2005). Note that in extract 5.10 Anna states ‘I 
want two of those like Katherine’. This further enhances the display of 
entitlement as it is emphasised that the object of the request is one which has 
been made available to a co-interactant and as such should also be given to 
the requester.  
 
On the other hand, requesting something which has been made available to a 
sibling makes available the inference that one may be requesting it merely 
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because the sibling has it. ‘I want ’ constructions foreground the speaker and 
request the object as simply a relation between speaker and object, 
irrespective of the sibling or any contingency in the parents’ granting the 
request. The use of the mental state term ‘want’ emphasises the request’s 
subject-side and proposes that Anna is truly at one with the request, which is 
made for her own sake rather than any other reason such as to emulate a 
sibling. Here we can see that the formulation of what proponents of Theory of 
Mind take to be an internal mental experience of desire, ‘I want X’, functions as 
a device in and for interaction in an environment where it may otherwise be 
assumed by the talk’s recipients (the parents) that the request is made 
because of a speaker-sibling rather than a speaker-object relationship. Let us 
now turn to extract 5.13 (an extended version of extract 5.10) in detail.  
 
Extract 5.13 Crouch 3 02:10 
01     (7.2) 
02   Kat: I don’t ea:t (.) all mi::ne (.) ↑↑yoghurt (       )↑↑ 
03     (2.0) 
04   Lin: >you’re have to have< so[me chee]rios as well=  
05   Ann:                         [hh     ]              
06   Lin: =th[en if you’re not goinna eat that one] 
07   Ann: [  [bee: gesu::h                        ] neh!ver 
08    guu:h ((singing))                             ]                      
09    [((reaches over and points at Kath’s yoghurt))] 
10     (2.0) 
11   Ann: [gu::h yoghu::rt        ] 
12   Ann: [((taps Kath’s yoghurt))] 
13     (0.8) 
14   Kat: don’t want ↑ea::t↑ that o:ne  
15     (0.3) 
16   Lin: if you don’t eat that one you’re going to need to eat 
17    some cheerios cause that’s not enough one little 
18    yoghurt¿ before you go to schoo:l.  
19    | (1.6)                  | 
20  Lin: |((separates full yoghurt from Kath’s eaten one and 
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21    places towards middle of table))| 
22   →  Ann: o:[:h!] 
23  Lin:   [  w]’you have some cheerios?  
24  Kat: ((nods head slightly and quickly)) 
25   →  Ann: I w[a:nt     o::]:ne                ]  
26  Ann: [((reaches for Katherine’s yoghurt))]  
27  Lin:    [or a banana?]  
28       [((moves yoghurt away from Anna))] 
29     (0.2) 
30  Kat: °mum[ee::°   ]  
31  Lin:     [you need] to finish that fi:rst darling 
32  Kat: I want cheerios please 
33  Lin: °°alri:ght eat your gra[pes ]°° 
34   →  Ann:                        [I wa]nt two (.)  woghurts 
35     (2.2)  
36 Lin: [ea:t those first,        ] 
37 Lin: [((passes grapes to Kath))]  
 
Let us first consider the various features of the extract. Prior to the beginning of 
the video recording, Anna has been given cereal for breakfast while Katherine 
has been given two yoghurts (data not shown). Two minutes into the meal 
Katherine announces that she will not be eating the second of these (line 2). In 
response, Linda tells Katherine that she will have to eat some Cheerios instead 
if she does not eat the second yoghurt (lines 4, 6). Anna breaks into this turn 
as she leans across the table and points at the yoghurt while singing (lines 7, 
9). She then moves back into her chair momentarily before leaning over again 
and tapping the yoghurt. Following Katherine’s second announcement ‘don’t 
want ↑ea::t↑ that o:ne’ Linda delivers a second directive, with an 
account that justifies the directive while restricting Katherine’s response 
options, specifying that she will indeed have to eat some Cheerios (‘cause 
that’s not enough one little yoghurt¿ before you go to 
schoo:l.’). Linda then picks up both yoghurt pots which are attached 
together and separates them, placing the uneaten yoghurt towards the middle 
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of the table. Note that at this point it is clear that Katherine will not be eating the 
yoghurt. Anna immediately cries out and reaches towards the yoghurt (line 22) 
and breaks into Linda’s turn to deliver the target turn ‘I wa:nt o:::ne’.  
 
On the one hand, the design of this turn indexes entitlement to have the 
request granted as it puts into place the absence of something for Anna which 
is available to Katherine. The omission of an overt reference term requires that 
Linda refer back to the preceding interaction to make sense of the request. 
This marks the turn as reactive and secondary to the preceding talk, 
highlighting that yoghurt was something that is available to Katherine and as 
such, should also be available to Anna. On the other hand the ‘I want’ 
construction emphasises the subject-side of the request and proposes that 
Anna is requesting the yoghurt for her own sake, as a relationship between 
speaker and object, irrespective of other considerations that may be 
circumstantial to the request, such as the fact that Katherine has yoghurt.   
 
Note that Linda does not reject the request, rather she uses a ‘need’ 
construction (line 31) to propose an intervening action that must be carried out 
before the request will be granted; namely, that Anna must eat her Weetabix 
before she is given additional food. Analysis of my materials shows that ‘need’ 
statements following a request from an interlocutor work as a way of delaying 
compliance while maintaining alignment with the base action (this will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 6). The turn is formulated as a delay of the 
provision of yoghurt, rather than a rejection, and so it is expectable that 
following the completion of this precondition (once Anna has eaten her 
Weetabix), yoghurt will be provided. The design of Anna’s second request 
displays an orientation to this expectability and treats yoghurt as something 
that will be forthcoming as she further specifies the request ‘I want 
two(.)woghurts’. Note that ‘two yoghurts’ is precisely that which Katherine 
was given to eat in the first instance. Rather ingeniously this highlights 
Katherine’s failure to finish her breakfast. Again we can note that on the one 
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hand the design of the turn invokes an absence of something for Anna which is 
available to Katherine. On the other hand, the ‘I want’ format builds the request 
as a relationship between speaker and object, irrespective of other 
considerations which my be incidental to the request, and grounds for rejecting 
it, such as that Anna does not really want the yoghurt, but is asking for it 
merely because her sister was given yoghurt.  
 
A similar pattern is observable in extract 5.13 in which Anna delivers an 
objectless ‘I want’ construction at precisely the moment at which Mike begins 
preparing a bread roll for Katherine.  
 
Extract 5.13 Crouch 1 00:27  
01  Mik: does any’ne w[ant a] roll to make a hot dog 
02  Lin:              [Anna?] 
03    what d’you say [Anna:]   
04  Kat:                [↑me  ]me me me↑ me:: 
05  Ann: me m[e me m]e:: 
06  Lin:     [(    )] 
07    | (1.2)                | 
08  Mik: |((takes rolls out of packet))| 
09  Ann: gye:p 
10  Kat: mum it’s only little piece of (     ) 
11     (0.4) 
12  Mik: well you can make it (.) like a sort of [hot dog] 
13    ((to Kath)) 
14   → Ann:               [ I WAN]T*  
15   →    WA:[N ]  
16  Mik:    [y’]can 
17    [put some prawns there as well if you want.]  ((to 
18    Kath)) 
19  Mik: [((cuts roll with knife))                  ] 
20  Lin: [sa:lt                             ] 
21  Lin: [((gets up and walks into kitchen))] 
22   →   Ann:  >#huh.hh#< I want one like tha::t 
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The first thing to note is that this extract is peppered with offers  (lines 1, 16-18) 
as the family prepare to eat. These are built with the transitive verb ‘want’. As 
noted by Curl (2006) offers built using this format propose to provide something 
that the recipient ‘needs’ or ‘desires’. Katherine is first to respond to this offer 
(line 4) and so Mike takes a roll out of the packet (line 8) and engages with 
Katherine as he prepares the roll for her (line 12). Note that Anna’s acceptance 
of the offer at line 14 is a direct repetition of Katherine’s prior turn. Mike does 
not respond to Anna as she delivers an ‘I want’ construction (lines 14-15) which 
breaks into Mike’s turn (which is addressed to Katherine) as he prepares a 
bread roll for Katherine. Anna abandons this turn and the object of the 
utterance is left unspecified. She begins a second turn at line 30 ‘I want one 
like tha::t,’. The omission of an overt reference form indexes the ongoing 
interaction (Oh, 2005) and highlights that as Mike is preparing a bread roll for 
Katherine, one should also be prepared for Anna. Note that the turn is the 
second part of an offer-acceptance pair with Mike’s turn at line 1 serving as the 
first pair part. Anna’s initial response ‘me me me me::’  is recognisable as a 
second pair part. The ‘I want’ format is built as a first pair part and undercuts 
the ‘firstness’ of the offer. By producing a request format following an offer, the 
turn is marked as a new first pair part which projects a response from Mike. 
This works to establish recipiency and reinitiate Anna’s interaction with Mike as 
he engages with Katherine. Note that the turn is not built as ‘can I have a roll?’ 
which projects yes or no as possible response options. Rather, the ‘I want’ 
format invokes entitlement and does not index contingencies for the request’s 
granting. The subject-side format of the request constructs the request as a 
relationship between speaker and object irrespective of other considerations 
which may be circumstantial to the request such as an offer being made, or a 
roll having been made available to Katherine. We can see then that the 
selection of request format displays recognition of the prior interaction and the 
interactional context within which Anna is operating, where the ‘I want’ format is 
designed to manage the considerations involved in requesting something 
which is also available to an interlocutor.  
 156
 
In summary, this section has examined children’s uses of ‘I want’ to deliver a 
request when it is expectable that it will be granted. The use of a declarative ‘I 
want’ format, which does not project refusal as a response option, displays 
entitlement to deliver the request and an orientation to understandings reached 
in the preceding interaction. In section 2.3.1 I examined requests for an object 
that is also available to a sibling. The use of ‘I want’ in this environment has 
two effects. First, by indexing the speaker, rather than the contingencies of the 
recipient, and through the use of a declarative rather than an interrogative form 
(which would formally solicit a yes/no response) these turns display entitlement 
to make the request. In doing so speakers display an orientation to the 
expectation that if something is available to a sibling, it should also be available 
to the requester. Second, these formats propose that the object of the request 
is one which the speaker requests for their own sake rather than, for example, 
to emulate or thwart a sibling. When requesting something which is available to 
a sibling it is inferable that the request is motivated by the projected object 
being one which a sibling possesses. The use of an ‘I want’ format manages 
this and proposes that the requester is truly at one with the request.  
  
3.0 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has examined children’s uses of ‘I want’ in request sequences. I 
began by showing how this request format displays entitlement to make a 
request by deploying a subject-side format in which any contingencies or 
obstacles to the request being granted are not invoked. I then examined one 
recurrent environment in which children build requests using ‘I want’ which is 
when it is expectable that the request will not be granted. I showed how the 
emphasis of the subject-side of the request, which proposes that the request is 
made simply as a relationship between speaker and object, manages the 
contingencies involved in delivering a potentially unacceptable request. 
Interrogative formats concede authority to request recipients and as such allow 
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for the possibility of refusal. However while recipients may be entitled to and 
may choose to refuse the object of a request, that this is something that the 
speaker ‘wants’ is not so easily denied. In plain terms, the speaker ‘wants’ the 
object, regardless of the possibility of refusal. In this section I also showed how 
speakers may use ‘I want’ constructions to downgrade and minimise requests 
by restricting their scope.  
 
In section 2.3 I discussed children’s use of ‘I want’ to request something when 
it is expectable that the request will be granted. Here the use of ‘I want’, which 
does not project the possibility of refusal, displays an orientation to this 
expectability and entitlement to make the request. In section 2.3.1 I examined 
children’s requests when the object of the request is something which is 
already available to a sibling. On the one hand, when requesting something 
available to a sibling it is expectable, without a special case having to be made, 
that the request will be granted and that the object will be made available to the 
requester. On the other hand, requesting something which is possessed by a 
sibling makes available the inference that the request is made precisely 
because the sibling possesses the object. The use of an ‘I want’ format in this 
environment has two effects. On the one hand the format displays entitlement 
to make the request. On the other hand the ‘I want’ construction proposes that 
the request is made because of a speaker-object, rather than speaker-sibling 
relationship.  
 
This chapter extends understandings of children’s request sequences. I have 
extended Wootton’s (1981) analysis in which he suggests that the syntactic 
constraints placed on the recipient’s next turn governs the selection of request 
format. What has become clear from the analysis here is that in addition to 
syntactic constraints, the selective emphasis of the subject-side, realised via 
the mental state term ‘want’ is a key feature of these requests.  
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In examining the interactional currency of ‘I want’ constructions in children’s 
talk a key area that was investigated is what is called ‘desire psychology’ in 
contemporary social cognitive research. As noted throughout the thesis, 
according to this view, the word ‘want’ appears in the vocabulary of the child to 
correspond with a private experience of desire. The use of ‘I want’ is taken as 
evidence that the child understands others in terms of their desires before they 
reach a fully developed, representational Theory of Mind and are able to 
understand others in terms of their beliefs (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). My 
analysis shows that rather than simply expressing a desire as this corresponds 
with a private, inner entity, children’s actual uses of ‘I want’ to deliver requests 
are orderly, sequential phenomena. In sum, a referential view of language 
which is dominant in contemporary cognitive psychology, does not adequately 
account for children’s uses of mental state terms in talk-in-interaction. By 
selecting ‘I want’ formats in particular environments young children display the 
ability to design their talk with reference to the ongoing sequential context. 
Rather than making guesses about references to putative internal states and 
trying to determine what this reveals about children’s development into 
adulthood, here I have examined one practice for managing the interactional 
contingencies involved in delivering particular types of requests, as I have 
shown how children may use ‘I want’ constructions in the service of 
sequentially unfolding social interaction.   
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6 
 
 Directing and requesting 
 
You can't always get what you want 
But if you try sometimes you might find 
You get what you need 
 (Jagger & Richards, 1969, tr. 9) 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
  
This chapter examines speakers’ uses of ‘I want you to X’, ‘you need to X’ and 
‘I need X’ to build directives and requests.  I show how speaker selection of 
these formats is a sequential phenomena. As noted throughout the thesis, it is 
a central premise of work in contemporary cognitive psychology that mental 
state terms map onto internal referents. That is, that the term ‘want’ reflects an 
individual experience of desire. The term ‘need’ is understood as referring to a 
particular class of objects which are “essential or very important rather than just 
desirable” (Oxford English dictionary, online). Rather than understanding the 
term ‘want’ as a reflection of a desire, or ‘need’ as an intrinsic feature of the 
requested object or action, I show how notions of ‘wanting’ and ‘needing’ may 
be invoked to manage a range of interactional considerations. In section 2 I 
focus on deferred action directives which are built using ‘I want you to X’ and  
show how this format is deployed to manage the contingencies involved in 
directing someone on something which is their business when one cannot 
monitor or control whether the projected action will be carried out. In section 3 I 
show how speakers deliver deferred action directives using ‘you need to X’, 
where the directive is built is an upshot of the prior talk. In section 4 I examine 
requests built using an ‘I need X’ format. ‘I need X’ formats recurrently occur in 
second position following a request or directive from an interlocutor and delay 
the provision of the relevant SPP while maintaining alignment. We shall see 
 160
then, that the particular format used to deliver a directive or a request is 
systematically related to the interactional environment in which it is produced.  
 
2.0  ‘I want’ formatted directives  
 
There are a variety of different ways of building requests and directives. In this 
section I examine directives built using ‘I want you to X’. The prototypical 
format for delivering a directive is the imperative such as ‘pass me the salt’. 
However as Huddleston and Pullam (2005) note, imperatives can be used to 
build a variety of turn types such as “offers, (have a pear), requests (please 
pass me the salt), invitations (come to dinner), advice (get your doctor to look 
at it), instructions (to see the picture click here) and so on” (p.8). The examples 
in this chapter are understood as directives or requests in part due to their 
location and in part due to the type of activity that they propose. In 
distinguishing between directives and requests I draw on Curl and Drew’s 
(2008) notion of entitlement and contingency in requests, and on Craven and 
Potter’s (2010) characterisation of directives as actions which embody no 
orientation to the recipient’s ability or desire to carry out the projected action. 
The examples in this section can be understood as directives by virtue of 
speakers’ orientations to their entitlement to issue the directive and the 
absence of any display of understanding of the contingencies involved with the 
recipient’s ability to carry out the projected action.   
 
Directives built as ‘I want you to X’ are relatively rare, with eleven instances in 
the data corpus.  My aim is to explicate the interactional work which is being 
managed by this expression. To that end I show how directives built with ‘I 
want you to X’ invoke authority and mobilise the recipient’s obligation to the 
director while on the other hand, they orient to the projected action as the 
recipient’s business. I show that directives built as ‘I want you to X’ are Janus 
faced in the sense that they have two contrasting aspects. On the one hand 
their action import is to tell rather than ask the recipient to do something, but on 
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the other hand they ostensibly orient to optionality. In other words, they are 
produced as if they are refusable when in fact, normatively, they are not. 
Before going on to consider these features I will first outline the typical 
environments in which speakers frame directives using ‘I want you to X’.  
  
2.1 Particular interaction environment  
 
There are several features which are typical of the interaction environment in 
which speakers build directives using ‘I want you to X’. First, the format is 
selected by speaker A when speaker A is directing speaker B on something 
which is speaker B’s business, rather than making a request on their own 
(speaker A’s) behalf, such as for assistance or permission.  In each example 
the projected action is within speaker B’s sphere of action and is something to 
which speaker B has primary access, relative to speaker A. In each example 
the recipient is required to carry out some action rather than grant permission 
or to assist speaker A in doing so. This is reflected in the construction of the 
turn ‘I want you to X’ rather than ‘I want X’. Second, speakers build directives 
with ‘I want you to X’ when the projected action is deferred (Lindström, 1989 as 
cited in Lanqvist, 2005) and the turn makes relevant a commitment to a future 
activity rather than immediate, embodied compliance. Finally, the majority of 
examples concern an action which is to be carried out when the director will not 
be present. Several examples are given below.   
 
Extract 6.1 AAF 26:58 
01   Pat: [((walks into room and puts hand on hip))] 
02   Gra: [let’s get moving o:n                    ] 
03   →   Pat: oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be ba:ck  
04   here by six. 
05      (.) 
06   Pat:  ri:ght? 
07     (.)  
08   Mar: [((walks past Pat out of room))] 
09     (Mar): [ri:ght.                       ] 
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10   Kev: I’m not going any(way,) ((out of camera shot)) 
 
Extract 6.2  TF2008 16:20 
01  Jan: WHE:RE YOU GOI:NG?                                   
02     (1.0) 
03  Tom: (       ) we’re not allowed to be in so we’re  
04   just gonna go:, 
05     (1.0) 
06   →  Jan: I WANT YOU BACK BY SI:X,  
07     (2.0) 
08  Tom:  I don’t wanna be back by six s[o   ]ma:ybe no:t 
09  Jan:                               [SIX!]  
 
Extract 6.3 Crouch 7 06:54 
01  Lin: <righ> Katheri:ne?   
02     (0.5)  
03   →  Lin: [I want you to eat your fruit in your]=  
04   Lin: [((pours milk into Anna’s bowl))     ]  
05   Lin: =[lunchbox today         ] 
06   Lin:  [((looks at Katherine)) ] 
 
In each of the arrowed turns instructions regarding recipients’ conduct are 
given. Note that the examples here are deferred action directives and the 
action which the recipient is directed to carry out cannot take place 
immediately. Such instructions make relevant a commitment to a future activity. 
Further, the director will not be present when the projected action is to be 
carried out. In Extracts 6.1 and 6.2 the recipients are instructed to be back 
home by a particular time and in extract 6.3 Katherine is told to eat the fruit in 
her lunch box at school later that day. In these instances, the speaker has no 
way of monitoring whether the recipient will carry out the projected course of 
action and there is no way of forcing an unwilling recipient to do so (c.f. 
Landqvist, 2005). Also note that in each example the projected course of action 
is something which is within the recipient’s sphere of action. That is, Grant and 
Tom are asked to be home by a particular time and Katherine is told to eat the 
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fruit in her lunch box. In each example, the turn is built using ‘I want you to X’ 
and rather than make a request on their own behalf (such as using I want X), 
the director asks something of someone else.  
  
Certain specific circumstances are likely to have an influence on the 
construction of turn types in this interaction environment. First, there are 
contingencies which must be managed when issuing instructions to another 
regarding something which is the recipient’s business and which is within the 
recipient’s sphere of action. Second, as the projected course of action is 
deferred (Lindström, 1989, as cited in Lanqvist, 2005) and is to happen when 
the speaker will not be present there is no way of monitoring whether the 
recipient will carry out the action and no means of forcing an unwilling recipient 
to do so (Landqvist, 2005), just as Simon takes steps to force Emily to clean 
the bath in the following example.  
 
Extract 6.4 TF2008 5 30:00 
01  Sim: ((stands directly in front of Emily and points at  
02   bathroom)) 
03  Sim: I’m not arguin’ with you get in there  
04    and do it now  
05    (1.0) 
06  Sim: >get in clean the barthroom.<  
07  Emi: ((steps back away from Simon)) 
08  Emi: I’ve got to do my BE:[D].  
09  Sim:  ((pushes Emily into bathroom))            
10  Sim:                      [y]es, and you’ve got to  
11   [clean the bathroom]  
12  Emi: [GET OFF           ] 
13  Sim: WELL JUST GO AND DO IT.  
14    (0.3)  
15  Emi: I [wi:ll       ] 
16  Sim: ((pushes Emily into bathroom and closes door behind  
17   her)) 
18  Sim:   [go and do it] NO YOU DO IT NOW bec’z I wanna go to  
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19   bed, and you’ve been in there for hours, now clean it  
 
Prior to the beginning of extract 6.4 Simon has repeatedly instructed Emily to 
clean the bath and these directives have been responded to with repeated 
refusals (data not shown). At the start of the extract Simon stands in front of 
Emily and points at the bathroom. The directive at line 6 ‘>get in clean 
the barthroom.<’ receives defiance as Emily provides an account for her 
refusal and invokes an alternative action which she must do ‘I’ve got to 
do my BE:[D].’ In response Simon physically pushes Emily into the 
bathroom  (lines 9, 16) and closes the door behind her (line 16). In this 
example then, the projected action (cleaning the bath) is to be carried out 
immediately. Following Emily’s refusal to comply Simon uses physical force to 
ensure that the action is carried out.  
 
While speakers who issue directives which make relevant immediate 
compliance have resources available to monitor and control whether the 
projected action is carried out, with deferred action directives speakers do not 
have resources such as physical force available to them. However there are 
resources available to speakers when building a directive which work to 
increase the likelihood of compliance. First, across the examples of ‘I want you 
to X’ formatted directives within the data corpus, the relationship between 
speaker and recipient is always asymmetrical in terms of relative deontic 
authority within the family unit. Notably, there were no examples within the data 
corpus of children involving themselves in an adult’s business with an ‘I want 
you to X’ construction. If we imagine a child doing that, it sounds rebellious, a 
usurpation of the direction of parental authority. Thus the speaker can increase 
the likelihood of compliance by mobilising the recipient’s obligation to them 
through the invocation of authority and entitlement. Second, speakers can 
maintain civil relations with a recipient when involving themselves in their 
business (c.f. Lanqvist, 2005) by orienting to the projected action as their 
business. This is done by building directives as a ‘my-side telling’. According to 
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Pomerantz (1980) by telling ‘their own side’ of a relevant matter speakers may 
fish for a response rather than directly asking for one. In doing so the speaker 
positions themselves as displaying an orientation to respecting the recipient’s 
right to privacy while simultaneously working around it. Further, the ‘I want’ 
construction generates an environment where the want may be satisfied, or 
not. So on the surface the possibility that the projected action will not be carried 
out is allowed for.  
 
Note that none of the examples here is built with an imperative format. For 
example the directive in extract 6.1 is built;  
oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be ba:ck here by 
six. 
 
It is not built using an imperative such as;  
oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt be ba:ck here by six. 
 
That is, the example in extract 6.1 does not build a directive by formally, or in 
speech act terms, directly telling Kevin and Grant to be back by six.  
We can also note that none of the examples are built using an interrogative 
format. Extract 6.1 was not built;  
oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt can you be ba:ck here by six. 
 
That is, extract 6.1 does not build a request using an interrogative format 
addressed to Kevin and Grant regarding their ability to be back by six. As a 
declarative, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response and so does 
not propose either of these as a possibility.  
 
Directives built using ‘I want’, then, are Janus-faced in the sense that they have 
two contrasting aspects. On the one hand they strengthen the recipient’s 
obligation to comply by invoking authority and entitlement while on the other 
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hand they orient to optionality and appear to give the recipient a way out. In the 
following sections I consider each of these two features in turn.  
 
2.2 ‘I want’ mobilises recipients’ obligation to comply 
 
Building a directive with an ‘I want’ preface invokes authority and reflects 
speakers’ orientations to their entitlement to issue a directive. Here entitlement 
is “pointedly displayed by not orienting to any possibility of the request not 
being granted” (Curl & Drew, 2008, p.145). This lack of orientation can clearly 
be seen in the following extract, in which Simon, Tom’s father, is stood at 
Tom’s bedroom door early in the morning. The previous night Tom and his 
sister were involved in a physical fight while they were alone in the house.  
 
Extract 6.5 TF2008 3 29:30 
01 Sim:   you’re in trouble mate. 
02    (1.0) 
03  Sim:  about last ni:ght. 
04    (1.0) 
05  Sim: ((starts pointing at Tom))                          
06  → Sim:   I want you home on the fi:rst bu:s,(.) not  
07  the second bu:s, 
08   (0.4) 
09  Sim:  okay¿ 
10   (0.2) 
11  Sim:  no skateboard to schoo:l, 
12   (0.5) 
13  → Sim:   I wanna check your bag before you go to   
14  schoo:l,  
15  | (1.0)                                  | 
16  Sim: |((stops pointing at Tom, steps towards him))| 
17  Sim: [you’re in trouble.                        ] 
18  Sim: [((pushes Tom’s bedroom door open further))] 
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The target turns at lines 6-7 and 13-14 have a clear sense of telling rather than 
asking. The turn at lines 1-3 (‘you’re in trouble mate.’) invokes Simon’s 
relative deontic authority. Tom is ‘in trouble’, a notion which implies some sort 
of punishment, which will presumably be administered by Simon. This turn also 
deletes Tom’s agency and choice with respect to the events which are to 
follow. Note that both target turns ‘I want you home on the fi:rst 
bu:s,(.) not the second bu:s,’ and ‘I wanna check your bag 
before you go to schoo:l,’  are built as a declarative format. They are 
not built as interrogatives such as ‘can you get the first bus home?’ which 
treats compliance with the request as contingent on the recipient’s willingness, 
ability, or capacity to comply (Vine, 2009). Requests built in this way, formally, 
can be refused (Craven & Potter, 2010)  as yes or no are available as possible 
response options (Raymond, 2003). As a declarative ‘I want’ does not formally 
solicit a yes/no response and so propose either of these as a possibility. A 
further notable feature of the construction of these turns, which distinguishes 
these from a typical directive, is that the ‘I want’ indexes the speaker, further 
invoking Simon’s relative deontic authority as his ‘wants’ are treated as a 
sufficient basis for Tom to comply. Whereas request forms built using a modal 
such as ‘can you?’, index the recipient (‘you’), and directives tell the recipient to 
do something often without giving a basis for doing so, here the ‘I want’ 
construction pointedly indexes the speaker as Simon’s intentional states are 
provided as the basis upon which Tom should comply.  In sum, Tom is treated 
as going to comply on the basis of Simon’s wants, which further enhances 
Simon’s display of entitlement.  
 
Note the turn at lines 13-14, which is an implicit directive embedded within a 
directive sequence. This appears to be a deviant case as the form used does 
not grammatically present the action as one which Tom, as the recipient, will 
carry out. Formally, grammatically, the turn differs from that at lines 6-7, where 
you expresses the agent of the future action. However as Edwards notes “the 
very notion of an intention to do something, as something worth formulating, 
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makes relevant a potential gap between thought and action” (2008, p. 180). 
Thus if Simon were simply able to check Tom’s bag, he would do so. The 
statement that Simon wants to check the bag, as something worth formulating, 
displays an orientation to the notion that the projected action requires an action 
on Tom’s part. Although semantically ‘I wanna check your bag before 
you go to schoo:l,’ refers to a future action that the speaker will carry out, 
its function is not to simply inform Tom of Simon’s ‘wants’ but to gain Tom’s 
cooperation, for him to comply and not to leave the house without first showing 
Simon his bag.  
  
We can see then that building directives with ‘I want you to X’ is a high 
entitlement way of issuing a directive. The invocation of authority embodied 
within the design of the turn is one resource for assuring compliance when the 
speaker cannot monitor whether a recipient will carry out a projected action 
and cannot force an unwilling recipient to do so.  
 
Let us explore this further in the following example in which multiple directives 
occur and non-compliance is not oriented to as a response option. In this 
example Jane has followed Tom, who along with his friend David, has just left 
the house after being told to do so during a confrontation with his father Simon.  
 
Extract 6.6 TF2008 4 16:20 
01 Jan: WHE:RE YOU GOI:NG?                                             
02   (1.0) 
03 Tom: (       ) we’re not allowed to be in so we’re  
04  just gonna go:, 
05    (1.0) 
06   → Jan:  I WANT YOU BACK BY SI:X,  
07   (2.0) 
08 Tom:   I don’t wanna be back by six s[o   ]ma:ybe no:t 
09 Jan:                               [SIX!]  
10  Jan: ((turns and walks back into the house))  
 169
11  Jan:   brilliant [ Sim]on, I don’t want him=  
12  Tom:                [(no)]  
13  Jan: =wandering round I don’t know where he i:s.  
 
Prior to the start of the extract Tom was playing a computer game, which 
Simon switched off as he told Tom to leave the house. Tom complied and left 
the house although he displayed a reluctance to do so. Jane is shouting from 
the front door. She asks Tom, who is out of camera shot in the street, where he 
is going (line 1). Rather than providing an answer to her question, Tom 
responds with the complaint implicative ‘we’re not allowed to be in 
so we’re just gonna go:,’. Jane’s directive at line 6, ‘I WANT YOU 
BACK BY SI:X’ has a clear sense of telling rather than asking.  It is notable 
that the projected action, that Tom be back home by six, is a deferred action 
directive which requires a commitment to a future activity and is to be put into 
action when Jane will not be present, such that Jane will be unable to ensure 
that the action will be carried out. Again, the turn is not built as an interrogative 
request and so does not formally solicit a yes/no response.  The verb format ‘I 
want’ indexes Jane and her wishes, rather than the contingencies of the 
recipient. The turn is built, then, without allowing for the possibility that it may 
be refused. 
 
At line 8 Tom responds to the directive with defiance. Not only does this turn 
embody a rejection of the projected course of action (he may not be back by 
six) but he explicitly rejects Jane’s deontic authority (he does not want to be 
back by six) as he invokes his own wants which contrast with Jane’s ‘I don’t 
wanna be back by six so ma:ybe no:t’. The repeat of the directive 
at line 9 is produced in overlap with Tom’s talk.  In displaying a lack of 
orientation to Tom’s talk this overlap in itself embodies entitlement. This is 
further evidenced as Tom’s response is treated as a failing; ‘SIX!’. No 
account is offered for the directive, which would suggest an analysis that an 
insufficient basis for compliance had been offered.  The directive is not 
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repeated in full, which would suggest that it might not have been heard by 
Tom. Rather, the partial repeat deletes the prior turn which is not allowed to 
shift the trajectory of the ongoing sequence. While second requests may orient 
to a new trajectory brought about by the recipient’s choice to refuse the 
request, the turn at line 9 does not acknowledge the recipient’s right not to 
comply. It is irrelevant that Tom does not want to be home by six, as he has 
been told to do so.  Immediately following this partial repeat Jane turns and 
walks back into the house (line 10)  and engages with Simon (lines 11, 13), 
effectively terminating the interaction with Tom, whose defiant response  ‘no’ is 
not oriented to, responded to or perhaps even heard.  
  
In summary, building directives with ‘I want’ displays speakers’ orientations to 
their entitlement to issue a directive.  There are two key features of these turns 
through which entitlement is invoked and displayed. First, the declarative 
format of the turn does not officially solicit yes or no as a response and does 
not project refusal as a response option. Second, in contrast to classic request 
forms such as ‘can I X?’ the modal indexes the speaker and attends to their 
wants, rather than the contingencies which may be involved in the recipient 
granting the request. In essence, the recipient is treated as going to carry out 
the projected action on the basis of what the speaker wants.  
 
2.3 Reporting a ‘want’ as a fishing device  
 
So far it has been noted that rather than ask recipients to do something, ‘I want 
you to X’ constructions are used to build directives that tell recipients to carry 
out an action. We have seen how these formats embody high entitlement as 
the recipient is treated as obliged to carry out the projected course of action on 
the basis of what the speaker wants.  However the ‘I want’ format changes the 
grammar of the turn so that formally the recipient is not being told what to do. 
Rather the speaker’s ‘want’ is simply reported which generates an environment 
where it may be fulfilled or not, which (on the literal surface at least) allows for 
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the possibility that the projected action may not be carried out. Invoking one’s 
mental states indexes a potential  gap between thought and action (Edwards, 
2008). In particular, intentional states such as want, wish and hope allow for 
the possibility of the intention not being realised, as after all one doesn’t always 
get what one wants. Formally the recipient is not being told what to do as is the 
case with classic directive forms. Neither are they directly asked to do 
something, as with requests. Further, these turns take the form of my-side 
tellings which orient to the recipient’s ‘own side’, the projected action, as the 
recipient’s business (Pomerantz, 1980).  Thus we can see that directives built 
using ‘I want’ are Janus-faced and on the one hand are designed to display an 
orientation to optionality, while on the other hand they restrict recipient’s 
response options. An initial orientation to optionality which is closed down once 
the directive is reissued can be seen clearly in extract 6.7 in which Pat directs 
her sons Kevin and Grant to be back home at a particular time later that day.  
  
Extract 6.7 AAFE3 26:58 
01 Pat: [((walks into room and puts hand on hip))] 
02 Gra: [let’s get moving o:n                    ] 
03 → Pat: oka:y now Kevin and Gra:nt I want you to be  
04   ba:ck here by six. 
05    (.) 
06  Pat:  ri:ght? 
07   (.)  
08  Mar: [((walks past Pat out of room))] 
09      (Mar): [ri:ght.                       ] 
10  Kev: I’m not going any(way,) ((out of camera shot)) 
11  Gra: [((runs past Pat out of room))    ] 
12  Pat: [you’re no:t goi:ng ↓good.↓ o:kay,] 
13  Pat: |((walks towards door, following Grant))| 
14  |(0.2)                                  | 
15  Pat: Gra:nt  
16   (.) 
17      (Mic):(ye:s)  
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18  Pat: GRANT?  
19  Gra: yea::h 
20  Pat: [((stands in doorway looking at Grant))] 
21  Pat: [YOU BE BACK HERE BY ↑SIX↑ O CLO:CK.   ] 
22   (0.2) 
23  Gra: I’ll be ba:ck here as soon as possible. 
24   (.)  
25  Pat: ohkay.   
26  Gra: ah say po see 
 
At the start of the extract Pat walks into the room just as Grant is about to leave 
the house (let’s get moving o:n). Note that the turn at lines 3-4 is not 
built as an imperative ‘Kevin and Grant be back here by six’ and so 
grammatically and formally does not tell the recipients to do something. Rather 
Pat’s ‘want’ is simply reported. Again there is a formal allowance for optionality 
as this ‘want’ may be fulfilled or not. The turn is built as a my-side telling. 
According to Pomerantz by telling ‘their own side’ of a relevant matter speakers 
may fish for a response rather than directly asking for one. In doing so the 
speaker positions themselves as displaying an orientation to respecting the 
recipient’s right to privacy while simultaneously working around it. Here then, 
Pat displays an orientation to Kevin and Grant’s right to direct their own 
behaviour, without fully respecting this right.  
Following a slight gap (line 5) a response is pursued with the incremental 
‘ri:ght?’, an attached interrogative clause with positive polarity which 
projects a ‘yes’. We can see that the ostensible orientation to optionality, and 
the gap between the ‘wanting’ and its realisation, is closed down as a ‘yes’ 
response is pursued. Following a sequence during which it is determined that 
Kevin will not be leaving the house anyway (lines 10-12) Pat again pursues a 
response from Grant (lines 15, 18) who has begun to leave the house. In his 
turn at line 19 Grant responds to the summons ‘yea::h’ rather than provide 
the response to the directive which is being pursued. The directive is then 
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redone using an imperative format ‘YOU BE BACK HERE BY ↑SIX↑ O 
CLO:CK.’ This imperative format restricts Grant’s response options solely to 
compliance. The pattern that we see in this example is a move from a report of 
Pat’s ‘wants’ that orients at least notionally to optionality to an interrogative 
which projects a ‘yes’, to an imperative format. As Craven and Potter note, this 
lack of acknowledgement of the recipient’s right not to comply is typical as 
repeat directives typically “upgrade the issuer’s entitlement and downgrade the 
recipient’s contingency” (2010, p. 8). In sum, the gap between thought and 
action and the possibility that the ‘want’ may be satisfied or not, is closed down 
as a ‘yes’ is first pursued (line 15) and finally, Grant’s response options are 
restricted solely to compliance (line 18).  
 
The following example (an extended version of extract 6.3) is a further 
illustration of an orientation to optionality which is subsequently closed down as 
the recipient’s response options are restricted.  This is brought off and carefully 
managed in a way that maintains civil relations with the recipient.  
 
Extract 6.8 Crouch 7 06:54 
01   Lin: <righ> Katheri:ne?   
02    (0.5)  
03 → Lin: [I want you to eat your fruit in your]=  
04  Lin: [((pours milk into Anna’s bowl))     ]  
05  Lin: =[lunchbox today       ] 
06  Lin: [((looks at Katherine))] 
07         | (0.9)                        | 
08    |((looks at Linda, continues eating))| 
09   Lin: <alright> c’I ↑know you ev your fruit at snack ti:me, 
10   (0.3) but you a:lso need to eat your fruit at lu:nch 
11   ti:me. 
12   | (1.3)                        | 
13  Lin: |((walks back towards her chair))    | 
14  Lin: m:kay cause (.) you never do: and it’s a waste of  
15    fruit but it’s very important that you have fruit. 
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16   | (1.2)                         | 
17  Lin: |((sits on chair, looks at Katherine))| 
18  Lin: you ha:ve fruit at snack time you <need to have piece 
19   of fr-> so what fruit? if I put some fruit in your 
20   lunchbox what fruit are you gonna eat are you gonna  
21   eat a bana:na? 
22    (0.2) 
23  Kat: gra:[::pes  ] 
24   Lin:     [clement] some gra:pes: (.) okay.  
25   | (2.7)                      | 
26  Lin: |((continues looking at Katherine))| 
27   Kat:  ::nd some grapes:: for my (0.2) fruit too. 
28  Lin: no I’ll av suming diff:erent we’d have ↑different 
29   things everyday so it’s (1.6) more balanced.  
 
At lines 3 through 5 Linda issues a directive using ‘I want’ ‘I want you to 
eat your fruit in your lunchbox today’. Again, this directive 
concerns an aspect of Katherine’s behaviour which Linda is unable to monitor 
or control, namely that she eat the fruit in her lunch box at school that 
afternoon. Following a slight delay (line 7) Linda pre-empts a possible objection 
and provides a series of accounts for the directive  (lines 9-11, 14-15) before a 
reformulation of the turn and a specific pursuit of a response (lines 18-21).  By 
this time Katherine’s response options are limited to a formulation of which fruit 
she wants, a banana or something else. Whether or not she will eat her fruit is 
clearly not up for negotiation.  
 
While the series of accounts for the directive (lines 9-11, 14-15) restrict 
Katherine’s response options to whether she wants a banana or another fruit, 
this is carefully managed. Each account for the directive  (‘you a:lso need 
to eat your fruit at lu:nch ti:me.’  ‘it’s a waste of fruit 
but it’s very important that you have fruit.’)  invokes external 
constraints and general rules about fruit consumption that apply to anyone. 
With directives, essentially one person involves themselves in another’s 
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business without asking or wondering about their capacity to comply (Craven & 
Potter, 2010).  Here the potential negative implications of this are countered 
through the invocation of general rules, rather than further personal investment.  
Although Katherine’s response options are severely limited and she has been 
told to eat her fruit, this is formulated as a result of the way that things are in 
the world, rather than Linda involving herself in Katherine’s business.  In sum, 
there is an orientation towards Katherine’s rights to direct her own behaviour 
(the base directive is formulated to allow for the possibility it may not be 
realised, the accounts provided are formulated as external constraints rather 
than a personal investment on Linda’s behalf) however these rights are not 
fully respected as her response options are limited and she is essentially told 
rather than asked to eat her fruit that day.  
 
2.4: Summary 
 
Extracts 6.1 to 6.8 are typical instances of how ‘I want you to X’ formatted 
directives are constructed in the family mealtime data. First, these directives 
are formulated to invoke authority and entitlement as the recipient is treated as 
obliged to carry out the projected action on the basis of what the speaker 
wants. On the other hand, the ‘I want’ construction changes the grammar of the 
turn so that formally the recipient is not being told what to do. Rather, the 
speakers’ want is simply reported which generates an environment where it 
may be satisfied, or not. ‘I want you to X’ formatted directives then, are Janus-
faced and work to increase the likelihood of compliance when building deferred 
action directives by invoking authority and entitlement while ostensibly orienting 
to optionality.  
 
3.0 ‘You need to X’ formatted directives 
 
In the prior section I showed how speakers may build directives using ‘I want 
you to X’ to manage the contingencies involved in instructing someone on 
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something which is their business when one will not be able to monitor or 
control whether the projected action will be carried out. However ‘I want you to 
X’ constructions are not the only format that speakers may use to deliver 
deferred action directives. In this section I examine directives which are built 
using ‘you need to X’. Unlike their ‘I want you to X’ counterparts ‘you need to X’ 
formats are interactionally generated and propose to solve a problem which is 
educed from the prior talk. As noted above, certain specific circumstances are 
likely to influence the construction of turn types when delivering a deferred 
action directive. First, in each example the projected action is the recipient’s 
business and is an action which the recipient is required to carry out. Second, 
speakers cannot force an unwilling recipient to carry out a particular action. In 
what follows I show how ‘you need to X’ formats manage these contingencies 
by building directives as an upshot of the preceding talk, while allowing the 
director to officially, grammatically, avoid telling the speaker what to do.  
 
The following extract is taken from the TF2008 corpus. As background, earlier 
in the day Emily announced that she has been sacked from her job. Emily is 
somewhat accountable for this as she often missed work because of staying 
out late at nightclubs. She is lying in bed crying for the duration of the extract.  
 
Extract 6.9 TF2008 5:22 
01 Emi: hhh 
02   (0.2) 
03 Sim: can I be Dad for a moment.  
04 Emi: ººumºº 
05   (1.0) 
06 Sim: you’re burnin the candle at both ends. 
07 Emi: º.shihhº 
08 Sim: aren’t you. 
09   (1.0) 
10 Sim: [a:ren’t you,]  
11 Sim: [((nods))    ] 
12   (0.9)  
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13 Sim: and what does thi:s do when you do this,  
14   (0.8)  
15 Emi: °hhhh° 
16 Sim: does it make you feel shit?  
17   (1.2) 
18 Emi: °hm° 
19   (1.0) 
20 Sim: aye? 
21 Emi: #yeah#  
22 Sim: right. 
23   (0.4) 
24   → Sim: so you need to do some re:st  
25   (1.8)  
26 Sim: don’t you.  
27   (0.1) 
28   → Sim: you need to get some early nights, [get your slee]p  
29  pattern  
30 Emi:                                    [hhh          ] 
31 Sim: =back to normal,  
32   (0.2)  
33 Emi: .shih 
34   (0.3) 
35 Sim: have a bit of re:st  
36   (0.1) 
37 Emi: ~#yeah#~ 
38   (1.0) 
39 Sim: yeah?  
 
Let us first consider the various features of the extract. At the start of the 
extract Simon initiates a pre-sequence as he frames what is to follow as him 
‘being Dad’, which implies that some sort of advice, or instructions regarding 
Emily’s conduct are to follow. He uses the idiomatic expression ‘burnin the 
candle at both ends.’ to describe Emily’s current behaviour, implying that 
she is ‘overdoing it’. Note that at various points throughout the extract Simon 
pursues a verbal response from Emily (lines 8, 10, 16, 20, 26) which, as she is 
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lying in bed crying, is often not forthcoming. In his turn at line 13 Simon 
produces a post-expansion using a ‘wh’ interrogative (‘and what does 
thi:s do when you do this,’). Note that the turn initial ‘and’ emphasises 
continuity. He then revises this using a yes/no interrogative (line 16), as he 
provides a candidate answer; that ‘doing this’ (spending nights out clubbing 
and sleeping all day) makes her ‘feel shit?’. This turn is built to restrict 
Emily’s response options as Simon moves from an open ‘wh’ interrogative to a 
yes/no format which makes relevant an agreeing response. Note that Simon 
treats Emily’s weak agreement form (Pomerantz, 1984) (line 18) as insufficient 
through the pursuit of a further response which projects a ‘yes’ (line 20). 
Following explicit agreement from Emily (line 21) Simon delivers the target turn 
‘so you need to do some re:st’. In this sequence then, Simon delivers 
a series of interrogatives as he formulates Emily’s actions as problematic 
(going out to nightclubs all night and staying in bed all day makes her feel shit) 
and recruits Emily as he elicits agreement from her in this matter. The target 
turn, which is delivered with a turn initial ‘so’, emphasises continuity and is built 
as a logical consequence of what has proceeded. That is, the ‘you need to X’ 
formatted directive is delivered to solve a problem which is educed from the 
preceding talk. Note that the turn is not built using an imperative format, such 
as ‘do some rest’. Neither is it built using an interrogative, such as ‘will you do 
some rest?’. Formally Simon does not tell Emily what to do. Rather he merely 
reports some circumstance and it is left to Emily as the recipient to determine 
the upshot of this. However we can note that by this point, following the 
question-answer sequence which culminated in Emily’s agreement that her 
current actions are making her ‘feel shit?’, her response options are 
severely restricted. This is further evidenced as Simon pursues a response 
with the tag ‘don’t you.’ which strongly projects a ‘yes’ response.  
 
Let us consider a further comparable example taken from the AAF corpus. As 
background, Lance, who lives away from home, is on the telephone to the rest 
of his family. The phone has been passed around to various family members. 
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Prior to the start of the extract Lance spent some time talking to Pat and told 
her that he currently has the flu. Pat has expressed concern as Lance is 
currently out of work and does not have money to visit a doctor.  
 
Extract 6.10 AAF 1 54:08 
01 Del: ((passes telephone to Pat)) 
02 Pat: La::nce¿ 
03 Lan: ye:s is this you::¿ 
04 Pat: yes  
05 Lan: well listen I just want to say goodbye before my  
06  voice goe[::s] 
07   → Pat:          [oh-] listen you’re talking too much  
08  >right now,< you need to go to be:d, 
09 Lan: uhu::h, I’m only kidding but- I-I will go to bed  
10  right no::w 
11 Pat: okay darling you be sure to call me >an if you-<  
12  if there is any cha::nge, I’m gonna be here all  
13  day and all night. 
14 Lan: okay (     )    u[ hu]:h 
15 Pat:    [an’] and so you be sure an  
16  call me and let me know what is going o:n (.)  
17  back there with you ri::ght¿ 
18 Lan: oka:y Mom right 
19 Pat: okay now- now plea::se take care of yourself.   
20 Lan: I really will mu:m tha:nks mu:m  
 
In his turn at lines 5-6 Lance tells Pat that he wants to say goodbye before his 
‘voice goe::s’, which implies that his illness is severe (as it is serious 
enough to prevent him from talking). Pat responds by telling Lance ‘you’re 
talking too much >right now,<’. Similarly to extract 6.9, this turn is 
built to make problematic some aspect of Lance’s conduct, i.e. as he is ill and 
is struggling to talk, he shouldn’t be doing so. In the second part of the turn Pat 
tells Lance  ‘you need to go to be:d,’. Again we can note that the 
projected action, that Lance go to bed, is an action which Lance, as the 
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recipient, is to carry out, and is something which is Lance’s business. The 
directive is delivered in the second part of a two-part turn, with the first TCU 
formulating Lance’s actions (talking on the telephone while sick) as 
problematic. The ‘you need to X’ format is built to offer a remedy and a solution 
to the problem educed in the preceding talk. We can note that again the turn is 
not built ‘go to bed’. That is, Pat formally reports some circumstance (that 
Lance needs to go to bed) and it is left to Lance as the recipient to determine 
the upshot of this.  
 
The examples in extracts 6.9 and 6.10 then, are built to address an overt 
problem which is educed from the prior talk. In extract 6.9 Simon delivers a 
question-answer sequence in which he builds Emily’s current circumstances as 
problematic and subsequently elicits agreement from her in this matter. In 
extract 6.10, following Lance’s announcement that his voice is about ‘to go’, 
Pat tells Lance that he is ‘talking too much’. In each example the ‘you 
need to X’ directive is built as an upshot of the prior talk, as a logical 
consequence of the recipient’s circumstances, rather than a matter in which the 
speaker has personal investment. Let us now consider one final example, 
taken from the Potts corpus.  
 
Extract 6.11 Potts 9 06:34 
01   (2.6) 
02  Way: [the ball were so: solid ] 
03 Way: [((makes fist with hand))] 
04 Don: hmm  
05 Way: an neur- David Brandon blasted it, 
06   (0.6) 
07 Jud: were Brandon? 
08 Way: yea:h 
09   (1.4) 
10 Way: he blasted it he’s got Ronaldo kicks him.  
11   → Jud: you need to get that (.) ↑pee ee top off him an all↑  
12  your pee ee to:p,  
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13 Way: °I know° 
14   (0.4)  
15 Jud: >or we wont< see: that again I’m not buying anothe:r 
16  | (1.4)         | 
17 Way: ((takes bite of food)) 
18 Don: wha:t pee ee top 
19 Jud:      [((points at Wayne))] 
20  Jud: they [didn’t do          ] pee ee on Fri:day so he 
21   lent (.) Brandon his pee ee to:p  
 
 
As background, Judy works as a playground monitor at Wayne’s school. Prior 
to the start of the extract Judy started to tell a story about performing first aid 
on a girl who had been hit in the face by a football, who cried throughout the 
event. At the start of the extract Wayne describes the ball ‘the ball were 
so: solid’, as David Brandon ‘blasted it’. This accounts for why the girl 
cried, as this must have been particularly painful. In her turn at lines 11-12 
Judy tells Wayne that he must retrieve his P.E top from David Brandon. Unlike 
the previous two excerpts, this directive does not logically follow the preceding 
sequence. That is, there is no source of trouble in the prior sequence which the 
turn is built to address. Nevertheless, the turn medial  ‘an all↑’ emphasises 
continuity and connects the directive with the preceding sequence. Wayne 
responds with ‘°I know°’. Notably, he does not respond with ‘I will’, rather he 
ratifies the status of the turn as telling him something that he needs to do. Judy 
could conceivably have built the turn ‘I want you to get that pee ee top off him’. 
As noted in section 2, doing so would invoke personal investment, as if Judy is 
personally motivated to deliver the directive. The use of ‘you need’ rather than 
‘I want’ builds the turn as a logical consequence of the way things are in the 
world. By using a ‘you need to X’ format Judy formally, grammatically reports 
some circumstance, rather than ask Wayne to do something, or indeed to 
officially tell him to do so. Unlike their ‘I want you to X’ formatted counterparts 
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here there is no ostensible allowance for optionality and it is clear from the 
outset that non-compliance is not a response option.  
 
In sum, in this section I have examined deferred action directives which are 
built using ‘you need to X’. Unlike their ‘I want you to X’ counterparts, these 
turns are built as an upshot of the preceding talk and address a problem which 
is educed in the prior sequence. There is no ostensible allowance for 
optionality as response options are limited and speakers are told from the 
outset what they ‘need’ to do. However formally the recipient is not told what to 
do. Rather, the speaker merely reports some circumstance and it is left to the 
recipient to determine the upshot of this. Nonetheless, it is clear that non-
compliance is not a response option. These turns are built as an upshot of the 
preceding talk, as a result of the way things are in the world, rather than 
invoking personal investment on behalf of the speaker. The speaker formally, 
officially merely reports some circumstance. Grammatically, the speaker does 
not tell the recipient what to do. These two features then, the invocation of 
authority while ostensibly not telling the recipient what to do, work in 
combination to manage the contingencies involved in directing someone on 
something which is their business when one cannot monitor or control whether 
the projected action is carried out.  
 
4.0 ‘I need’ formatted requests 
 
As noted throughout this chapter, requesting may be accomplished through a 
variety of formats. In this section I examine speaker selection of ‘need’ as a 
transitive verb in declarative requests. Within the data corpus there are eleven 
candidate request sequences built using ‘I need’. In the following section I 
begin by outlining the basic features of requests built using ‘I need’. I then 
discuss two recurrent environments in which these requests occur. First I show 
how these formats are produced in second position following a request or 
directive from an interlocutor where they are constructed as a prerequisite to 
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compliance with that base FPP.  Second, I consider how speakers subvert this 
feature of these turns as a way of exiting a trouble relevant sequence.  
 
4.1 ‘I need’ as a way of building a ‘no problem’ request 
 
There are several features which are typical of the ways in which requests built 
using ‘I need’ are produced and are responded to. With this format speakers 
orient to requests as ones which they are entitled to make. In turn, recipients 
typically orient to the object of the request as something which should routinely 
be granted. The selection of ‘need’ as a transitive verb, then, is implicated in 
bringing off requests as ‘no problem’. In the following extract, taken from a 
family mealtime, Wayne requests a new back wheel for his bike.  
 
Extract 6.12 Potts 7 06:40 
01   (44.5) 
02 Way: [((looks at table))                ] 
03   → Way: [need new back wheel °for me bi:ke°] 
04  | (3.2)                      | 
05 Way: |((glances at Don))                 | 
06 Don: |((nods and stares straight ahead)) | 
07 Don: w’get you one.  
08  | (6.9)                  | 
09 Don: |((licks sauce from fingers))| 
10 Way: ((chews food))              
11 Jud: then you can buckle ano:ther one 
12  | (4.4)| 
13 Way: |((chews food))| 
14 Jud: ((pulls face at Wayne)) 
15 Way: mi:ne just buckle:d¿  
16   (3.6)  
17 Jud: ((chews food)) 
18 Don: ((coughs)) .pt 
19 Way: °went° down steps, ( [ )] 
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20  Don:                     [ta]ke it down Harry Shields, 
21    (0.2) and get them to fix it,  
22   (1.8) 
23 Don: no matter what it co:st, (0.4) get it fi:xed  
24  | (7.4)                   | 
25 Don: |((puts food in mouth and chews))| 
26 Don: [it doesn’t matter, cause it’s a good bi:ke,]  
27 Don: [((looks at Wayne))                         ] 
28   (0.2) 
29  Don: if it were a rubbish bike you’d throw it awa:y and get 
30   another  
31   (1.2) 
32 Don: considering you’ve only had! it four month  
33   (5.0) 
34 Jud: and hardly u:sed it,  
 
We can begin by noting that as Wayne delivers the request ‘need new back 
wheel °for me bi:ke°’ he looks down at the table (line 2) and does not 
make eye contact with Don, the recipient. There are several design features of 
the turn which evidence its status as a routine, likely to succeed request. First, 
note that the turn is not built as an interrogative; ‘can I have a new back wheel 
for my bike?’ which formally solicits a yes/no response (Raymond, 2003) and 
so proposes either of these as a possibility. Rather, as a declarative statement 
the turn does not require a granting or a rejection. This sense of the request as 
one which does not formally require a granting and for which compliance is 
expectable is further strengthened through the declarative intonation with which 
the turn is produced. We can also note that the utterance does not correspond 
to a complete grammatical unit, as the deletion of the subject (‘I’) implies that it 
is objectively the bike which requires a new back wheel, rather than something 
in which Wayne has a personal investment. This deletion of agency helps build 
the request as a matter of fact, as a result of the way which things are in the 
world. Don orients to the request as routine and non-problematic as he 
immediately nods before indicating that the request will be granted without 
gazing at Wayne (lines 6 & 7). In short, the request is produced as routine and 
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is treated as such through Don’s unproblematic, immediate indication that the 
request will be granted.   
 
Judy’s complaint implicative turn (line 11) is not aligned with by Don as rather 
than admonish Wayne for riding his bike down the steps (as something which 
may cause damage to the bike) he launches a post-expansion and elaborates 
on his response to the base request. Although the turn at line 20 ‘take it 
down Harry Shields,‘ appears to be an imperative, contextual information 
suggests that due to the location of the shop, Wayne is unable to take the bike 
himself and so the turn is hearable as an offer, as an elliptical version of 
something such as ‘we/I can take it down Harry Shields’. By not specifying the 
agent, it is left open as to how the bike will actually get there. It later transpires 
that it is Don who will take the bike to the shop (data not shown). Note that the 
notion of the bike being ‘fixed’  (line 21) constructs the new back wheel as 
something which is required, as the bike is broken, rather than something 
which is desirable. Indeed there is further elaboration by Don (line 23) as he 
treats the request as one which must routinely be granted ; ‘no matter what 
it co:st,(0.4) get it fi:xed’.   
 
In sum, Wayne’s request at line 3 is produced as one which he is entitled to 
make. The ‘need’ construction provides for the request as one which is dictated 
by the state of the world rather than one in which he has a subjective, personal 
investment which would be conveyed, for example, by  ‘want a new back wheel 
for my bike.’ ‘Needing’ as a way of requesting goes beyond the realm of 
personal wishes and desires, a realm which is diffusible and refusable, by 
invoking some kind of necessity dictated by the state of the world. In general, 
requests built using the transitive verb ‘need’ are treated as something which 
should be routinely granted and here Don’s unproblematic indication that the 
request will be granted is notable.   
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We can note at this point that to refuse a request built using ‘need’ requires 
more work than refusing an interrogative request and requires unpacking of the 
notion that the object of the request is needed, just as Simon rejects the idea 
that he and Jane  ‘HAVE TO’ renew their wedding vows in the following 
example;  
 
Extract 6.13 TF2008 8 21:54 
01 Jan: °.hh I de bo I tried one on° ((whispering)) 
02  Sim: [you sa(h)d ↑sad sad saddo↑      ] 
03  Jan: [((puts handbag down and smiles))] 
04   | (1.8)                                 | 
05  Sim: |((walks out of dining room, into living room))| 
06   →  Jan: .shish SO WE’RE GONNA HAVE TO RENEW OUR VOWS I-IN  
07   THREE YEARS TIME.  
08    (0.6) 
09   →  Sim: [°I don’t° need to renew our vows] 
10  Sim: [((walks back into living room)) ] 
11  Jan: right I’m divorcing you then.   
12    (0.4) 
13   →  Sim: [£we do not need to renew our] vows£ 
14  Jan: [hhhh             heh heh heh]  
15  Jan: #we do::, I’d like a twenty fifth wedding anniversary      
16   pard-# renewing of vows and par[ty ] PLEASE THANK YOU  
17  Sim:                               [heh]  
18   heh he::h [heh] 
19  Jan:           [hhh] ↑heh heh heh↑  
 
As background, Jane has been wedding dress shopping with her daughter, 
who is about to get married. At the start of the extract she tells Simon that she 
tried a wedding dress on while out shopping (line 1). She then announces ‘SO 
WE’RE GONNA HAVE TO RENEW OUR VOWS I-IN THREE YEARS TIME.’ 
Simon responds by refuting the notion that they need to do so ‘°I don’t° 
need to renew our vows’. That is, rather than replying with ‘no’, Simon 
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unpacks and challenges the notion that he ‘needs’ to do so. Similarly, in his 
turn at line 13 he states ‘£we do not need to renew our vows£’ again 
rejecting the notion that he and Jane need to do so.  
 
Extract 6.14 contains a further example of a sequence initial request done 
using the transitive verb need. The extract is taken from earlier on the same 
day as extract 6.13. Simon and Jane’s daughter, Jessica, is getting married 
and it has been agreed that Simon and Jane will pay for part of the wedding. 
The extract begins immediately after an edit by the television producers. Prior 
to the edit, Simon has asked Jane what their plans are for that day, as he has a 
day off from work.  
 
Extract 6.14 TF2008 8 01:30 
01 Sim: [((swings arms back and forth))] 
02  Sim: [↑beautiful da:y↑              ] 
03     (0.6) 
04  Jan: #I’ve got# to clean the house Simon I won’t be  
05   able to do it on Monda:y.  
06     (0.6)  
07  Sim: why what you doing on Monday  
08     (0.4) 
09  Jan: I’m going to have a root cana:l, 
10     (0.4) 
11  Sim: [((shrugs shoulders slightly))] 
12  Sim: [ueohh                        ] 
13     (0.4) 
14  Jan: and then I’m going we:dding dress shoppi:ng.  
15     (3.1)  
16  Sim: [ueohh               ] 
17  Sim: [((exaggerated shrug of shoulders))] 
18     (2.4) 
19   →  Jan: I’m going to need you to lend me some money.   
20  Sim: [A:::H the ba:nk of Simon] 
21  Jan: [((scratches ear))       ] 
22     (0.9) 
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23  Jan: well I’ll give it ba:ck,  
24   | (0.6)            | 
25  Sim: |((opens curtains))| 
26  Sim: .shi:sh (0.2) we:ll you better be ni:ce to me  
27   then hadn’t you  
28  Jan: [↓you better be nice (to me)↓] 
29  Jan: [((sits up in bed))          ] 
30   |  (0.2)              | 
31  Jan: |((throws cushion at Simon))| 
32  Jan: (th’s mo::rnin.)  
 
The notion of obligation and external constraint is invoked in the turn at lines 4-
5 as Jane accounts for being unable to go out for the day. It transpires that the 
cleaning must be done that day as Monday, which is presumably when the 
cleaning would otherwise be done, will be taken up with a dental appointment 
and wedding dress shopping. Here then, the activity of ‘we:dding dress 
shoppi:ng.’  is treated as one which takes priority. The target turn ‘I’m 
going to need you to lend me some money.’  follows Simon’s non 
receipt of the announcement at line 14 (rather he shudders, at lines 12 and 16 
in response to the announcement that Jane will be having root canal 
treatment).  
 
Note that the request is formatted as a projected future need and as such 
highlights that this is not merely a whim or something which is desirable but 
something which is a precondition for the activity of going wedding dress 
shopping. The choice of lexical description ‘lend’, rather than ‘give’ qualifies 
and softens the request, further enhancing its likelihood of success. Simon’s 
ironic response; ‘A:::H the ba:nk of Simon’ is neither an indication that 
the request will be granted, nor a rejection. Although a response is pursued at 
line 23 this is not forthcoming, rather there is an implicit indication that the 
request will be granted; ‘.shi:sh (0.2) we:ll you better be ni:ce 
to me then hadn’t you’. This is treated as sufficient as a further 
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response is not pursued (line 28). In summary, the base request is brought off 
as one which is routine and likely to succeed. As a declarative statement, 
rather than a yes/no interrogative, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no 
response (Raymond, 2003). Indeed, neither a granting nor a rejection is 
forthcoming and this is not oriented to as unproblematic as both interactants 
treat the granting of the request as a given.  
 
In extracts 6.12 and 6.14 the request is produced as one which the speaker is 
entitled to make. The selection of the verb ‘need’ constructs requests as ones 
which are dictated by the state of the world, rather than personal subjective 
investment. As declarative statements these turns do not formally solicit a 
yes/no response and thereby propose either of these as response options. This 
is further strengthened by the declarative intonation with which each of these 
examples are produced. In turn, request recipients treat the requested action 
as one which should routinely be granted.  
 
4.2 ‘I need’ as a prerequisite to compliance 
 
In the preceding section the logic of speakers building requests with ‘I need’ 
was explicated. I will now examine the interactive uses of ‘I need’ constructions 
within a particular sequential position, which is in second position by speaker B 
following a base FPP which directs some aspect of speaker B’s actions, 
delivered by speaker A. Extracts 6.15-6.17 provide some examples of 
declaratively formatted ‘I need’ requests in this particular sequential position.  
 
Extract 6.15 AAF 7 04:22 
01 → Pat: [mm gonna get your hair cut today?] 
02  Pat: [((looks at Kevin))               ]  
03  Kev: huhu:m  
04  Pat: a:h 
05   (0.5) 
06 Bil: tri::m= 
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07  Kev:  =I need mone:y  
 
Extract 6.16 Potts 6 09:10 
01 → Don: ((passes napkin to Wayne)) 
02  Way: ↑what tha:t for↑ 
03   (1.0) 
04 → Jud: wipe yer fa:ce on 
05   (1.0)  
06 → Don: [£for wiping your   a:rse on after.£] 
07  Don: [((takes napkin out of packet))     ]  
08   (1.2) 
09  Way: °°(   ) (after)°° 
10   (0.1) 
11  Don: wipin’ th’a:rse on ((singsong voice)) 
12   (2.3) 
13 Way: need some mo:re  
 
Extract 6.17 Potts 8 08:00 
01 → Jud: you’re not going anywhe:re so you might as well  
02  eat ‘um                              
03   (2.2) 
04  Way: I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk? 
 
In each of the arrowed turns some aspect of the recipient’s conduct is 
specified. In the first extract Pat requests that her son Grant get his hair cut. In 
the second extract, Don passes a napkin to Wayne and albeit in a manner 
which is oriented to as ‘non serious’, instructs Wayne to wipe his ‘arse’ on the 
napkin, with the non-ironic instruction at line 4, which is ‘wipe yer fa:ce 
on’. In the third example Judy directs Wayne to eat his left over food and to 
remain sitting at the dinner table. The kinds of instructions given to recipients in 
these extracts are built using various turn types and at various positions within 
TCUs. However, although there is diversity in the content and sequential 
positioning of these turns it is recognisable that each directs some aspect of 
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the recipient’s conduct. Note that in each example the base FPP is responded 
to with an ‘I need’ construction which launches a further request sequence.  
 
Note that none of the examples here use an interrogative format. The request 
in extract 6.13, for example is built;  
need some mo:re 
 
It is not built with an interrogative form such as  
can you give some mo:re 
 
Rather than a request which solicits a yes/no response and which is contingent 
on the recipient’s willingness or ability to comply (Vine, 2009) speakers display 
entitlement to make these requests on the basis of their positioning as a 
prerequisite to compliance with the base request. I now turn to extracts 6.18 
and 6.19 (extended versions of extracts 6.15 and 6.16)  to examine the 
practice in further detail.  
 
In extract 6.18, an extended version of extract 6.15, Pat and her daughter 
Michelle are sitting in the car before leaving the family home to stay with Pat’s 
mother in another city for a period of several months. Her husband Bill and 
their sons Kevin and Grant are saying goodbye.  
  
Extract 6.18 AAF 7 04:30 
01  Pat: [mm gonna get your hair cut today?] 
02  Pat: [((looks at Kevin))               ]  
03  Kev: huhu:m  
04  Pat: a:h 
05   (0.5) 
06  Bil: tri::m= 
07   → Kev:  =I need mone:y  
08   (.) 
09  Kev: its gonna cost fifty dolla:rs.  
10   (.) 
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11  Pat: ↑li[sten take-        ]take your↑ picture and=  
12 Kev:    [for a good ba:rber]    
13  Pat: =send it to me plea:se, 
14  Kev: heh HE::H HEH.   
15   (0.4) 
16  Kev: .h[hh!        ] 
17  Pat:  >[will you do] tha:t< 
18  Kev: o:h oka:y  
19   (0.2) 
20  Mic: WE ALL wanna see what it looks like.  
 
We can begin by noting that the example in this extract ‘I need mone:y’, 
(line 7) appears to be a deviant case. Unlike the examples in extracts 6.15 and 
16.6 where the ‘I need’ formats launch an insert sequence in second position 
as they introduce a prerequisite to compliance, the target turn occurs following 
a question-answer sequence launched by Pat (line 1) which is responded to by 
Kevin (line 3) and then appears to be closed following Pat’s turn in third 
position (line 4). As the sequence appears to be closed, how can the target 
turn be understood as introducing a prerequisite to compliance?  
  
The sequence initial request concerns whether Kevin will be getting his hair cut 
later that day. As background, Kevin will soon be moving away to start a new 
job working with a colleague of his father’s and it is expectable that he will have 
his hair cut before doing so, such that we can hear Pat’s interrogative at line 1 
as a requirement rather than merely an information-seeking question. As an 
affirmative-polarity yes/no interrogative this turn projects a ‘yes’ response 
(Raymond, 2003) which would imply compliance with it as a request.  At line 3 
Kevin responds with a weak agreement form (Pomerantz, 1984). Note that the 
turn is not built as an explicit ‘yes’, and is thus open for revision. Following 
Pat’s receipt of this response (line 4) where the sequence is brought to 
possible closure, Bill further specifies and reopens the request as he indicates 
the kind of haircut that Grant should have ‘tri::m=‘ . Kevin then delivers the 
target turn, arguably in second position; ‘I need mone:y’. Logically and 
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sequentially (following Bill’s turn at line 6 as an operation on line 1) this turn 
deals with the still active request that he have his hair cut. Although there is a 
glitch in the sequential order in this example, Kevin’s turn at line 7 deals with 
and can be heard as introducing a pre-requisite to compliance with the request 
at line 1.   
 
A further notable feature of the design of the turn at line 7 is that it is produced 
as an upshot of the preceding talk, as something which has emerged 
interactionally, rather than a request which was previously on the agenda. As a 
declarative, the turn does not formally solicit a yes/no response. Rather than 
functioning as a straightforward request which may either be granted or 
rejected, the obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened by virtue of 
the turn’s positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base request. As 
Schegloff notes, insert sequences are promissory in nature as they are 
“understood to have been launched to address matters which need to be dealt 
with in order to enable the doing of the base second pair part. They project the 
doing of that second pair part upon completion of the preliminary work” (2007, 
p. 99). Hence, the turn builds on Pat’s commitment to having her own, prior 
request complied with. Note that the request is oriented to by Pat as one which 
is ‘no problem’. Although the turn receives no explicit response it is implicitly 
treated by Pat that Kevin will have his hair cut and so will be given the money 
for this, as she requests that he send her a picture once he has done so (lines 
11, 13, 17).  
 
As an action ‘I need money’ accomplishes requesting. One feature which 
denotes this action import is that Kevin’s co-interactants, Pat and Bill, are in a 
position to grant the request and to provide Kevin with the money. As Kevin’s 
parents, particularly as Pat has requested the haircut, it is routine and 
expectable that they provide the money to do so. A second evidential feature is 
the turn’s sequential positioning. The request is produced as an upshot of the 
preceding talk, as something which has emerged interactionally rather than 
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something which was previously on the agenda. That is, Kevin is not simply 
requesting money for any old thing, nor simply stating that he needs money 
‘out of the blue’. Kevin goes on to further specify the request ‘its gonna 
cost fifty dolla:rs.’ and provides an account which justifies this ‘for 
a good ba:rber’. One key feature of the ‘I need’ construction is that not only 
will the granting of this request enable the base request to be granted, but it will 
allow more effective compliance. Kevin ‘needs’ money not only to comply, but a 
specific amount of money to get his hair cut by a ‘good ba:rber’. This 
renders an otherwise potentially disruptive intervention an affiliative one.   
  
The central observation about this extract upon which the rest of the analysis 
hinges is the recipient’s use of an ‘I need’ construction following a request from 
an interlocutor as a way of introducing a precondition to compliance. The turn 
is hearable as a request in part due to its sequential positioning. In reporting 
some circumstance it is left for the recipient to determine its upshot for the 
projected course of action and to make proposals arising from what is reported 
(Drew, 1984), allowing Grant to avoid making an explicit interrogative request. 
The turn is built as an upshot of the preceding talk and so the obligation of the 
recipient to comply is strengthened, as the ‘needed’ object is formulated as a 
precondition to compliance with the recipient’s own prior request. Here we can 
see that there is more than the semantics of the word ‘need’ or the object of the 
request that contribute to its sense as something which is necessary. Rather, 
the turn gains its interactional potency from its sequential positioning as 
formulating a precondition to compliance with a base request.  
  
The following extract provides a further example of an ‘I need’ formatted 
request which occurs following a directive from an interlocutor.  In this example 
the relevant adjacency pair is the question-answer sequence at lines 2 through 
6. The target turn (line 13) is produced as an upshot of what may be heard as 
directives within this sequence.   
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Extract 6.19 Potts 5 09:10 
01 Don: ((passes napkin to Wayne)) 
02   → Way: ↑what tha:t for↑ 
03   (1.0) 
04   → Jud: wipe yer fa:ce on 
05   (1.0)  
06   → Don: [£for wiping your a:rse on after.£] 
07 Don: [((takes napkin out of packet))   ]  
08   (1.2) 
09 Way: °°(   ) (after)°° 
10   (0.1) 
11 Don: wipin’ th’a:rse on ((singsong voice)) 
12   (2.3) 
13   → Way: need some mo:re  
14   (1.2) 
15 Don: what for wiping th’a(h)ss o(h)n  
16  | (1.2)  | 
17 Way: |((nods at Don))| 
18 Way:  [whole pa:ck       ] 
19 Way:  [((glances at Don))] 
20   (0.2) 
21 Don: wha? 
22 Way: (  ) a [whole pa:ck      ] 
23 Jam:  [     I[’m not eating tha]t bit its all gristle ] 
24 Don:  [((puts pack of napkins on table next to Wayne))] 
25 Way:  hu::hyna heh  
 
While there are several features of this sequence that display speakers’ 
orientations to the conversation as ‘non-serious’ (the turn at line 7 is produced 
in a ‘smiley-voice’ while line 12 is said in a sing-song voice along with Wayne 
smiling as he nods confirmation at line 18) the extract includes a further 
example of an ‘I need’ construction following what can be heard as a directive 
from an interlocutor.   
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In his turn at line 7, in response to Wayne’s question regarding the purpose of 
the napkin given to him (line 3) and after Judy has provided an answer ‘wipe 
yer fa:ce on’ Don redoes this response; ‘£for wiping your a:rse on 
after.£’, which is partially repeated at line 11 ‘wipin’ th’a:rse on’. 
Sequentially the turns at lines 4, 6 and 11 provide the information solicited by 
the turn ‘↑what tha:t for↑’ produced by Wayne at line 4. These turns also 
direct some aspect of the recipient’s behaviour, namely that Wayne wipe his 
face/arse on the napkin. Wayne’s ‘need some mo:re’ (line 13) arises from 
the preceding turn, continuing the joke. The turn is understood as a request 
firstly as Don is in a position to grant the request and to give Wayne more 
napkins. Second, by virtue of its sequential positioning as an insertion 
sequence required for compliance with Don’s directive implicative turn.  
  
We can note that the request is not built as an interrogative; ‘can I have some 
more?’ but rather as an upshot of the preceding talk, as something which has 
emerged interactionally. It is produced as emerging from Don’s turn and 
highlights a prerequisite which must be fulfilled before the base FPP can be 
complied with. There is no verbal response to this request, rather Don passes 
the packet of napkins to Wayne (line 24) and the inserted request is brought off 
as one which is ‘no problem’. It is again notable that having more napkins will 
not only enable Wayne to comply with the directive, but it will allow more 
efficient compliance- if given more napkins, the job will be done more 
thoroughly. Again, therefore, the inserted ‘I need’ formulated request is brought 
off as affiliative.  
  
In summary, one recurrent sequential environment in which speakers build 
requests using ‘I need’ is following a request or directive from an interlocutor, 
where the ‘I need’ formulated request is inserted as a prerequisite to 
compliance. Grammatically ‘I need’ constructions do not on their own 
accomplish requesting but are hearable as requests in part due to their 
sequential positioning. The selection of this format builds requests as an 
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upshot of the preceding talk, rather than something which was previously on 
the agenda. The obligation of the recipient to comply is strengthened due to 
this sequential positioning, building on the recipient’s commitment to having 
their own prior request complied with.  
 
 
 
 
4.3 ‘I need’ as a strategy for exiting a trouble relevant sequence 
 
In the previous section I showed how ‘I need’ formatted turns invoke a 
precondition to the possibility of continued alignment with an initiating, directive 
implicative, action. In what follows I examine a further interaction environment 
in which ‘I need’ constructions occur, namely as an exit strategy in trouble-
relevant sequences.  These constructions work as a way of doing resistance 
and exiting a sequence while maintaining alignment in principle. That is, they 
formulate some precondition which must be fulfilled in order to comply with the 
course of action projected by the base part. In this manner they are 
comparable to requests built using ‘I need’ in that they maintain alignment 
while delaying compliance with some projected course of action.  
 
The first example is taken from the TF2008 corpus. The segment is taken from 
a scene which occurs during the morning following debate the previous day 
concerning Simon and Jane’s daughter, Emily, working part time rather than 
full time (with full time being preferable to her parents) and spending most of 
her days sleeping.  
 
Extract 6.20 TF2008 5 41:10 
01   Sim: ((walks into bedroom)) 
02   Jan: uhn a lovely da:y¿                                   
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03   | (1.2)               | 
04   Sim: |((leans over to kiss Jane))| 
05    (0.5) 
06   Jan: cleaning the house (.) what’s Emily doing today  
07   | (1.3)         | 
08   Sim: |((walks towards door))| 
09   →  Sim: °I don’t know. I’m not getting into it  
10   right now, I need to go to work. heh°    
11   ((slightly whispering))  
12   Jan:  hmm 
13   Sim: ((picks up jacket off bed)) 
14   Sim: hhh! so y’n-  no I’m not going down that path.  
15    (1.0)  
16  Sim: hh at a:ll 
17     (1.0) 
18   Sim: I’m afraid 
 
In this example the action accomplished by the ‘I need’ construction at lines 11 
and 12 is to provide an account for refusal to engage with the project of 
complaining about Emily’s work situation, initiated by Jane at line 8. I will now 
consider various features of the extract that are relevant to the role played by 
the construction. As background, immediately before going to bed the previous 
evening, Simon and Jane engaged in what was characterised by Simon as a 
‘row’, as Jane accused Simon of ‘giving in’ to their daughter Emily (data not 
shown). In the turn at line 8 Jane volunteers the information that she will be 
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spending the day ‘cleaning the house’. There are several features which 
evidence this turn’s status as complaint implicative. First, as both speakers 
have equal epistemic access to the object of the enquiry (what Emily will be 
doing that day) the turn can be heard as doing complaining rather than 
questioning (Koshik, 2003). Second, although grammatically an answer is 
provided to the question; ‘I don’t know.’ Simon treats this as an 
inadequate answer as he provides an account for his refusal to engage with 
the action which is alluded to within the turn and so he treats the turn as doing 
more than questioning.  
 
Through the production of an ‘I need’ construction (lines 11-12) Simon’s refusal 
to engage with the project alluded to in Jane’s turn at line 8 is formulated as a 
delay (via ‘right now,’) rather than an outright rejection. The first TCU within 
the turn ‘°I don’t know.’ answers the question as an information 
solicitation, the second TCU delays engagement with the action packaged 
within this turn (as a complaint) while within the third TCU ‘I need to go to 
work.’, the ‘I need’ construction itself accounts for that delay. That is, Simon 
highlights an overriding obligation that prevents his continuing involvement with 
Jane’s projected actions. Arguably, whether or not the discussion topic is 
indeed resumed later, once Simon gets home from work, is irrelevant. The ‘I 
need’ construction allows for alignment with Jane’s project in principle despite 
engagement with it being impossible at that moment in time, due to externally 
imposed constraints.  
 
In summary, the ‘I need’ construction is deployed here as a way of exiting a 
trouble-relevant sequence (following a complaint from an interlocutor) while 
allowing that in principle, engagement with the project is preferred. The 
semantics of the word ‘need’ along with the recognisability of going ‘to work.’ 
as a necessary action, construct the rejection as imposed by external 
constraints, rather than personal preference or desire on the speaker’s part. 
These features are the essence of what makes ‘I need’ a useful resource for 
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speakers. In the preceding section I showed how ‘I need’ constructions can be 
deployed to delay compliance following a request or directive from an 
interlocutor as they highlight a necessary precondition to compliance. The 
granting of this prerequisite enables not only compliance but more effective 
compliance. So rather than being rejection implicative, these constructions 
maintain alignment. ‘I need’ constructions, then, are generally a members 
method of delaying or avoiding compliance while maintaining alignment, this 
being deployed in extract 6.20 as a way of exiting a trouble relevant sequence 
while maintaining that, were it not for these constraints, cooperation or 
compliance would be forthcoming.  
  
The following segment, also from the TF2008 corpus is drawn from a scene 
during which Simon has asked his daughter Emily, to clean the bath after using 
it late at night. Also present is Emily’s mother, Jane. Here we have a further 
example of an ‘I need’ construction as an account accompanying a rejection, in 
this instance, defiance in response to a directive.  
 
Extract 6.21 TF2008 5 36:32  
01 Sim: [((points towards bathroom))                  ] 
02  Sim: [<now get in there [and wipe the ba:th rou:nd.]  
03  Emi:                    [there’s no               c]leaning  
04  stuff    
05 Sim: <wi:pe th[e bath round,  
06 Emi:          [there’s no cleaning stu:[ff] 
07 Sim:                               [   [ i]t’s underneath]=  
08 Sim:                               [((nods at bathroom)) ] 
09  =the sink. 
10 Emi: no it isn’t*  
11 Sim: ((turns head and looks at Jane)) 
12 Sim: ↑is the ba:rth- (.) cleaner [su]- 
13 Jan:                             [ n]o there isn’t any in  
14  the:re (.)  °don’t think°  
15  | (2.4)                          | 
16 Sim: |((turns head slowly back towards Emily))| 
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17 Sim: [((turns head towards Jane))] 
18 Sim: [what there’s no spo:nge    ] 
19 Jan: ye[a:h there’s a sponge] 
20 Emi: [ [      there’s a spon]ge but there’s no point I need 
21  the cleaning stuff            ]  
22 Sim: [((continues looking at Jane))] 
23 Sim: where’s the cleaning stuff  
24  | (2.6)         | 
25 Sim: |((turns towards Emily))| 
26 Sim: I wan’ it clea:ned Emily,  
 
The extract begins immediately after an edit by the television producers. Prior 
to the edit and shortly before the beginning of the extract there are repeated 
directives to clean the bath, which have been responded to with resistance 
from Emily (data not shown). The first directive within the segment, ‘<now get 
in there and wipe the ba:th rou:nd.’, is responded to with the first 
formulation of a prior condition for the cleaning of the bath (lines 3-4), namely 
that there are no cleaning products. Following a sequence during which it is 
determined that there are indeed no cleaning products under the sink, Emily 
builds further resistance and accounts for her inability to comply by stating the 
absence of a precondition- there is no cleaning stuff and as such she is unable 
to clean the bath.  
 
The target expression ‘I need the cleaning stuff’ highlights the 
absence of a precondition to compliance which prevents the projected course 
of action being carried out effectively- if there were cleaning products other 
than the sponge, then Emily would be able to clean the bath properly. Although 
this response occurs in an established environment of disaffiliation and is 
rejection implicative there are two features of the ‘I need’ construction that 
differ from an outright rejection. First, the formulation of a necessary 
precondition to compliance appeals in principle to a scenario in which 
compliance would occur, but is not possible on this occasion due to external 
constraints. Thus it is due to the nature of the world (no cleaning products), 
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rather than personal disposition or desire, that Emily is unable to comply. 
Second, the act of looking under the sink (as evidenced in the turn at line 8 in 
which Emily displays knowledge that there are no cleaning products there) is in 
itself part of incipient compliance. Thus, rather than an outright rejection of the 
proposed action, the ‘I need’ construction highlights that in principle compliance 
is the default option. Thus the turn is designed as alignment implicative, rather 
than an outright rejection as it is external constraints, the absence of cleaning 
products, that prevent compliance from occurring. The ‘I need’ formulation 
then, retains Emily’s engagement with the project.  
 
Similarly to extract 6.20, the turn works as a way of exiting a trouble implicative 
sequence, although in this instance the strategy is somewhat unsuccessful. 
The turn is not treated as an absolute refusal, rather Simon aligns with the 
notion of cleaning products as a prerequisite as he directs Jane to retrieve 
them. Here the precondition is fulfilled and the projected course of action, that 
Emily clean the bath, is eventually carried out (data not shown).  
  
So far I have examined two sequential contexts in which ‘I need’ constructions 
occur; as a request following a directive or request from an interlocutor, and as 
an exit strategy in trouble relevant sequences. However these two 
environments are not exclusive, rather they are interdependent and both 
introduce the notion of being unable to comply or cooperate with some 
projected action due to a precondition which must be fulfilled. This is notable in 
the following example, in which the promissory nature of insert sequences is 
subverted and an ‘I need’ request format is used to exit a trouble relevant 
sequence.  
 
Extract 6.22 Potts 3 08:00 
01   (14.0) 
02 Way: ((puts down knife and fork)) 
03 Jud: well you can eat the:m two, 
04  | (1.8) | 
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05 Way: |((shakes head))|  
06 Jam: he’dint even one.  
07  | (3.5)              | 
08 Don: |((looks at Wayne and chews))| 
09 Don: ri::ght you’re not leaving them are you 
10 Way: ↑heh hum! hh↑ 
11   (0.8) 
12 Don: ↑s’up wi’yer↑ 
13   (1.2) 
14 Jud: [((speaks with mouthful of food))]                   
15 Jud: [you’re not going anywhe:re so you might as well eat  
16  ‘um                              ] 
17   (2.2) 
18   → Way: I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk? 
19 Jud: |((cuts up food on plate))| 
20  | (2.1)           | 
21 Jud: cah- ↓get a drink of water.↓ 
22 Don: just have a toma:to.   
23 Way: |((turns around, reaches in cupboard for glass))| 
24  | (0.8)                                  | 
 
Let us first note the various features of the extract. At line 3 Judy states a ‘well’ 
prefaced objection to Wayne having put down his knife and fork, appearing to 
have finished eating. She states that he ‘can eat the:m two,’. Two 
features of this turn make this a particularly forceful way of issuing a directive. 
First, the ‘well’ preface marks the turn as contrastive to Wayne’s action of 
putting down his knife and fork, and the implication that he has finished eating. 
Second, it is implied that Wayne is able to eat more, without an orientation to 
the possibility that he may be unwilling to do so. At line 7, in a turn which is 
responsive to, but deletes Wayne having shaken his head to indicate that he 
will not be eating more, Don issues a request ‘you’re not leaving them 
are you’ which, formulated as a negative interrogative, prefers a ‘no’ 
response (Heritage, 2002). Following laughter from Wayne, Don produces a 
further objection with a ‘wh’ formatted interrogative which can be heard as 
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challenging (Koshik, 2003) as he displays puzzlement regarding Wayne’s 
actions; ‘↑s’up wi’yer↑’ (what’s up with you). Judy then issues her second 
directive within the sequence, ‘you’re not going anywhe:re so you 
might as well eat um’’ (lines 15-16).  
 
There are a series of directives within this sequence, with the final one at lines 
15-16. It is notable that as a base action, this directive does not receive a 
response. Rather, the target expression ‘I nee- I nuh nee:d a dri:nk?’ 
works as a way of delaying the production of the required response. As 
Schegloff notes, insert sequences are promissory in nature as they are 
“understood to have been launched to address matters which need to be dealt 
with in order to enable the doing of the base second pair part. They project the 
doing of that second pair part upon completion of the preliminary work” (2007, 
p. 99). That is, compliance with Judy’s directive (remain sitting at the table, eat 
further food) is projected once Wayne has been granted permission to leave 
the table momentarily to retrieve a drink. Indeed the turn is treated as a request 
to leave the table momentarily in order to get a drink as Judy grants Wayne 
permission to do so (line 21). Wayne has been directed not to leave the table 
but rather to eat more food and his request is formulated as an upshot of these 
instructions. The turn aligns with the instructions to stay at the table and 
highlights a precondition for him to comply; he needs a drink and must acquire 
one in order to stay at the table for a further period of time. Rather than being 
rejection implicative, therefore, the turn highlights a precondition which will 
enable more effective compliance. 
 
However as Schegloff (2007) notes, this character of insert sequences is 
promissory and here no second pair part of the base sequence is produced. 
Once Wayne returns to the table with his drink of water, the directive to eat 
more food is not attended to. As it happens, there is no further orientation to 
this until a minute and a half later (data not shown) when Don eats one of the 
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items himself, and directs Wayne to eat the other, which he does without 
further resistance.  
 
Here the ‘I need’ construction aligns with the directive to stay at the table, while 
delaying production of the required base second pair part. As an insert 
expansion, the turn is oriented to as coming before the second pair part and 
works as a way of breaking up the sequence. However this feature of insert 
sequences is promissory and here the second pair part, namely compliance 
with the directive to eat more food, is not forthcoming. In summary, the ‘I need’ 
construction works as a way of exiting the sequence, disrupting the 
progression from first pair part to second pair part, in this case compliance with 
the directive to eat more food.  
 
5.0 Chapter summary 
 
The focus of this chapter has been on speaker selection of ‘want’ and ‘need’ in 
directive and request sequences. I have shown how speakers build directives 
with ‘I want you to X’ as a way of managing the contingencies involved with 
directing someone on something which is within the recipient’s sphere of action 
when one cannot monitor or control whether the projected action will be carried 
out. In the second section of the analysis I showed how speakers may build 
directives using ‘you need to X’ to manage these same contingencies. Finally, I 
documented two sequential environments in which speakers build requests 
using ‘I need’ which are following a request or directive from an interlocutor and 
as a strategy to exit a trouble relevant sequence.  
  
In the first part of this chapter, the analysis focused on two features of ‘I want 
you to X’ formats, demonstrating their interactional import in a specific 
sequential environment. These two elements are 1) mobilising recipients’ 
obligation to comply and 2) reporting a ‘want’ as a fishing device. I have 
discussed each of these two features in detail, showing how they do the work 
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of managing the contingencies involved with issuing deferred action directives. 
That is, they increase the likelihood of compliance by invoking authority and 
entitlement on the one hand, and maintaining civil relations with the recipient 
on the other (c.f. Landqvist, 2005). In this way, ‘I want you to X’ constructions 
are Janus-faced and as such tell recipients to do something while appearing to 
ask.  
  
In the second section I showed how speakers may deliver directives using ‘you 
need to X’. These turns are built as a logical consequence of the preceding 
talk. These formats allow speakers to maintain civil relations with the recipient 
as formally the recipient is not told what to do. Rather the speaker merely 
reports some circumstance and it is left to the recipient to determine the upshot 
of this. Nonetheless, I showed how recipient’s response options are severely 
limited as non compliance is not projected as a response option.  
 
In the final section I examined two sequential environments in which speakers 
select ‘need’ as a verb in request sequences. One key feature which was 
examined was speakers’ and recipients’ orientations to ‘I need’ formatted 
requests as ones which should routinely be granted. In support of this 
argument two types of evidence were presented. First, speakers orient to these 
requests as ones which are routine and likely to succeed. For example, in 
extract 6.9 this was evidenced by the deletion of the subject, declarative (rather 
than interrogative) intonation and the lack of eye contact as the turn was 
produced. Each of these features contributed to the sense of the request as 
one which was ‘no problem’ and likely to succeed. Second, responses to these 
requests show recipient’s orientations to them as routine in a variety of ways. 
For example, rather than providing an explicit response speakers may respond 
to ‘I need’ formatted requests with an ironic, analysably ‘non serious’ response. 
Rather than pursuing an explicit response, speakers may treat ironic responses 
as sufficient.  
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The second stage of the analysis has been to examine the interactive uses of 
this request form in two particular sequential environments. These two 
environments are 1) in second position following a request or directive from an 
interlocutor, 2) as an exit strategy in a trouble relevant sequence. I have 
discussed each of these environments in turn, showing how they relate to each 
other and are an effective exit strategy precisely because of their sequential 
function as a way of delaying compliance while maintaining alignment. Here 
there are a normative set of rules, that ‘I need’ formatted requests can occur in 
second position following a directive in order to highlight some prerequisite to 
compliance, that may be subverted (Sacks, 1992) and used to do some other 
action. As noted by Sacks (1992), the visibility of interaction allows people to 
say things and to perform actions for the kinds of actions they will normatively 
be taken to be. Due to the promissory nature of insert sequences as coming 
before the base second pair part (Schegloff, 2007) these do not destroy the 
notion of compliance. Rather their logic can be subverted and used to get 
participants ‘off the hook’, as it were.  
  
With regard to ‘I need’ formatted requests which occur in second position I 
showed how the recipient’s obligation to comply is strengthened by virtue of the 
turn’s positioning as a prerequisite to compliance with the base request. Thus 
rather than an intrinsic feature of the requested object, the turn gains its sense 
as something which is necessary from its sequential positioning as formulating 
a precondition to compliance with a base request. 
 
It is reasonably assumed that the verbs ‘want’ and ‘need’ are descriptions of 
events which are used when true. That is, that speakers use ‘I want’ 
constructions to refer to an private experience of desire. Within folk psychology 
these desires are understood interact with beliefs to produce intentions, while 
these intentions lead to actions. It is also assumed that the word ‘need’ is used 
to refer to a particular class of objects which are “essential or very important 
(rather than merely desirable)” (Oxford English dictionary, online). However 
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throughout this chapter I have documented how speakers select these terms 
drawing on sequential understandings, to perform a range of actions. This 
contrasts with dominant views of  ‘want’ as a reflection of an inner desire and of 
‘need’ as an intrinsic feature of an object or a projected action.  
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7 
 
 “I’m not X, I just want Y” 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I focus on one environment in which speakers formulate their 
‘wants’, which is as part of a two-part structure in which they first reject a 
formulation of their motivations or a proposal regarding their actions and 
proceed to formulate an alternative motivation using an ‘I want’ construction. 
There are two formal types of environment in which speakers deploy the two-
part structure within my materials;  
 
1. In one large group of cases the device, a responsive turn design used by 
speaker B, occurs following a turn by speaker A that embodies some proposal 
by speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. This group of cases can be 
organised into two main subtypes which are directives and account 
solicitations. It is recognisable that in each instance some proposal is made by 
speaker A regarding speaker B’s actions. The device ‘I don’t want/I can’t  X, I 
want Y’ works as a way of rejecting the proposed action by formulating a ‘want’ 
which contrasts with the proposed action.  
 
2. In the second group of cases the device is used by speaker B in response to 
a formulation by speaker A of speaker B’s actions or motivations. In this subset 
the turn is always built using the minimiser ‘just’. The device ‘I don’t want/I’m 
not X, I just want Y’ first rejects this formulation and constructs an alternative 
sense of agency in the second TCU. Here the device implies that as the 
speaker is motivated to do just a particular thing, they are not motivated to do 
anything more.  
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More formally the structure is composed of two TCUs;  
 
1. I’m not/I can’t/I don’t want plus a formulation of motivation or desire 
proposed by speaker A.   
2. I want/just want plus a formulation of an alternative motivation or desire 
which contrasts with that proposed by speaker A.  
 
The following example is prototypical;  
 
Extract 7.1 TF2008 6 12:48 
01 (1)→  Sim: you’re not starting a fi:ght now are you Jane  
02     Jan: ((walks into dining room towards Simon)) 
03 (2) →  Jan: I’m not tryna’ start a fi:ght     
04  I just want my clo:thes ba:ck.  
05  Sim: what’s happened no:w 
 
There is something more than a simple denial here. After denying the 
accusation that she is ‘tryna’ start a fi:ght’ Jane reformulates her 
actions as directed at ‘just’ getting her clothes back (‘I just want my 
clo:thes ba:ck.’). This formulation of her wants is constructed as the 
motivating force behind her actions. According to the communication view 
“communication is supposed to be intentional, i.e. activated by the speakers’ 
reasoning about its own beliefs, desires and intentions” (Dragoni, Giorgini & 
Serafini, 2002, p. 120). That is, Jane experiences a desire to obtain her 
clothes, believes that Emily has her clothes and thus intends to retrieve them 
from Emily. However that is not an adequate account of what is happening 
here. Rather, the formulation of ‘wanting’ arises to counter the notion that Jane 
may be motivated to do some other thing (to ‘start a fi:ght’). Rather than 
a simple ‘didn’t do it’ denial which is susceptible to further challenge (Dersley & 
Wootton, 2000), Jane formulates an alternative sense of agency and by doing 
so she is realising a particular rhetorical effect. To uncover what this effect is it 
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is necessary to turn to those who treat displays of mental states within talk as 
“genuine references to psychological states” (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, p. 31) 
and who subscribe to the notion of desires, beliefs and intentions as 
explanatory variables in human actions. Within this literature the creation of a 
contrast between action and intention is understood as a cognitive 
accomplishment (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983) however 
here it is understood and is examined as a piece of interactional business.  
 
One thing to note is the effect of formulating an alternative sense of agency 
using ‘I want’. If Jane left it at a simple denial her turn would be open to further 
challenge (see Dersley & Wootton, 2000 on the defeasibility of ‘didn’t do it’ 
denials) . The formulation of an alternative sense of agency has the effect of 
making turns less susceptible to challenge. The second thing to note is the use 
of ‘I want’ in the second TCU of a two-part construction. When responding to 
multiunit turns speakers normatively orient first to the final TCU (Schegloff, 
2007). Delivering a denial in the first TCU, away from the zone of contiguity, 
decreases the likelihood of Jane’s denial being challenged.  
 
My argument then, is that formulating an alternative sense of agency using an 
‘I want’ construction strengthens the speakers case, weakens its counter and 
decreases the likelihood of a further counter. The aim of the chapter is to 
extend the argument developed throughout the thesis that when people 
formulate their ‘wants’ they are not simply communicating a private desire but 
are formulating a desire to achieve a particular effect in a specific sequential 
environment. I will consider what it is that formulating an alternative ‘want’ 
following some proposal or formulation does.  
 
The structure of the chapter is based on the two versions of the practice as 
discussed above. In section 2 I begin with an overview of the relevant literature 
as I turn to those who treat desires, beliefs and intentions as explanatory 
variables which are expressed through language. The analysis begins in 
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section 3 as I show how speakers may reject some proposal regarding their 
actions by formulating a ‘want’ which contrasts with the proposed action. In 
section 4 I examine how speakers may refute a formulation of their actions by 
an interlocutor by claiming an alternative motivation. We shall see that the 
formulation of a ‘want’, an intention which drives behaviour, is a members’ 
method for rejecting and undermining an alternative.  
 
2.0 Rejecting a proposal regarding future actions 
 
In this section I show how speakers may use the two-part structure ‘I don’t 
want X, I want Y’ to reject a proposal regarding their actions made by an 
interlocutor. The analysis is divided into two subsections. I begin by examining 
speakers’ deployment of ‘I cant/I don’t want X, I want Y’ in response to 
directives. Following this I examine responses to account solicitations which 
challenge speaker B’s actions and make a proposal regarding their future 
actions. A key feature across the examples is some proposal regarding the 
recipient’s (B’s) actions. The ‘I cant/I don’t want X, I want Y’ construction is 
delivered as a way of rejecting that proposal.  
 
2.1 Rejecting a directive 
 
The clearest examples of instructing another regarding their actions in 
conversation are directives; actions which direct the recipient in some way, to 
do something or to desist in doing something (Craven & Potter, 2010). As 
noted by Craven and Potter (2010) although directives can be understood as 
projecting only compliance, recipients may select response options other than 
those projected in the construction of the turn and may refuse to comply. In the 
face of defiance, directors typically respond with second directives which 
“upgrade the issuer’s entitlement and downgrade the recipient’s contingency” 
(p. 8), that is, contingencies which may affect the proposed action being carried 
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out, (Curl & Drew, 2008). Just as Tom delivers a series of upgraded directives 
in the following sequence;   
 
Extract 7.2 TF2008 4 03:08 
01  Sim:  [what you wearin to the disco then]  
02 Sim: [((walks upstairs))               ] 
03    (0.4) 
04  Tom: thi:s  
05   | (1.2)                     | 
06  Sim: |((knocks on Tom’s bedroom door))| 
07 →  Tom: don’t go in  
08  Sim: why? 
09  Tom: I’m gettin ready.   
10  Sim:  why can’t I come in? 
11    (0.4) 
12  Tom:  cuz I’m ↑getting ready↑  
13  Sim:  [it’s only me and you:. (°fi:ne°)]  
14  Sim: [((pushes on bedroom door))      ] 
15   | (0.3)            | 
16 →  Tom: |((pushes door closed))| 
17  Sim: To:m?  
18 →  Tom: I SAID I’M NOT (.) LETTIN YOU IN YET  
  
 
Before the start of the extract Simon arrived home from work and shouted a 
summons while stood in the hallway, to see whether anyone else was at home. 
Tom is in his bedroom getting ready to attend a school disco. Tom delivers the 
first directive ‘don’t go in’ in response to Simon knocking on his bedroom 
door (line 6). Simon challenges this with a why-formatted account solicitation 
(Bolden & Robinson, 2011) (line 8). Tom’s responsive turn (‘I’m gettin 
ready.’) is deleted and treated as insufficient as Simon pursues a further 
account with ‘why can’t I come in?’. Simon then attempts to open the 
door (line 14), in response to which Tom physically pushes the door closed, 
making it impossible for Simon not to comply. He delivers a second, upgraded 
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directive (line 18) with raised volume. The ‘I SAID’ preface emphasises that this 
is a repeat directive and holds Simon accountable for not complying in the first 
instance. The design of the turn indexes Tom as the director  (‘I’M NOT (.) 
LETTIN YOU IN YET’), downgrading Simon’s contingency. Given that Tom 
has closed the door and physically prevented Simon from entering the room 
Simon is forced to comply. In sum, we can see that following Simon’s defiance 
as he attempts to open the door, Tom physically forces Simon to comply by 
pushing the door closed as he delivers a directive which upgrades Tom’s 
entitlement and downgrades Simon’s contingency.  
 
I now turn our attention to how ‘I don’t want X, I just want Y’ constructions work 
as a practice for decreasing the likelihood of a second, upgraded directive 
being delivered. Through the use of this two-part structure speakers first defy 
directives and then proceed to formulate an alternative course of action. The 
following is a prototypical case. Pat is visiting her son Lance who has moved 
away to live at the Chelsea Hotel in New York to pursue an acting career, 
although he is not currently working. 
 
Extract 7.3 AAF 2 07:15 
01   Pat: ((looking through photograph album)) 
02   Pat: well uh- Lance are you wo:rking? are you doing   
03   anee:, (0.2) any,   
04    (0.4) 
05 →  Lan: ↑↑you’ll just have to wait Mo:m↑↑ juss           
06   hh((singsong voice)) 
07 →   Pat: well I can’t wait I want you:, (0.2) to wo:rk  
08  Lan: well that (   ) 
09   Sor: well (.) we’re just holding off.  
10   Lan: we’re juss really (.) we’re j[ust-    ] 
11   Sor:                              [‘til the] last       
12   minute me and him are gonna have to get a        
13   little £job of some k(h)i[nd£] 
14  Lan:           [  h]eh heh I know.  
15    (0.2) 
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16   Lan: Soren’s gonna get me a job in that fi:lm (0.2)  
17   store 
Throughout the duration of the extract Pat is looking through a scrapbook of 
photographs belonging to Lance taken during his previous periods of work in 
the theatre. In her turn at line 2 Pat asks Lance whether he is currently 
working. There are several design features of this turn which display an 
orientation to this question as a dispreferred (Pomerantz, 1984) action. First, 
dispreference is projected through the ‘well’ preface. Second, there is 
hesitation and a gap within the turn. Finally, the turn terminal ‘are you doing 
anee:,’ (presumably headed for ‘are you doing any shows?’) constructs the 
question as an interest in his acting career, rather than a question regarding his 
employment status (conveyed, for example, by ‘are you wo:rking?’). 
Indeed Lance treats the turn as objectionable as he rejects the enquiry. This 
turn is built as a directive  ‘↑↑you’ll just have to wait Mo:m↑↑’. That 
is, it tells Pat what she has to do (‘to wait’), and puts Lance into speaker 
position A in our structure. Pat (speaker B) rejects the directive and the 
proposal that she ‘wait’ by claiming an inability to do so (line 7). As we saw 
above, following defiance, directors typically produce a second, upgraded 
directive (Craven & Potter, 2010). If Pat were to leave it at that her rejection 
would be open to challenge. It is notable that for Pat the topic of talk, Lance’s 
employment status, is a ‘B-event’ (Labov & Fanshell, 1977) and is something 
which, particularly as he is living independently, is Lance’s business, making 
Pat’s rejection particularly susceptible to challenge.  
 
In the second TCU Pat heads off further challenge by formulating a ‘want’ 
which contrasts with the projected course of action ‘I want you:,(0.2) to 
wo:rk’. There are two things to note about the construction of the turn. First, 
the second TCU ‘I want you:,(0.2) to wo:rk’ is a prototypical example 
of an ‘I want you to X’ formulated directive. As noted in chapter 6 these turns 
invoke authority and entitlement on the one hand, while orienting to the 
projected action as the recipient’s business. That is, by indexing her intentional 
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states and a potential gap between thought and action (Edwards, 2008), Pat 
displays an orientation to Lance’s employment status as his business. On the 
other hand, the invocation of authority displays entitlement to pursue the topic 
and to direct Lance’s actions. This pursuit contrasts with the directive to ‘wait’. 
A second thing to note is that Pat delivers the ‘I want’ construction in the 
second TCU of a two-part turn. This continuation in what might have been a 
transition relevant place makes a response to the first TCU less immediately 
relevant and is a useful strategy for decreasing the likelihood of a further, 
upgraded directive occurring in third turn position.  
 
In sum, the likelihood of further challenge in the form of a second, upgraded 
directive by Lance is decreased as the formulation of Pat’s ‘wants’ and 
intentional states, delivered in the second TCU, are rhetorically organised to 
undermine and reject the course of action proposed by Lance. The use of an ‘I 
want’ construction displays entitlement to pursue the topic and to direct Lance’s 
actions, standing in stark contrast with the directive to ‘wait’.  
 
Compare now a further example, taken from the Potts corpus. Prior to the 
beginning of the extract there has been disagreement between Wayne and the 
rest of the family regarding the time Wayne will spend ‘playing out’. Indeed this 
is a recurrent theme within the family as Wayne often refuses to finish meals in 
favour of going out to meet friends. Earlier in the meal Judy and Don stated 
that Wayne will be staying in that night to do his homework, resulting in Wayne 
leaving the table without permission to do so and reportedly lying on his 
bedroom floor ‘in a strop’ before being summoned back to the table.  
 
Extract 7.4 Potts 8 19:27 
01           Jud: =and then we’ll see what tomorrow (.) bri:ngs,  
02                                  when yer come in (0.2) when yer home from     
03      school and your upstairs get’ cha:nged and   
04               you’ve gone out while I’m putting car awa:y  
05               and you’ve not done your h[ome]work¿                            
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06          Don:                     [[eh ]             ] 
07          Don:                          [((looks at Jamie))] 
08                 (1.4) 
09          Jud: >and then you’ve got us[s-<] 
10          Way:                        [↓ca]n I go no:w the::n 
11                (0.2) 
12    →     Jud: no: e[at your cho]colate  [ca:[ke    ] 
13          Jam:      [(RUSH IT!) ]      ch[o:c’late c]ake   
14   →      Way:                               [don’ ] wa:n i:t  
15                n[o::w] 
16          Jam:   [ tou]gh  
17   →     Way: °I wanna meet my m[a::tes°] 
18          Jud:                   [ well w]here’s all your may-  
19               you’re not going to pa:rk at this ti:me=  
20          Way: =the:y’re all wa::y’i:n 
21          Jud: whe:re they wait*in  
22          Way: [((glances at Judy momentarily))] 
23          Way: [↓cobden stree::t↓              ] 
 
In her turn at line 1, Judy builds a complaint regarding Wayne’s previous 
behaviour as an account to justify why Wayne will not allowed to go and play 
out with his friends on this occasion. The use of the idiomatic expression ‘and 
then we’ll see what tomorrow (.) bri:ngs,’ constructs Wayne’s 
future actions as scripted (Edwards, 1994) and predictable. Wayne cuts into 
Judy’s turn with ‘↓can I go no:w the::n↓’, a request which stands in 
direct opposition to the line of action proposed in this turn. Judy immediately, 
emphatically rejects this request (‘no:’) and tells Wayne to eat his chocolate 
cake instead. Wayne responds to this directive with the target turn. In the first 
TCU he first defies the directive. Research has shown that in response to 
defiance, directors typically deliver a second directive which upgrades the 
director’s entitlement and downgrades the contingencies or considerations 
involved in the recipient’s compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010) (indeed, Jamie 
takes a turn in overlap with ‘tough’ which deletes Wayne’s turn and challenges 
his entitlement to refuse to comply, although this is not oriented to by her co-
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interactants). In the second TCU Wayne formulates an alternative ‘want’ which 
contrasts with the projected action ‘°I wanna meet my ma::tes°’. The 
effect of this is to decrease the likelihood of Judy delivering a further, upgraded 
directive in third-turn position. When responding to multi-unit turns, 
respondents typically orient to the final TCU (Schegloff, 2007) and so the two-
part structure in which Wayne defies the directive in the first TCU shifts the 
trajectory of the ongoing sequence and makes a response to Wayne’s defiance 
less immediately relevant. The topic of conversation is shifted from the matter 
of the chocolate cake to that of Wayne meeting his friends, a third party to 
whom it emerges Wayne has an obligation (‘=the:y’re all wa::y’i:n’). 
We can note that this topic shift is successful as the matter the cake is not 
pursued in Judy’s subsequent turn, rather she enquires as to the whereabouts 
of Wayne’s friends (line 21) and Wayne is subsequently allowed to leave the 
house after agreeing to eat his cake upon his return (data not shown). 
  
In this example then, in contrast to a simple rejecting response Wayne deploys 
a two-part structure which decreases the likelihood of a further upgraded 
directive being delivered in third-turn position. He defies the directive in the first 
TCU and proceeds to formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with the projected 
action. Here he invokes his friends as a third party to whom he has an 
obligation to meet. The ‘I want’ construction then, undermines the projected 
course of action and successfully shifts the trajectory of the ongoing sequence.  
 
2.2 Rejecting a proposal embodied within an account solicitation  
 
In the preceding section I showed how speakers may deliver the two-part 
structure ‘I don’t want X/I want Y’ following a directive in order to first reject the 
directive and then proceed to formulate an alternative ‘want’ which contrasts 
with the projected action. While directives may represent the prototypical action 
for instructing another on their conduct, there are alternative resources 
available to speakers for doing so. One of these are why-formatted account 
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solicitations (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) which embody a proposal regarding 
the recipient’s actions. As Bolden and Robinson note, speakers’ responses to 
‘why’ formatted account solicitations may demonstrate an orientation to the 
solicitation as a challenge. In their analysis they show how respondents 
typically respond to account solicitations either by overtly aligning with 
challenging stances or by rejecting the appropriateness of the challenge and 
justifying the reasonableness of the accountable item. In what follows I 
examine one practice for rejecting the appropriateness of the challenge by 
justifying the reasonableness of the accountable item.   
 
A key feature of the account solicitations across these examples is a challenge 
of the recipient’s actions, embodying a proposal regarding their future actions. 
Speakers respond to these challenges by first rejecting the notion that they 
would be motivated to carry out the proposed action and proceeding to 
formulate a ‘want’ which contrasts with that action. Consider the following 
example in which the Potts family are eating a take-away meal from a chip-
shop.   
 
Extract 7.5 Potts 11 08:00 
01  Don:  [((walks back into camera shot and sits down))] 
02  →  Don: [why don’t you get a portion of chips  
03   betwee:n you instead of throwing-             ]  
04    →  Jam: ↓b’cause I dont want chips!↓ I want ↑ri:ce↑ 
05   chips and gravy he don’t like gravy I don’t 
06   like plain chips. 
07  Jam:  |((puts food into mouth))|  
08   | (0.6)             | 
09  Way: I don’t like ri:ce 
10  Don:   [((points towards Jamie’s plate))] 
11  Don: [well why don’t you get a portion of rice, a  
12   portion of chips, (.) with the >buh-oh-eh-<  
13   gravy,                            ] 
14    (0.6)  
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15  Jud: (can’t) (    ) gravy 
16  Don: |((points towards Wayne’s plate))| 
17   | (0.4)                    |     
18  Don: split the ri:ce, n-er-n-uh and the chips and     
19   th[en,]  
20  Jam:   [ YE]AH but whose gonna have the other half 
21   of the ri:ce  
 
In his turn at lines 2-3 Don challenges Jamie and Wayne’s current practice of 
ordering food separately, rather than one portion of chips to share as this 
would be less wasteful (instead of throwing-). As noted by Bolden and 
Robinson (2011) account solicitations are frequently co-implicated in actions 
such as complaining or criticising. As it is Don, Wayne and Jamie’s father, who 
pays for the food, the turn can be heard as complaint implicative. Bolden and 
Robinson also note that ‘why’ formatted account solicitations index a stance 
that the accountable item (in this instance, buying food separately rather than 
one portion of chips to share) is nonsensical. Similarly, Koshik observes that 
why-formatted interrogatives may “accomplish challenging/complaining rather 
than questioning” (2005, p. 40) and may convey speakers’ stance that “no 
adequate account” (p.51) for the problematic action is available. This turn then, 
is built to imply that there is no adequate account for the purchasing of 
separate food and thus that in future Jamie and Wayne should order one 
portion of chips to share. In sum, the turn embodies a proposal regarding 
Jamie and Wayne’s future actions; that they share a portion of chips rather 
than ordering separately.  
  
At lines 4-6 Jamie responds with an account; ‘↓b’cause I dont want 
chips!↓’. Bolden and Robinson (2011) note that in third-turn position account 
solicitors may upgrade their challenging stance in a variety of ways. As chips 
are part of the meal that Jamie is currently eating her claim that she doesn’t 
want chips is open to challenge. In the second TCU she heads off this 
challenge as she formulates an alternative ‘want’ ‘↑ri:ce↑ chips and 
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gravy,’ a specific meal which is typically served in one tray from chip shops in 
northern England. While chips form part of this meal, this is built as contrastive 
with the course of action prescribed by Don. This contrast, and the 
reasonableness of the accountable item, is further emphasised in the final TCU 
‘he don’t like gravy I don’t like plain chips.’.  
 
Here, the use of an ‘I want’ format pre-empts and heads off a further challenge. 
By delivering the rejection of Don’s proposal in the first TCU, the likelihood of a 
response in the form of a further challenge is decreased. The ‘I want’ format 
displays entitlement to decide on what food should be purchased while the 
subsequent accounts display the reasoning behind this. We can note then that 
this formulation of Jamie’s wants is “is organised to undermine or reject an 
alternative” (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 3), namely the proposal that one 
portion of chips be bought in future.  
 
The next case illustrates how account solicitors may orient to a statement 
regarding what one does not want as insufficient and may upgrade their 
challenge in third turn position, and how the two-part structure may work to 
head off a further challenge. The topic of talk is the date on which the couple, 
Tim and Marian, will get married. Marian has been at pains to persuade Tim to 
get married within the next few months, during the filming of the documentary 
series in which the family are taking part. Immediately preceding the start of the 
extract Tim has stated that he ‘doesn’t fancy getting married just yet’, citing 
their current living circumstances (the couple live with Marian’s parents) and 
lack of resources to decorate a flat a reason for waiting. 
 
Extract 7.6 TF1974 16:59 
01  Mar: [((looks directly at Tim))        ] 
02  Mar: [s::o, yer gonna make a da:te then] 
03   Tim: ((looks at Marian and shakes head while speaking))  
04   Tim: YEAH BUT IT WONT BE IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THOUGH-  
05   TWO OR THREE MONTHS=.  
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06   Mar: =*why no::t* 
07   → Tim: I DON’T ↓WA:NNA GET MARRIED IN THE NEXT TWO OR     
08   →  ↓↓THREE MONTHS. 
09  Mar: ↑WHY: NO:T↑  
10   → Tim: just don’t wa:nt to:. 
11   Mar: WHY  
12   Tim: °well why shoul[d I]° 
13   Mar:                [ (j]ust cause she said-) WHY   
14   SHOULDN’T YOU: 
15   (0.2) 
16 →  Tim: >>well I just do::n’t want to get married in the  
17   next two or three mo:nths.<< 
18   Mar: wh:y not 
19 →  Tim: ah don’t know, I just don’t want to I just want to  
20   wai:t, and get everything done. (.) in this time you 
21   ca:nt do anything in [seven weeks ti:me     ] 
22  Mar:                      [(you- you don’t)   kno]w that  
23  Tim: I do:: love.  
24  Mar: [no you don’t.  ] 
25  Mar: [((shakes head))] 
 
In the turn at line 2, Marian proposes that Tim will set a date for the wedding. 
Note that ‘so’ is regularly used by speakers to introduce a formulation of what 
previously has been said. The turn initial ‘so’ then, implies that Tim may have 
already agreed to do so. Tim subsequently confirms that a date will be set but 
rejects the notion that this will be within the next two or three months, during 
the timeframe which is preferable to Marian. Marian subsequently challenges 
this timeframe using a why-formatted account solicitation (Bolden & Robinson, 
2011) ‘=*why no::t*’. Tim responds with a defensive account at lines 7-8, 
claiming a desire not to do so. This response is treated as insufficient as 
Marian deletes the turn with an exact repeat of her turn at line 6, which is 
delivered with raised volume (line 9). Although it has been suggested that 
speakers treat one another as possessing specific rights to narrate their own 
experiences (Pomerantz, 1980) this is clearly not the case here as there is 
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disagreement regarding the sufficiency of ‘not wanting’ to do something as an 
account for not doing so.  
  
There is then a series of further account solicitations (lines 11 & 13) and 
rejections (lines 10, 12, 15) as Marian continues to challenge Tim. In his turn at 
lines 18-20 Tim delivers the two-part structure. In the first TCU he refutes the 
notion that he wants to get married in the next few months ‘ah don’t know, 
I just don’t want to’. Notably, throughout the sequence Tim’s claim to 
not want to get married in the next few months (lines 7-8, 10) have been 
treated as insufficient. If Tim were to leave it at this it is expectable that a 
further challenge would be forthcoming. In the second TCU the likelihood of a 
further challenge is decreased as Tim formulates a ‘want’ which contrasts with 
the projected action of getting married during the next few months ‘I just 
want to wai:t, and get everything done.’. He adds an incremental 
(Schegloff, 2000, as cited in Schegloff, 2007) instalment to this account ‘you 
ca:nt do anything in seven weeks ti:me’ which justifies the 
reasonableness of the projected action of waiting. Again we can see that the 
trajectory of the ongoing sequence is successfully shifted as Marian orients to 
and deals with the second TCU ‘(you- you don’t)know that’ (clearly, 
however, Tim is not completely off the hook as the topic of the date of marriage 
is pursued further!).   
 
In this section, I examined speakers uses of ‘I don’t want X, I just want Y’ to 
reject some proposal regarding their actions. I identified two subsets which are 
directives, the prototypical format for directing another’s behaviour, and 
account solicitations. Research has shown that when speakers defy directives, 
directors typically respond with a second directive which upgrades director’s 
entitlement (Craven & Potter, 2010). Similarly, account solicitors may upgrade 
their challenge in third position (Bolden & Robinson, 2011). The use of a two 
part structure in which speakers first reject the preceding turn and then 
proceed to formulate an alternative sense of agency shifts the trajectory of the 
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ongoing sequence and decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third 
position.  
 
3.0 Following a formulation of actions or motivations  
 
In this section the analysis focuses on speakers’ use of the two part structure 
to refute a formulation of their actions or intentions, as in extract 7.7 ‘you’re 
not starting a fi:ght now are you Jane’. When the structure is 
deployed in this environment speakers first deny the complained-of action and 
then proceed to formulate an alternative, restricted sense of agency. The 
minimiser ‘just’ is a key response feature of these sequences (as in ‘I just 
want my clo:thes ba:ck.’) as this implies that speakers motivations are 
restricted and that they do not intend to do anything more.  
 
Consider the example in extract 7.7. The topic of talk between Jane and Emily 
is a missing jumper belonging to Jane that Emily has allegedly been seen 
wearing. Prior to the beginning of the extract Emily has repeatedly denied this.  
 
Extract 7.7 2008E6 12:48 
01  Emi: it’s not your jumpe:r  
02    (1.0) 
03   Jan: ↑well that’s funny cause my jumper’s gone         
04   missing and you::’re seen wearing one that looks  
05   exactly like my jumper 
06   Sim: ((putting papers away in the dining room)) 
07 →   Sim: you’re not starting a fi:ght now are you Jane  
08  Jan: ((walks into dining room towards Simon)) 
09 →  Jan: I’m not tryna’ start a fi:ght I just want my     
10   clo:thes ba:ck.  
11   Sim: what’s happened no:w 
12   Jan: ((hold arm out, pointing towards living room)) 
13   Jan: well there’s pictures of he:r on facebook, wearing  
14   all my clo:thes! 
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15   | (1.5)            | 
16   Sim: |((folds up plastic bag))| 
17   Sim: °how do you kno:w° 
18    (.) 
19   Sim: well- whu- d’you don’t wanna go there now do you  
20  Jan: [((leans on chair and pushes it further under the       
21   table))                  ] 
22   Jan: [whe:n do I go there then] 
 
As the extract begins Jane proclaims emphatically ‘↑well that’s funny↑ 
cause my jumper’s gone missing and you::’re seen wearing 
one that looks exactly like my jumper’. At this Simon, who is in the 
next room, accuses Jane of ‘starting a fi:ght’.  There are several design 
features of Simon’s turn at line 7 which evidence the turn’s challenging status. 
First, as a negative interrogative, Jane is heavily held accountable as the turn 
can be heard as assertive rather than questioning (Heritage, 2002). Second, 
the choice of lexical description constructs Jane’s actions as antagonistic 
(‘fi:ght’) as well as intentional, unprovoked and unjustified (‘starting’). 
Finally, as well as specifying Jane, rather than Emily as the recipient, the turn 
terminal address term works to underscore Jane as the antagonist as well as 
personal concern for the problem (Lerner, 2003). In sum, the turn can be heard 
as accusatory as Simon formulates Jane’s actions as intentionally starting a 
fight. To deny this accusation Jane deploys an ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ 
structure (line 9). First she delivers a typical ‘didn’t do it’ denial. Research has 
shown that when speakers simply deny a complained-of action, co-interactants 
respond with a further assertion of the complained-of action (Dersley & 
Wootton, 2000). Thus leaving it at this would leave the turn susceptible to 
challenge. The likelihood of this challenge is decreased as Jane formulates an 
alternative motivation which contrasts with ‘starting a fi:ght’ which is ‘I 
just want my clo:thes ba:ck.’. Here the minimiser ‘just’ is a key 
component, highlighting that Jane’s intentions are restricted to obtaining her 
clothes and hence do not include ‘starting a fi:ght’. Note that the choice 
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of noun, ‘clo:thes’ deletes the specific relevance of the jumper and in 
generalising constructs this as a matter of principle rather than an isolated, 
specific, battle. As someone whose ‘clothes’ have been taken by another, 
Jane’s requests for them back are hardly compatible with the intentional, 
unjustified act of ‘starting a fi:ght’.  We can also note that as the denial 
is delivered in the first TCU, a response to this is less immediately relevant. 
Jane could conceivably have built the turn as ‘I just want my clothes back, I’m 
not trying to start a fight’. Notably, none of the two-part structures in the data 
corpus are built in this manner. 
 
Consider another example, which is extract 7.8. Here the topic of talk is an 
upcoming party for Jane’s fortieth birthday which falls on the same weekend as 
Mother’s Day. Earlier in the day Emily, Jane’s daughter, announced that she 
will be working all weekend and will be unable to spend time with the family. 
Prior to the beginning of the extract Jane has announced that she is getting 
‘fed up of the whole weekend’ (data not shown).  
 
Extract 7.8 TF2008 1 31:50  
01  Jan:  [((gestures with hands))             ] 
02  Jan: [what have you a:sked people to bring]  
03    (0.4) 
04  Sim: they could bringi:ng, (0.2) wh(h)y are you £worried 
05   about it£ 
06    (0.4) 
07  Jan: [((gestures with hands)) ] 
08  Jan: [well c’z I’m just wondering what foo:d you’re gonna 
09   do                       ]  
10    (.) 
11 → Sim: ↑do:n’t worry abou:t it↑ 
12 → Jan: I’m not worried about it I just* want* to know what 
13   it IS.   
14    (0.5) 
15  Sim: [((shakes head slightly))     ] 
16  Sim: [↑what are you worried↑ about¿] 
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17    (0.2) 
18  Sim: >>whuh-uh<< I’m not gonna poison anybody don’t  
19   worry, 
 
My argument is that Jane’s ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ construction undermines 
and rejects Simon’s ascription of her as ‘worried’. In his turn at lines 4-5 Simon 
treats Jane’s ‘wh’ interrogative, regarding the food which will be at the party 
(line 2), as a challenge (Koshik, 2003, 2005).  He begins to provide a relevant 
response (‘they could bringi:ng,’) and then abandons this in favour of 
soliciting an account using a ‘why’ formatted interrogative, challenging the 
grounds for her enquiry. Jane’s subsequent reformulation of her enquiries as a 
normative action (‘I’m just wondering what foo:d you’re gonna 
do’), again minimised with ‘just’, is rejected as Simon persists with his 
formulation of Jane as ‘worried’ as he instructs her to desist in doing so 
(‘↑do:n’t worry abou:t it↑’). Although the turn at lines 4-5 is delivered 
partly in ‘smiley’ voice, as Simon is responsible for arranging the party the turns 
at lines 4-5 and 11 can be heard as complaint implicative. Jane’s deployment 
of the target turn ‘I’m not worried about it I just* want* to 
know what it IS.’ counters and rejects Simon’s formulation of her as 
‘worried’. As a ‘didn’t do it’ denial (Dersley & Wootton, 2000) the first TCU in 
itself is open to challenge. This challenge is headed off in the second part of 
the turn as Jane formulates an alternative motivation- that she just wants to 
know what it (the food) is. Wanting to know what food will be provided at her 
upcoming milestone birthday party does not equate to ‘worrying’. It is notable 
that this is the third revised question regarding the party food. The ‘I want’ 
format embodies high entitlement and strongly projects a relevant response 
which further decreases the likelihood of a further accusation.  
 
In the previous two excerpts, the two-part structure was built using the verb 
‘want’. In the next case, taken from the Potts corpus, Judy first rejects Don’s 
formulation of her actions and proceeds to formulate an alternative using the 
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verb ‘interested’. This eloquently shows the rhetorical work done by the 
selection of a particular mental state term.  
 
Extract 7.9 Potts 6 11:00 
01  Jud: David an Tommy,  
02  Way: |((continues chewing))| 
03   | (3.0)         | 
04  Jud: °and whose the sixth one° 
05  Jud: |((looks at Wayne))| 
06   | (2.4)       | 
07  Don: would you li:v the lad alo:ne to eat his  
08   (.) [ b]loody tea,  (([c]ough)) 
09  Way: [((scratches face, looks at Judy))] 
10  Way: [↑he[rm]↑          e:r[m],        ] 
11    Don: >spedda gi<- instead giving him the bloody (0.7)  
12   Spanish inquisition¿  
13   Jud: [((looks at Don))                    ] 
14    Jud: [↑shu:! I were making conversa:tion.↑] 
15    Way: not allo:wed  
16   conver[sation about [someone        els]e’s]  
17   children 
18   Way:                     [((glances at camera)) ] 
19   →   Don:       [yeah but yer juss spyi:ng on him] 
20   →    Jud: ↑↑I’m no:t spying↑ I’m just interested who he’s  
21   ou- who he’s bin ou:t with.↑ 
22    (1.2)  
23    Jam: Bob Marley.  
24    (1.6) 
25  Jud: say nowt then,  
26  Don: has he got his wai:lers the:re 
  
The topic of talk immediately preceding the extract is what Wayne has been 
doing, and with whom, while he was away from the house. We can begin by 
noting that the sequence contains a series of formulations and reformulations 
of Judy’s actions. In the first TCU at lines 7-8 Don accuses Judy of preventing 
 229
Wayne from being able to eat his ‘tea’ (a term used to denote an evening 
meal), implying that her questions concerning with whom he has been 
spending time are illegitimate and overbearing. He then formulates her 
questions as ‘giving him the bloody (0.7) Spanish 
inquisition¿’. This idiomatic expression highlights the extreme and 
complainable nature of Judy’s actions while moving to close the topic (Drew & 
Holt, 1988). At line 14 Judy emphatically rejects Don’s implied accusation that 
her questioning is illegitimate by delivering a ‘didn’t do it’ denial (Dersley & 
Wootton, 2000). Notably this is delegitimized by Wayne as he invokes the 
presence of the recording equipment as a basis for not talking about ‘someone 
else’s children’ (i.e. with whom Wayne has been spending time). Judy’s 
denial is also emphatically rejected by Don as he cuts into Wayne’s turn with a 
further accusation  ‘yeah but yer juss spyi:ng on him’.  
 
In the target turn Judy first denies this accusation ‘↑↑I’m no:t spying↑’ 
and proceeds to reformulate her actions ‘I’m just interested who he’s 
ou- who he’s bin ou:t with.↑’. The second TCU removes the 
problematic, specific characterisation of what kind of conversation is taking 
place as Judy invokes her intentional states and reformulates her enquiries as 
a normative action. There are two things to note about this sequence. First, 
following a second assertion of the complained-of action by Don, Judy heads 
off further pursuit by formulating a mental state; ‘interested’. In this instance 
this is successful as following a lapse in the conversation (line 22) Jamie offers 
an ironic candidate answer ‘Bob Marley.’ which is further developed by Don 
(‘has he got his wai:lers the:re’). A second observation is Judy’s 
careful characterisation of her actions as she formulates the object of her 
‘interest’ as a way of managing an interactional dispute regarding motivation. 
Note the self repair at lines 20-21, as the projected ‘who he’s out with’ which 
would suggest an ongoing, perhaps overbearing and illegitimate interest, is 
replaced with ‘who he’s bin ou:t with.↑’, specifying that her interest 
applies in this instance only. Also note that the choice of lexical description 
 230
‘interested’ is devoid of any notion of monitoring or ‘spying’. ‘Wanting’ to 
know something invokes personal investment and a perhaps illegitimate 
interest, which is precisely the type of interest which the turn is working to 
refute. In contrast the term ‘interested’ is devoid of any notion of spying and 
orients to the topic of conversation, with whom Wayne has been spending time, 
as Wayne’s business. While being ‘interested’ in what one’s child has been up 
to is a legitimate action for a mother to be doing, ‘wanting’ to know and having 
a personal investment in doing so, may not be. We can see then that the 
choice of lexical description, Judy’s formulation of her actions as 
‘interested’ is sequentially specific and is a practical expression which is 
delivered within a sequential flow of interactional considerations.  
 
In sum, in this section I have shown how, following a formulation of their 
actions, speakers may respond by first delivering a ‘didn’t do it denial’ (Dersley 
& Wootton, 2000) and then proceeding to formulate an alternative sense of 
agency. The interactional import of the ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ structure in this 
environment is to decrease the likelihood of accusers responding with a further 
assertion of the complained-of action in third turn position.  
 
4.0 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has examined a two-part structure in which speakers formulate 
their ‘wants’ ‘I don’t want/I’m not X, I want Y’. I identified two recurrent 
environments in which speakers deploy these this structure. The first of these 
is to a reject a proposal made by an interlocutor regarding the speakers’ 
actions. The second is to undermine and refute a formulation of the speakers’ 
intentions and motivations.  
 
I began by examining speakers’ uses of the device to reject a proposal 
regarding their actions. I identified two types of turns which precede these 
constructions, these being directives, which are the prototypical action for 
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directing another’s actions, and account solicitations which embody a proposal 
regarding the recipient’s future actions. Typically when recipients refuse to 
comply with directives, directors respond by delivering a second directive which 
upgrades the director’s entitlement to deliver the directive and reduces the 
contingencies relevant to the recipient’s compliance (Craven & Potter, 2010). 
Similarly, in third position account solicitors may upgrade the challenging 
stance towards the accountable item (Bolden & Robinson 2011). Speakers 
may conceivably respond by delivering the first part of the structure only. 
However doing so would leave these turns open to challenge. The use of a 
two-part structure in which speakers first reject the directive or proposal and 
then proceed to formulate an alternative, contrasting ‘want’ works to decrease 
the likelihood of further challenge. This is realised in two ways. First, when 
responding to multiunit turns, speakers normatively respond to the final TCU 
(Schegloff, 2007). Delivering a rejection in the first TCU decreases the 
likelihood of further challenge. Second, the formulation of an alternative sense 
of agency highlights that rather than carry out the proposed action, speakers 
are motivated to do some other thing.  
 
This chapter extends our understanding of sequences in which some aspect of 
another’s conduct is specified by examining speakers’ deployment of the two-
part structure to reject a proposal, realised by directives or account 
solicitations, made by an interlocutor regarding their actions. Typically when 
respondents deliver non-aligning responses to directives or account 
solicitations this response is challenged in third turn position (Craven & Potter, 
2010; Bolden & Robinson, 2011). The use of the ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ 
structure decreases the likelihood of challenge by formulating an alternative 
sense of agency. The formulation of an alternative motivation in the second 
TCU is a key feature of these sequences as this further decreases the 
likelihood of subsequent challenge.  
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In section 4 I examined speakers uses of the structure to reject a formulation of 
their motivations delivered in the preceding turn. This chapter extends our 
understanding of complaint sequences by examining one practice for 
responding to a compliant implicative accusation regarding an interlocutor’s 
actions. My analysis shows that complaint recipients may decrease the 
likelihood of further challenge in third turn position by first rejecting the 
formulation and proceeding to formulate and alternative motivation in the 
second TCU. Two features of ‘I’m not X, I just want Y’ constructions work in 
combination to head off a potential further challenge. First, speakers formulate 
an alternative sense of agency which implies that as speakers are motivated to 
do one thing, they are not motivated to do anything more. Second, the 
formulation of an alternative sense of agency in the second TCU following a 
rejection decreases the likelihood of a further challenge in third turn position.  
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8 
 
 Discussion 
 
This chapter is the concluding discussion. Before considering the areas to 
which the thesis may contribute and future research directions I begin by 
summarising the key themes and arguments of each chapter and begin to 
discuss the implications of the thesis for work in social cognition, in particular 
that which is carried out under the rubric of Theory of Mind.  
 
1.0 Thesis summary 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
This short chapter introduced the research topic. I briefly outlined work in 
Theory of Mind as I discussed the main themes and aims of the thesis. The 
introduction also included an overview of the chapters to follow.  
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
This chapter provided a review of the literature relevant to the thesis. I began 
by discussing two areas of cognitive research, those of Theory of Mind and 
mainstream approaches to emotion. From this I introduced social 
constructionist and conversation analytic approaches to emotion and cognition 
as alternative ways of understanding human actions. Here I highlighted the 
theoretical and methodological problems which are inherent in approaches 
which begin with the fundamental assumption that the ability to understand 
others’ mental states is a prerequisite for participation in social interaction. In 
the second part of the review I surveyed work in the sociology of childhood, in 
particular work in CA which has examined children’s conversational repair skills 
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and the sequential organisation of children’s requests. I then discussed 
sociolinguistic and discursive work on requests and accounts. The work 
surveyed in parts 1 and 2 sets each of the analytic chapters in context. In the 
final part of the chapter I discussed in detail the approach of discursive 
psychology including the main theoretical influences of ethnomethodology, 
conversation analysis and the sociology of scientific knowledge. I discussed 
the theoretical issues which arise from using a discursive perspective to 
examine mental state talk, and outlined the approach of epistemological 
constructionism which informs the analysis. Finally, I discussed work within 
interaction analysis which may be described as ‘anti-cognitivist’. Specifically, I 
introduced the body of work in CA which has developed a sustained critique of 
Theory of Mind.  
 
Chapter 3: Method  
 
This chapter discussed the methodological procedures and practicalities of the 
thesis. The chapter began by introducing the dataset and discussing the 
advantages and limitations of each corpus of data. Reactivity to the presence 
of recording equipment and the use of media data which was produced for a 
viewing audience were key issues that were discussed. It was recommended 
that the data for the thesis should be understood as ‘naturalistic’ rather than 
‘natural’. I then outlined the steps involved in recording, transcribing and 
analysing the materials.  
 
Chapter 4: Want as an interactional resource 
 
This chapter marked the beginning of the analysis. I began at a basic level and 
focussed on ‘I want’ constructions as an interactional resource. I examined how 
speakers construct their wants (I want X) and the wants of others (you want X) 
in talk and outlined some of the conversational activities in which these 
constructions are involved.  
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The chapter began by discussing experimental tasks which are designed to 
assess children’s understandings of ‘desires’, the assumptions embodied in 
this work and associated theoretical and methodological problems. The 
subsequent analysis showed that the assumptions embodied in this work are 
inherently problematic. First, I showed how the assumption that ‘wanting’ is a 
sufficient basis for acting is somewhat speculative. Participants in these tasks 
(which are based on the classic false belief test) are required to predict 
characters’ actions based on information regarding the characters’ ‘desires’. An 
‘incorrect’ prediction is assumed to reflect an inability to recognise that others 
may have desires which differ from one’s own, and to appreciate the subjective 
nature of desires. The analysis in this chapter showed how young children 
often use ‘I want’ to build requests. As an action, requesting may be defined as 
asking for something to be given or done. Hence the very act of requesting 
presupposes that permission, assistance or agreement is required for the 
request to be carried out. Otherwise, one would simply carry out the projected 
action. I also showed how expressions of ‘wanting’ often occur in relation to, in 
the service of, interactions involving obligations and constraints. Hence, that 
individuals proceed and act in a manner which is consistent with the fulfilment 
of their ‘desires’ is a departure from what goes on during the course of our 
everyday lives and a gross simplification of the meaning of ‘wanting’ for both 
children and adults.  
 
In the second part of the analysis I illustrated further what is meant by 
considering ‘wants’ as embedded within various conversational activities as I 
introduced the kinds of activities in which ‘I want’ and ‘you want’ are involved. 
Specifically, I showed how speakers recurrently use a ‘you want X’ structure to 
convey a challenging stance towards a recipient’s actions, how speakers use ‘I 
don’t want X’ to implement rejections and refusals and how speakers may 
provide accounts for their actions using ‘because I want X’.  
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In sum, the analysis in this chapter showed that rather than the communication 
of a private mental state, claims regarding ‘wants’ are practical expressions 
that work within a sequential flow of interactional and deontic considerations. 
That individuals recurrently make claims regarding their wants in the service of 
interactions involving obligations and constraints has implications for the 
assumption that individuals act in ways which are consistent with the fulfilment 
of their ‘wants’.  
 
Chapter 5: Children’s wants 
 
The second analytical chapter builds on the first and takes the analysis further, 
examining in detail the sequential environments in which children build 
requests using ‘I want’. The analysis focussed on two main environments 
which are; 1) when there is some basis in the preceding interaction for the child 
to suppose that the request will not be granted, 2) when there is some basis for 
the child to suppose that the request will be granted. I began by discussing 
work in Theory of Mind which examines children’s talk and has developed 
coding systems to identify genuine references to desire as distinct from uses 
which are behavioural, such as particular types of requests. Within this work, 
references that are coded as behavioural are dismissed as uninteresting and 
disregarded for the purposes of analysis. I argue that rather than making 
guesses about which uses of ‘I want’ refer to putative mental states, all uses of 
‘I want’ may be fruitfully examined as performing actions in the service of 
sequentially unfolding social interaction.  
 
Chapter 6: Directing and requesting  
 
In this chapter the analysis examined adult speakers’ uses of ‘I want you to X’, 
‘you need to X’ and ‘I need X’ to implement directives and requests. I examined 
one recurrent environment in which speakers use ‘I want you to X’ to deliver 
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directives which is when the proposed action is something which is the 
recipient’s business, something within the recipient’s sphere of action rather 
than a request on the speakers’ behalf such as for assistance or permission, 
and when the directive is future oriented and makes relevant a commitment to 
a future activity rather than immediate, embodied compliance. The analysis 
then moved on to examine speakers’ deployment of ‘you need to X’ to deliver 
directives. I showed how this format allows speakers to maintain civil relations 
with recipients by officially, formally avoiding telling them what to do. Finally I 
examined speakers’ use of ‘I need’ to implement requests. I showed how 
speakers routinely deliver ‘I need’ formatted requests following a request or 
directive from an interlocutor to introduce a prerequisite to compliance. Here 
the action import of the ‘I need’ format is to delay the production of the relevant 
SPP while maintaining alignment with one’s co-interactant. Traditionally, 
‘wanting’ something is associated with a desire, while ‘needing’ may be thought 
to refer to a class of objects which are necessary for some function, rather than 
merely desired (Oxford English Dictionary, online). The important point raised 
by the analysis was that rather than simply using ‘I want’ to express an 
individual desire, or ‘need’ being an intrinsic feature of the requested object, 
these terms have specific practical uses in their normative sequential 
environments. Claiming to want or to need something then, is entirely a social 
matter, as invocations of ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ are sequentially organised and 
may be deployed in the service of particular conversational activities.  
 
Chapter 7: “I’m not X, I just want Y” 
 
In the final analytic chapter I focussed on two environments in which speakers 
use ‘I want’ constructions, which are as part of a two-part structure used to 
reject a formulation of their motivations or a proposal regarding their actions 
made by an interlocutor. In the first part of the structure speakers deliver a 
rejection (I’m not/I don’t want X) and in the second TCU formulate an 
alternative motivation (I want Y). The implications of this two-part structure are 
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that as the speaker is motivated and ‘wants’ to do one thing, they are not 
motivated to do anything more or to engage in a proposed action. The 
important point is that speakers may formulate an intention during the course of 
a conversation to achieve a particular rhetorical effect. Rather than a priori 
entities which cause actions, the analysis shows how speakers formulate 
intentions to attend to considerations which are live in an interactional 
sequence.  
 
2.0 Contributions of the thesis 
 
This study provides new insights for the fields of DP, CA, social and 
developmental psychology. The analytic chapters describe the sequential 
nature of invocations of ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ in both adult-adult and child-adult 
interaction. The study draws on the methods of DP and CA to offer a radical 
new way of examining what it means to ‘want’ or to ‘need’ something in 
interactional terms. Following the pioneering work of Edwards (1997) and 
Edwards and Potter (1992), I have examined naturalistic everyday interaction 
between families and have shown how claims regarding ‘wants’ and ‘needs’ 
are managed within a sequential flow of interactional considerations. In each of 
the 4 subsections below I discuss ways in which the thesis could contribute to 
existing work in developmental psychology, sociology, interaction analysis and 
systems family therapy.  
 
2.1 Developmental psychology: Theory of Mind  
 
The thesis makes a major contribution to studies of social cognition in 
developmental psychology. How children come to participate in social 
interaction is currently studied under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which has 
been discussed at length within various chapters. This theory is couched in a 
Cartesian view of individual, isolated minds which are faced with the task of 
‘figuring out’ the contents of other individual minds. The theory that children 
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come to understand the contents of others minds by using processes akin to 
scientific theory formation is a fundamental assumption of work in 
developmental psychology and has been adopted by researchers in clinical 
settings. For example a proposed Theory of Mind deficit is fundamental in 
theories of autism and has been implicated in explanations of schizophrenia.  
 
It was noted in chapter 2 that there is a long standing, intense debate regarding 
the processes through which children acquire a Theory of Mind. It has been 
suggested that the resolution of this issue would help settle the debate 
between two of the main theoretical perspectives, the ‘Theory-Theory’ and the 
Modular Theory (Wellman, 2010). ‘Beliefs’, ‘desires’ and ‘intentions’ are 
traditionally understood as individual, discrete entities which creates the 
problem of how children learn to ‘read other minds’. This ‘mind reading’ ability 
is understood as a prerequisite to successful participation in social interaction. 
Drawing on existing discursive research and following the analysis here I argue 
that researchers should take a different approach to this topic. The thesis offers 
a new way of understanding ‘wants’ as interactional concepts rather than 
private, individual entities. What speakers state that they ‘want’ and claim that 
others ‘want’ are sequentially specific constructions which work within a flow of 
interactional considerations. These constructions are bound up with a diverse 
range of conversational activities such as making a request, telling someone to 
do something and refuting a formulation of one’s actions. The important point is 
that the problem is not one of how the child develops an innate ability to ‘read 
minds’ but of how individuals participate in social interaction. Speakers do not 
need to construct theories to read the minds of others as interaction is a social 
matter. Regardless of what a speaker may be thinking or feeling, the thesis has 
shown that speakers state what they ‘want’ in specific sequential contexts to 
accomplish particular actions. There is no need for theory construction to 
bridge the gap between isolated, individual minds as what is currently viewed 
as a ‘psychological’ matter becomes an interactional one.  
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Chapter 7 ‘I’m not X, I want Y’ has specific implications for the notion that 
intentional action is an outcome of an individual’s desires and beliefs. 
Intentions, the product of beliefs and desires, are considered to be a priori 
cognitive entities that are expressed through communication. Motivation is 
understood as a causal determinant of action. The analysis in chapter 7 
focussed on speakers’ formulations of their wants and motivations to account 
for their actions in two specific sequential environments. The first of these is 
following a proposal regarding their future actions. The second of these is to 
refute a formulation of their motivations in the prior turn. I showed how 
speakers’ formulations of their ‘wants’ decreases the likelihood of further 
challenge in third-turn position. Rather than descriptions of a priori motivational 
states, then, these are best understood as sequentially specific formulations 
which perform a particular conversational action, namely to undermine and 
reject an alternative that is alive in the current interaction.  
 
In sum, the thesis has broad implications for the question of how children come 
to participate in social interaction. Rather than constructing a theory to bridge 
the gap between minds and being faced with “a referential challenge” 
(Slaughter, Peterson & Carpenter, 2009, p. 1058) as the child faces the 
impossible problem of learning how to accurately categorise and describe 
“internal, unobservable mental states” (ibid.) we can instead consider 
formulating ‘wants’ as an interactional activity. This understanding of mental 
state terms as resources which may be used to perform a range of actions 
takes us away from the view of isolated minds which are faced with the task of 
mapping mental state terms onto internal referents. Mental state terms are no 
longer understood as names which develop in language to denote private 
entities but as concepts which emerge as part of the child’s interactional 
repertoire. Rather than ask how does the child learn to read the minds of 
others? We should instead turn our attention to understanding how the child 
participates in social interaction. This removes the need for theory construction, 
the operational definition of variables and attempts to pinpoint the precise 
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moment at which the child shifts to a representational Theory of Mind, as 
understanding others is an interactional, public and visible matter.  
 
2.2 The sociology of childhood  
 
The thesis contributes to the body of work in The Sociology of Childhood by 
examining children’s interactional competencies. Specifically, I extended the 
work of Wootton and showed how selection of request format is governed by 
sequential considerations. There is a growing body of work in CA which comes 
under the rubric of The Sociology of Childhood, which examines children’s 
social interactional skills. This thesis offers a unique approach by doing a DP 
analysis. Hence, as well as contributing to the body of work which examines 
the sequential organisation of children’s request formats, the study offers a 
radical new perspective on what it means to ‘want’ something in interactional 
terms. The idea that desire is central to cognition is fundamental in both 
psychoanalytic and philosophical theorising (Raphael-Leff, 2010). That the 
child is absorbed with his or her own desires and intentions to act is one 
explanation of the ‘terrible-two’s’ (Travis & Brown, 2011). The thesis offers a 
technical, formal understanding of the meaning, for children and for parents, of 
what it means to ‘want’. As ‘wants’ and ‘desires’ occupy a central place in 
understandings of children’s development the empirical account of what is 
involved when children state that they ‘want’ something is fundamental and 
furthers our understandings of family interaction and socialisation.  
 
2.3 Work on social interaction: Discursive psychology and conversation 
analysis 
 
The thesis contributes to research in CA which has examined the construction 
and sequential organisation of request and directive formats. I showed how 
speakers may preface deferred action directives with ‘I want’ as a way of 
managing the contingencies involved in directing someone on something which 
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is their business when one will not be present to monitor or control whether the 
projected action will be carried out. The analysis also examined how speakers 
may select ‘need’ as a transitive verb in request sequences to introduce a 
precondition to compliance with a base FPP, delaying the production of a 
relevant SPP while maintaining alignment. The thesis also adds to the body of 
DP and CA literature on accounts, rejections and refusals by identifying a two-
part structure ‘I don’t want X, I want Y’ which speakers may use to refute a 
formulation of their actions or to reject a proposal regarding their future actions.  
 
2.4 Systems family therapy 
 
The thesis’s focus on invocations of ‘wanting’, morality and constraints and 
obligations may have important implications for family therapy practices. In 
family therapy, narrative and social constructionist approaches have become 
increasingly popular (Carr, 2009). For example, systemic family therapy is 
grounded in Gergen’s relational social constructionism and frames 
understanding of the individual in the context of their most intimate 
relationships, and aims to integrate family relationships directly into therapeutic 
intervention (Flaskas, 2009). An important theme in narrative therapy, which 
also draws heavily on relational constructionism, is narrative coherence, the 
idea that individuals’ narratives and stories about their lives should ‘fit’ with 
other parts and that the emotions an individual shows in relation to their story 
should be congruent and fit with the story (Flaskas, 2009). The analysis in the 
thesis has implications for this and suggests that therapists’ focus on narrative 
congruence may be problematic as individuals are seen as creating their own 
story in isolation and communicating their emotions about their story, rather 
than being understood as producing a conversational account in interaction 
with therapists. Although family therapy draws increasingly on constructivist 
thinking and sees the person as emerging in relationships with others, there is 
no empirical work which examines the minutiae of interaction between family 
 243
members. The thesis addresses this by offering a formal account of what it 
means to ‘want’ something in interactional terms, for both adults and children.  
 
3.0 Future research implications 
 
The thesis is primarily concerned with the interactive uses of the term ‘want’ 
which restricted the potential to explore other interesting avenues and themes 
which emerged during analysis. One such theme would be to explore the 
interactive uses of mental state expressions of ‘belief’ such as think and know 
in children’s talk (see Kärkkäinen, 2003; 2006 on uses of I think in adult-adult 
talk). It was noted earlier in the thesis that there is keen debate concerning 
children’s acquisition of Theory of Mind. In particular, there is disagreement 
concerning whether children come to understand others in terms of their 
desires before they understand the concept of belief, or whether understanding 
of all mental states develops, or ‘comes online’ together. Children’s frequent 
use of the term ‘want’ before the use of terms such as ‘think’ and ‘know’ is cited 
as one form of evidence for this simple desire psychology. My argument is that 
rather than developing in language as name referring to a discrete experience 
of desire, the term ‘want’ has practical uses in particular sequential 
environments. In chapter 4 I showed how children may use ‘I want’ formatted 
requests to manage a range of interactional and deontic considerations. I 
argue that it is precisely for this reason then, that ‘want’ is used more frequently 
than terms such as ‘think’ and ‘know’. Requesting is a common conversational 
action, particularly in children’s talk as children are dependent on care-givers 
for permission and assistance with everyday activities. The analysis in chapter 
4 showed that for young children, this conversational activity makes relevant 
uses of ‘I want’. It would be interesting to examine the kinds of environments in 
which, and for which purposes, children use terms of ‘belief’.  
 
At this point we can note that one limitation of the thesis is the use of edited 
media data. It was possible to identify where disruptions existed in the video 
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recordings and the extent to which these would impact on the analysis. 
However it was often the case that contextual information regarding what 
occurred earlier in interactions was not available. It is also the case that 
recordings were purposely selected by the production team for broadcast. 
During data collection I attempted to contact the producers of TF2008 to gain 
access to unedited materials but this was not possible at the time. Gaining 
access to such material would be highly advantageous as an alternative to 
relying on recordings of family mealtimes. This thesis is a starting point and 
has shown the potential for extending research on family interaction to include 
data from alternative sources, such as media data.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Participant information sheet 
 
Family Interaction 
 
Participant information sheet 
 
 
Aims of the study.  
 
This research aims to investigate how families interact with each other during 
the course of their everyday lives. It will examine how basic conversational 
activities are done and how issues of family roles become live in interaction. It 
is hoped that the findings will address significant questions about how 
language is used in social situations, particularly in talk between parents and 
children.  
 
What does it involve?  
 
Your family will record family meal times using a video recorder. In addition an 
audio recorder will be placed in a room where the family regularly congregate 
together, such as the living room. You will switch the recorder on for as long as 
you are comfortable with it, to record ordinary family interactions. Do not worry 
if not all family members are present, or even if the recorder is running when 
the room is empty! The aim is for your family to be comfortable with the 
presence of the recorder as you go about your everyday lives. In general, try to 
disrupt your normal routines as little as possible. The research is interested in 
normal patterns of interaction. The recordings will be transcribed and analysed 
by the researcher to identify patterns of language use. This will form the basis 
of a report into how families converse, discussing the day, telling stories, 
offering advice and so on.  
 
What happens next?  
 
Initially I will meet with you and your family to discuss the procedure, answer 
any questions you may have, and do the paperwork. If you all agree to 
participate, I will then explain how to use the recorders and make sure all 
family members who may be present are comfortable with the procedure. 
 
I will leave the recorders with you to record approximately ten to fifteen meals 
and to record your everyday interactions as often as you are comfortable with. 
Which meals you record is entirely up to you – breakfasts, lunches, dinners are 
all suitable, as are snatched meals, everyday meals or special occasions. If for 
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whatever reason, you don’t feel like recording one day, then you do not have 
to. You have complete control over what data you hand over for analysis. If you 
subsequently decide that any of the recordings should not be in the data these 
will be deleted.  
 
When not to record:  
 
• When there are guests present please do not record as they will not 
have signed a consent form.  
 
After the recording period I will collect the recorder from you and begin to 
transcribe the recordings. At any point during this study, you have the right to 
withdraw and for your data to be destroyed. 
 
What will you do with my personal information?  
 
• Participants have full control of all data they submit to the researchers.  
• The recordings will be stored separately from any contact details.  
• Pseudonyms for names and places will be used on the transcripts. 
• All recordings and transcripts will be stored safely and securely for the 
duration of the study and for 10 years in the first instance following its 
conclusion. 
• If participants agree, their recordings will be donated to the DARG 
archives at Loughborough University Social Sciences Department for 
research and teaching purposes.  Data of this kind has allowed useful 
historical and cross cultural comparisons. However it is still possible to 
take part in the study without consenting to donate your data. 
Furthermore, all participants, child or adult, can request for their data to 
be deleted from this archive at any time in the future.  
• Participants can request access to recordings and transcripts of 
themselves.  
 
Want more information?  
 
Student researcher: Carrie Childs 
Degree course: PhD Social Psychology  
Department: Social Sciences 
Contact details: Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, 
Loughborough, LE11 3TU. c.childs@lboro.ac.uk   07745 638 790 
 
Project Supervisor: Professor Derek Edwards 
Department: Social Sciences.  
Contact details: Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, 
Loughborough, LE11 3TU. d.edwards@lboro.ac.uk  01509 222 544 
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Please contact me if at any time you have any queries or concerns regarding 
any aspect of this research.  
 
What if I am not happy with the way the research was conducted?  
 
The University has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle 
Blowing which is available online at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm   
 
Thank you for your interest in participating.  
 
Carrie Childs 
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Appendix B: Consent forms 
 
FAMILY INTERACTION 
WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE FORM  
FOR PARTICIPANTS UNDER 18 
 
 
 
Please tick the boxes and sign to say you understand and agree 
 
 
I understand why this study is being carried out and what I have been asked to do.   
 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about what I will be doing in the study. 
 
 
I understand that I do not have to take part in the study. 
 
 
I understand that I can stop being part of this study at any time for any reason, and 
that I do not have to explain why I want to stop.  
 
 
I agree to take part in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
                               Date ___ / ___ / ___ 
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FAMILY INTERACTION 
PARENTAL CONSENT FORM  
FOR PARTICIPANTS UNDER 18 
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
Please tick the boxes and sign to say you understand and agree 
 
 
I am the parent/guardian of (child’s name): _____________ (Child’s DOB): ___ / ___ / ___ 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I give permission for my 
child (name) _______________ to participate in this study. 
 
 
I understand that I can withdraw the child from the study at any point and that I do not have 
to provide a reason for withdrawing. 
 
 
I will allow the child to withdraw at any point if they wish to, without pressing them to remain 
in the study. 
 
 
 
Please state whether you agree to your child’s data being used for the 
following purposes 
 
I agree to my child’s data being used as part of a research project by the student researcher. 
  
I give my permission for the transcripts to be used in grant reports, research publications 
and presentations. 
 
 
I give my permission for the video data to be used in grant reports, research publications and 
presentations. 
 
 
I give my permission for the audio data to be used in grant reports, research publications and 
presentations. 
 
 
I give permission for my child’s data to be donated the Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric 
Group’s (DARG) archives at Loughborough University following the completion of this study. 
 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
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                               Date ___ / ___ / ___ 
 
FAMILY INTERACTION 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
FOR PARTICIPANTS OVER 18 
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
Please tick the boxes and sign to say you understand and agree 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that this 
study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been 
approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee. 
 
 
I have read and understood the participant information sheet and this consent form. 
  
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
  
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
  
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, 
and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence. 
  
I agree to participate in this study. 
  
 
Please state whether you agree to your data being used for any or all of the 
following purposes: 
 
I agree to my data being used as part of a research project by the student researcher. 
  
I give my permission for the transcripts to be used in grant reports, research publications and 
presentations. 
 
 
I give my permission for the video data to be used in grant reports, research publications and 
presentations. 
 
 
I give permission for my data to be donated the Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric Group’s 
(DARG) archives at Loughborough University following the completion of this study. 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
              Your signature 
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Signature of investigator 
 
 
                               Date ___ / ___ / ___ 
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Appendix C: Transcription notation 
 
The transcription system used is based on that developed by Gail Jefferson 
(see Atkinson & Heritage, 1984).  
(0.8)   Pauses are shown by the tenth of the second in brackets. 
(.)   A micropause, which is too short to measure.  
[  ]   Square brackets indicate the beginning and end of  
   overlapping speech.  
↓ ↑   Vertical arrows precede notable pitch changes.  
Underlining  Denotes emphasis- the location of underlining within a 
   word locates emphasis and also indicates how heavy it is.  
CAPITALS   Indicate words which are notably louder than the  
   surrounding speech.  
°i know°  Degree signs enclose words which are notably  
   quieter than the surrounding speech.  
I do::nt know  Colons indicate that the preceding sound is elongated. 
   More colons denote more elongation.  
hhhh   Outbreath. As with colons, this is proportionate.  
.hhhh   Inbreath, proportionate.  
really?  Question marks indicate a ‘questioning’ intonation.  
no.    A full stop denotes a falling intonation.  
no,    Commas mark weak rising intonation.  
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>really<  Arrow brackets enclose talk which is delivered at a notably 
   faster pace.  
<really>  Arrow brackets which point away from talk indicate that 
   speech is delivered at a notably slower pace.  
heh heh  Laughter.  
st(h)o(h)p i(h)t h’s in brackets signals laughter within speech.  
£   Denotes ‘smiley voice’.  
bu-u-   Hyphens indicate a ‘cut off’ of the preceding sound.  
(guess)  Words within round brackets indicate uncertain  
   transcription.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
